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The Most Dangerous Branch of Science?
Reining in Rogue Research and Reckless
Experimentation in Social Services
James G. Dwyer*

ABSTRACT
Most people are unaware how much public policy is either
lacking in any empirical-research support or driven by bad research.
Political actors motivated by ideology or donor/constituent demands
propose new government practices—in areas ranging from policing
to funding of treatments for gender dysphoria in youth to welfarequalification rules—that will greatly impact people’s lives, and if
anyone asks what basis they have for thinking the impact will be good,
they can readily find some study to support their case. Especially when
powerless populations are put at risk, neither the legislative process
nor peer review in the publication process provides a real check on
reckless experimentation and incompetent or corrupt research.
This Article argues that, at least with respect to social services
for vulnerable populations, innovation and scientific study should be
subject to constraints analogous to those for introduction of new drugs
and vaccinations. These include pre-implementation assessment of
evidentiary basis by panels of independent experts, piloting, and
assurance of scientific rigor as well as protections for human
“subjects”—a concept that, even in medicine, should be expanded, to
include anyone substantially impacted by an experimental
intervention and not just those whom researchers choose to study. In
addition, agencies and research institutions must become more
circumspect about who provides proxy consent for non-autonomous
subjects.

*

Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law at the William & Mary School of Law. This
Article benefited greatly from feedback generously provided by Elizabeth Bartholet,
I. Glenn Cohen, Sarah A. Font, Zachary M. Schrag, and my colleagues at an internal
workshop.
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As illustration of the problem and how the solutions might be
implemented, the Article focuses on the repeated innovations over the
past forty years in state response to child maltreatment, a pattern sure
to continue indefinitely unless discipline is imposed. A voiceless
population with no reliable surrogates, too often treated as
distributable goods rather than persons, children in the child
protection system present the perfect storm of conditions conducing to
unethical behavior among policy makers and social scientists. In this
realm, “fake news” destroys lives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Research regulation captures little public attention, even when a
crisis like a pandemic creates urgent need for potentially harmful medical
experiments. But the approval process for human-subject research is a
central aspect of life for most university departments and their faculties
and for other institutions conducting research—not just medical research,
but also psychological, sociological, anthropological, historical, etc.1 And
social science research – the focus of this Article – is immensely important
to all areas of social policy.2
Social scientists in the United States. have complained, throughout
the half century in which the federal government has imposed ethics rules
on human-subject research, that requiring advance approval of their work
by Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”), as federal regulations have been
interpreted to require, is generally unnecessary and – when institutions
take it seriously – so burdensome and poorly-executed that it dooms many
research plans that could yield important knowledge or serve as valuable
learning experiences for students.3 Their work, they say, is rather
harmless, not posing physical dangers to subjects the way biomedical
research does and rarely raising serious concerns about non-physical
impact.4 Most social scientists have accepted IRB review as a fact of life,

1
See ZACHARY M. SCHRAG, ETHICAL IMPERIALISM: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1965-2009 ix, 1–2 (2011) (describing how
intrusive IRB review is for researchers in numerous disciplines – anyone who wishes
“to interview, survey, or observe people or to train students to do so” and noting
compulsory training for any new university faculty who will be conducting research
on human subjects).
2
Steven Rathgeb Smith, Because Social Science Makes Sense of the Institutions
That
Shape
Our
Lives,
WHY SOC.
SCI.?
(July
18,
2017),
https://www.whysocialscience.com/blog/2017/7/17/because-social-science-makessense-of-the-institutions-that-shape-our-lives [https://perma.cc/M5VV-SHU5].
3
See generally SCHRAG, supra note 1; see also CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE
CENSOR’S HAND: THE MISREGULATION OF HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH 33–69 (2015)
(work of law professor echoing complaints of social scientists); Institutional Review
Boards and Social Science, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS (Nov. 1999 & May 2000),
https://www.aaup.org/report/institutional-review-boards-and-social-science-research
[https://perma.cc/95HS-8JEJ] [hereinafter AAUP Report].
4
Id. (“the research of most social scientists involving human subjects does not
pose a threat of physical or mental harm to the subjects… For these scholars, then, the
Common Rule was established and has evolved within a clinical and biomedical
framework that does not fit their research, or fits it poorly”); SCHRAG, supra note 1, at
188 (positing that only one in ten thousand social science studies poses any danger to
subjects); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 1 (“Social-science research and much
biomedical research cannot harm subjects physically. . . . And while all research can
inflict social, psychological, and dignitary harm, it happens little and is rarely grave.”);
id. at 19 (“social harms – usually the worst nonphysical risks – are rare and modest. .
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and some even ascribe value to the process.5 But others have issued
strident calls for exempting all or nearly all social science studies from that
process, charging that it violates free speech rights and causes public harm,
far outweighing any benefits, by inhibiting acquisition of needed
knowledge and generating great expense.6
This Article counters the claims that social science poses little danger
and, further, that social scientists can be relied on to self-regulate. It urges
greater scrutiny of research proposals in social science, or scrutiny of a
different kind. The greatest dangers from social science research have yet
to be widely acknowledged and addressed. The threat is not so much harm
to research subjects, which has been the focus of IRB-review defenders
and critics,7 but rather that bad research is produced and generates bad
policy harmful to a much greater number of people.8 Intuitively, this is
especially likely with policies impacting people less able to participate in
policy making and to challenge research findings, or as to whom there is
widespread prejudice or devaluation – for example, welfare recipients,
gender-questioning youth, prisoners, domestic violence victims, juvenile
delinquents, and persons with a mental disability or mentally illness. 9
. . But what of psychological harms? . . . The evidence confutes this stereotype of frail
subjects bludgeoned by questions.”).
5
SCHRAG, supra note 1, at 5.
6
See generally Zachary M. Schrag, Vexed Again: Social Scientists and the
Revision of the Common Rule, 2011–2018, 47 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 254 (2019);
SCHRAG, supra note 1, at 105 (noting free speech objection); see also SCHNEIDER,
supra note 3, at 163–84; AAUP Report, supra note 3.
7
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 15–19, 31 (stating that the focus of debate is
three potential nonphysical harms to subjects, and arguing that there is too little reason
to be concerned about these to justify ex ante regulation); SCHRAG, supra note 1, at
14–16, 32, 52 (discussing subjects’ interests in avoiding deception, discomfort,
dignitary harm if consent to participation is not properly secured, and breach of
privacy or confidentiality). There has also been some discussion of social-science
research that might embarrass a community or be used for illicit purposes by
government. Id. at 13, 16, 18, 45–46. But neither of those concerns spoke to the
problems highlighted here – that is, poorly-done research and the harmful policies it
can foster. See generally Kristen Underhill, Broken Experimentation, Sham EvidenceBased Policy, 38 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 150 (2019).
8
Id. at 227; Jochen Gläser, et al., The Independence of Research – A Review of
Disciplinary Perspectives and Outline of Interdisciplinary Prospects, 60 MINERVA
105, 124 (2021) (“many fields in the sciences and social sciences have begun to reflect
upon a loss of trust in published results. Problems include: Errors in publications that
spread through scientific communities; Results that cannot be reproduced for a variety
of (partly unknown) reasons; Interpretation bias or “spin”, which is defined as
“reporting practices that distort the interpretation of results and mislead readers so that
results are viewed in a more favourable light”; Fraud, i.e. the falsification of results.”)
(citations omitted).
9
The problem does at times get noticed in some policy fields. See, e.g., David
Eads, Too Many Politicians Misuse and Abuse Crime Data, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10,
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Research that is poorly designed, executed, and/or analyzed because of
bias or incompetence is likely to produce false findings or invalid
conclusions.10 This might or might not affect the individuals who populate
the studies, but the potential for harm to members of the broader groups
they represent is itself sufficiently great to warrant ex ante quality
constraints on much social science research.11 Yet the commission
principally responsible for developing research regulation in the 1970s
explicitly directed that IRB’s “should not consider as risks the possible
consequences of application of the knowledge gained in the research (e.g.,
the possible effects of the research on public policy.)”12 In doing so,

2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/politics/giuliani-trumpchicago-data-crime.html [https://perma.cc/L7PE-4Y9B]; Kyle D. Pruett, Social
Science Research and Social Policy: Bridging the Gap, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 52 (2007)
(describing how the author’s research on parenting was misused by opponents of
same-sex marriage); Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of
Research Results, 49 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 1998 259, 261 (1998) (“Sadly, there is no
shortage of politicized research topics, where the motives of researchers and the
interpretation of their findings are fiercely disputed. Some topics are matters of
perpetual dispute; examples include research on the effects of gun control, the death
penalty, pornography, and drug prohibition. And recent years have seen the emergence
of new battlegrounds involving research on global warming, HIV/AIDS, the
addictiveness of tobacco, the biological basis of sexual orientation, the effects of gay
and lesbian service personnel on military cohesion, and the validity of therapeutically
elicited repressed memories and racial stereotypes.”); Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by
Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J.
GEN. L. & POL’Y 207 (1995).
10
Biases and Confounding, PUB. HEALTH ACCESS SUPPORT TEAM,
https://www.healthknowledge.org.uk/public-health-textbook/research-methods/1aepidemiology/biases [https://perma.cc/NNU6-4NXX] (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
11
An additional warrant, as some ethicists outside the U.S. have noted, is that
bad research cannot be justified to potential subjects or to government agencies asked
to assist with it: What justification is there for investigators’ scrutiny of subjects’
person, behavior, or private information, and for granting them access to agency
records, absent assurance a study is well designed to lead to knowledge rather than
falsehood? See Ariella Binik & Spencer Phillips Hey, A Framework for Assessing
Scientific Merit in Ethical Review of Clinical Research, 41 ETHICS & HUM. RSCH. 2
(2019); Tim Bond, Ethical imperialism or ethical mindfulness? Rethinking ethical
review for social sciences, 8 RSCH. ETHICS 97, 102 (2012) (“Ensuring the quality of
the research undertaken is an essential precondition of involving the contributions of
human participants. Poorly designed or implemented research undermines public trust
in the integrity of the research process and may generate misleading knowledge
claims.”).
12
SCHRAG, supra note 1, at 71 (discussing the work and decisions of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research).
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however, that commission had in mind use of valid research.13 It never
addressed the problems bad research might cause or the possibility that
research in some domains should undergo greater scrutiny because of
potential policy use. This Article’s principal concern is with those
problems, and it calls for consideration of that possibility.
Existing mechanisms relied on for quality control are review of
research proposals by funding agencies, post-hoc peer review solicited by
publishers, and public deliberation of legal reforms.14 These are
manifestly inadequate. Despite them, much poor-quality research is
produced, published, and used successfully for policy and legal
advocacy.15 Some funding agencies, as shown in Part II, have long been
part of the problem rather than the solution, promoting research designed
to advance political agendas rather than scientific knowledge. Even when
funded by unbiased sources, researchers might inject their own policy
biases, cut corners, misunderstand the phenomenon, or lack competencies,
yet their reports can find a publication outlet.16 And, advocates and policy
13
Id. at 16, 71 (indicating that the consequence contemplated was adverse
impact on sympathetic, vulnerable organizations or ethnic groups if research results
fostered a negative public view of them).
14
KORNELIA TANCHEVA, PUBLIC RESPONSES RECEIVED FOR REQUEST FOR
INFORMATION 85 FR 9488: PUBLIC ACCESS TO PEER- REVIEWED SCHOLARLY
PUBLICATIONS, DATA, AND CODE RESULTING FROM FEDERALLY-FUNDED RESEARCH
(2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Open-AccessRFI-Comments-Reduced-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4SP-KX4E].
15
See infra Part II; Underhill, supra note 7, at 227; Lee Drutman & Steven M.
Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists Instead of Thinking for Itself, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/whencongress-cant-think-for-itself-it-turns-to-lobbyists/387295/ [https://perma.cc/A95PCPJ5] (“Those who can saturate Washington by funding the most research, hiring the
most lobbyists, and paying for the most elites to write op-eds highlighting and
supporting their perspective are going to stay at the front of the crowd.”). Though this
is not documented, the author has observed lawyers in family court proceedings
invoke and sometimes introduce into evidence problematic research, without
challenge by other counsel. For an example of mischaracterization of research in court
filings, see Brief of Casey Family Programs and Ten Other Child Welfare and
Adoption Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Haaland v.
Brackeen, No. 21-376, 2022 WL 585881 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2022) (No. 21-376), 2021 WL
4803872, at *8 (stating: “Research and experience confirm that, when possible,
children's interests are best served by staying with their families.” and citing a study
that only examined whether parents retained custody after a particular intervention
and not any aspect of child welfare, and that itself noted that “avoiding placement does
not necessarily mean that children and families are doing well” and that sometimes
foster care “placement would actually be regarded as a `success’ from a clinical
perspective” because the intervention identifies unsafe home conditions) (citing
Kristine Nelson et al., A Ten-Year Review of Family Preservation Research 10
(2009)).
16
Even the most prestigious science journals occasionally accept seriously
flawed work. See, e.g., Roni Caryn Rabin, The Pandemic Claims New Victims:
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makers routinely rely on studies without regard for their quality or the
reputation of the publisher.17 Even if someone challenges the quality of
research relied on or the soundness of conclusions drawn from it, advocacy
groups, legislators, agency officials, and judges typically have little desire,
patience, or capacity to respond to questions about research quality.18
This Article proposes, as an additional ex ante check against flawed
research, enhancing a different step in the process that extends from
research idea to policy implementation – namely, IRB assessment of
human-subject research proposals. Currently, that review need not (and
typically does not) include assessment of research design; it focuses on the
safety of research subjects and their informed consent to participation. 19
Existing ethical standards and regulations were developed principally for
medical experiments, as a reaction to notorious studies that physically
harmed participants.20 Moreover, though existing regulations address the
possibility of distorting motivations, they target only profit motive, as
when drug manufacturers seek positive reports on their new products.21
That typically is not the sort of conflict of aims that infects social science.
This Article therefore urges that IRBs be required rigorously to
examine research design, and it suggests strategies for motivating their
Prestigious
Medical
Journals,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/health/virus-journals.html
[https://perma.cc/7E3N-H8DT] (explaining how peer review failed to prevent
publication of flawed studies on use of certain drugs in treatment of COVID-19 in
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE and THE LANCET); see also M. Findley et al.,
Can Results-Free Review Reduce Publication Bias? The Results and Implications of
a Pilot Study, 49 COMPAR. POL. STUDIES 1667, 1668 (2016) (noting pronounced
concern in political science with “a peer-review process that privileges the
significance of results over their theoretical contribution, research design, quality of
the data and analysis”).
17
See infra Part II; Underhill, supra note 7, at 186–98.
18
Underhill, supra note 7, at 186–87; Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with
Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1784 (2014) (discussing problem that federal
appellate court judges rely on, but are not able independently able to verify, factual
claims and supporting citations submitted in amicus curiae briefs); Jeffery J.
Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 921–22 (2011) (“The lack
of shared goals means that many studies are essentially irrelevant to underlying legal
policy . . . . People interpret social science evidence in ways that are consistent with
their beliefs, embracing work that supports them and rejecting work that does not.”).
19
SCHRAG, supra note 1, at 108, 115–16.
20
See id. at 2 (noting “IRBs’ origins as a response to abuses in medical and
psychological experimentation”), 7 (“medicine and psychology set the agenda”); id.
at 9 (“regulators forced social science research into an ill-fitting biomedical model”);
id. at 38, 51; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at xix (characterizing the modern
research-regulatory regime as a response to the infamous Tuskegee study); Zachary
M. Schrag, How Talking Became Human Subjects Research: The Federal Regulation
of the Social Sciences, 1965–1991, 21 J. POL’Y HIST. 3, 5–9 (2009).
21
See infra, Part IV.B.
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members to do so. It also recommends that IRBs be charged with guarding
against a broader set of interest conflicts—in particular, when researchers’
funding comes from an entity that also lobbies governments to promote a
policy agenda. Just as campaign-finance law reflects recognition that
wealthy advocacy organizations could buy legislative votes if permitted,
research-ethics law should reflect recognition that such organizations can
buy “scientific findings” if permitted.22 Many social scientists are highly
dependent on grants not just for pursuing their own research ideas but also
for retention and promotion in their jobs.23 They also, to a far greater
degree than in medicine, are likely to be driven by their own ideological
views to design and analyze studies in such a way as to ensure felicitous
results.24 Once results are published, no matter how flawed, advocates for
causes run with them to policy makers, and the effects are difficult to
undo.25 The need for more stringent ex ante scrutiny is pressing.
More dramatically, this Article suggests viewing new social service
programs and practices as a form of human-subject experimentation, just
as new medical interventions are. It recommends scientific – not just
political – gatekeeping. Social welfare policy innovation impacting
vulnerable populations is often fueled by “the latest research,” which
might be fatally flawed, but revealed as such only after the idea it promotes
is implemented. The history of “treatments” for gay and trans persons
illustrates that clearly.26 But whereas the Food and Drug Administration
22
Thomas E. Mann & Anthony Corrado, Party Polarization and Campaign
Finance, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. BROOKINGS (July 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Mann-and-Corrad_PartyPolarization-and-Campaign-Finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X97-TT9B].
23
See Kelsey Piper, Science funding is a mess: Could grant lotteries make it
better?,
VOX
(Jan.
18,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2019/1/18/18183939/science-funding-grant-lotteries-research
[https://perma.cc/JSU6-6SPU].
24
Underhill, supra note 7, at 166 (“Values, too, may drive the types of questions
that scientists seek to answer, the causal hypotheses they seek to test, and the ways in
which scientists frame their proposals and policy implications.”); id. at 203
(“Researchers grow invested in the well-being of the populations they study, or enter
research in the hopes of improving outcomes for a group or community. Ratcheting
poses long-term threats to funding priorities that work to benefit communities (most
often policies for welfare and safety net programming), and researchers who fear
ratcheting may be unwilling to expose negative or null program effects for fear of
undermining all resources.”).
25
See id. at 210–11 (discussing flawed evidence base that fueled proliferation
of “Scared Straight” programs for juvenile offenders); infra Part II.
26
See Marie-Amelie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion
Therapy Bans, 68 ALA. L. REV. 793, 803 (2017) (discussing the psychological
community’s past embracing of sexual-orientation conversion therapy, based on
supposed research findings that homosexuality is a changeable characteristic and that
particular therapies were effective in changing it); Jack Turban, The Disturbing
History of Research into Transgender Identity, SCI. AM. (Oct. 23, 2020),
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approval process for new vaccinations, medications, and medical devices
is robust, familiar, and the focus of most scholarship on human-subject
experimentation, little scholarly or government attention has been paid to
ethical standards and procedures for experimentation with behavioral and
other non-medical interventions. Yet innovation in social services can also
have life-altering effects, and it likewise entails danger of ethical lapses
and undercounting adverse impacts on vulnerable populations. 27 Driven
by ideology, it can be downright reckless.
Viewing social-service innovation as human-subject experimentation
invites the question whether it should – like novel medical interventions –
sometimes be subject to pre-implementation safeguards like pre-approval
by experts, piloting, controlled incremental expansion, and careful study
at each stage.28 Further, this Article recommends expanding the
conception of who is a human subject, strengthening protections for
subjects whose autonomy is undeveloped or compromised, and applying
to social-services experiments risk-benefit conditions common to medical
experimentation. This could go a long way toward protecting vulnerable
populations from harmful practices for which the primary motivation
might be other than their wellbeing, and it might minimize use of flawed
research to promote such innovation.
To illustrate the problems, Part II focuses on a particular niche of
social policy presenting both high human stakes and a maximal set of
ethical problems relating to innovation and study – namely, human-service
agency and court responses to child maltreatment. States have
experimented considerably in recent decades in this realm, typically in a
headlong fashion. Repeatedly, research supporting an innovation in this
ideologically-charged realm has ultimately proven rife with design flaws
and tendentious analysis, after it has driven government decision-making.
The pattern in this field provides a vehicle to analyze to what extent rules
for ethical experimentation and research could prevent dangerous
innovations in social services generally and minimize the amount and
impact of bad research produced and published in social sciences. Part III
distills from the description in Part II a set of general problems in social
services and social-science research that demands attention. Part IV
considers to what extent existing research regulations could cover social
service provision and social science research, to address those problems.
Part V recommends new pre-approval requirements for social-service

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-disturbing-history-of-research-intotransgender-identity/ [https://perma.cc/R8WH-RL2T].
27
See infra Part III.
28
See Development & Approval Process | Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs
[https://perma.cc/BMK4-ENXP].
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innovations and social-science research, with particular emphasis on those
impacting non-autonomous persons.

II. AN ILLUSTRATION OF RECKLESS SOCIAL-SERVICE INNOVATION
In a typical year, over two million children in the United States,
disproportionately infants, are subjects of “screened-in” reports of
maltreatment.29 Law governing state response to such reports, in the U.S.
and elsewhere, is often characterized as a pendulum, swinging between
emphasis on parents’ perceived rights to maintain their relationship with
children and emphasis on safety and faster permanency for children (via
foster care and adoption).30 Child protection law, like criminal law, is
especially politically sensitive because it disproportionately impacts
persons living in poverty and members of racial minorities.31 Some child
welfare experts have charged that child welfare policy has, as a result,
become driven by ideology rather than sound research.32 An extreme antigovernment, family-preservationist, community-protectionist mentality
has dominated the field in recent decades, arising from sympathy with the
adults in these communities, many of whom had adverse childhood
experiences themselves, coupled with a less-understandable adult-focused

29
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAM., CHILD
MALTREATMENT
2019
x
(2021),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/cm2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NN3-2H2S]. Screened-out reports might be accurate but the law
does not treat the behavior or circumstance reported as abuse or neglect. Id.
Conversely, countless children do suffer maltreatment but are never reported. See
Brett Drake & Melissa Jonson-Reid, Defining and Estimating Child Maltreatment, in
THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 14–33 (J. Bart Klika & Jon R.
Conte eds., 2017); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE
STUDY
OF
CHILD
ABUSE
AND
NEGLECT
(NIS-4)
16
(2010),
https://www.childhelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Sedlak-A.-J.-et-al.-2010Fourth-National-Incidence-Study-of-Child-Abuse-and-NeglectNIS%E2%80%934.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QGV-BB2G] [hereinafter FOURTH
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT].
30
See, e.g., Brandon Stahl, Child protection in turmoil across the country, STAR
TRIBUNE (Nov. 30, 2014, 5:53 AM), https://www.startribune.com/child-protectionsystems-are-in-turmoil-across-the-country/284225031/
[https://perma.cc/B5T29FVH]; JEREMY SAMMUT, RESETTING THE PENDULUM: BALANCED, EFFECTIVE,
ACCOUNTABLE CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND ADOPTION REFORM IN AUSTRALIA
33
(2017),
https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2017/11/rr33.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4QB-AB3P]; Gary C. Dumbrill, Ontario’s Child Welfare
Transformation: Another Swing of the Pendulum?, 23 CAN. SOC. WORK REV. 5–19
(2006).
31
See infra at notes 90–102 and accompany text.
32
LELA B. COSTIN ET AL., THE POL. OF CHILD ABUSE IN AM. 142 (1997).
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outlook on social justice.33 These experts say this ideological commitment
has infected research in the field, generating a steady stream of poorlyconstructed and mistakenly-interpreted studies used to support false
objections against child-protective actions and to promote more parentprotective responses to child maltreatment that ultimately prove
detrimental to children.34
One need not share that perspective to acknowledge threats to
research integrity in the child welfare field, as in many other social service
realms. As shown below, much of the research is funded by organizations
that are themselves promoting or even operating the family-preservation
interventions, seeking research to validate their policy aim.35 The studies
commonly involve observation and interaction with persons – typically
adults subject to child maltreatment charges, but occasionally maltreated
children – fairly characterized as “vulnerable populations.”36 A subset of
this vulnerable population (children) comprises non-autonomous persons
legally incapable of giving informed consent to participation themselves
yet whose normal proxies (parents) have potentially conflicting interests.37

A. Federal Law Background of Child Protection Practice
Though technically states set child protection policy in the United
States, federal law has driven much of it by conditioning states’ receipt of
certain federal funding.38 The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 embodied the family-preservation impulse, requiring Child
See, e.g., RICHARD GELLES, OUT OF HARM’S WAY: CREATING AN EFFECTIVE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 83–91 (2017); DAVID STOESZ, QUIXOTE’S GHOST: THE
RIGHT, THE LIBERATI, AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY 102–20 (2005); LELA B.
COSTIN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE IN AMERICA 142–45 (1997); Elizabeth
Bartholet, Thoughts on the Liberal Dilemma in Child Welfare Reform, 24 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 725 (2016). One might perceive a similar favoring of one group
over another within a subordinated population in calls to defund the police, in reaction
to brutally unjust treatment of persons suspected of committing crimes, which might
be insufficiently attentive to potential crime victims in the same communities.
33

34
See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare
System: The Use and Misuse of Research, 13 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 1, 8
(2014).
35
See Elizabeth Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in
Child Welfare, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573, 584, 609–11 (2015).
36
See generally Ronald C. Hughes et al., Issues in Differential Response, 23
RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 493 (2013).
37
See infra notes 219–26 and accompanying text.
38
See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 435–41
(2008).
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Protective Services (“CPS”) to make “reasonable efforts” to prevent
removal of maltreated children from their homes and to rehabilitate
parents and ultimately avoid termination of parental rights (“TPR”).39 The
2018 Family First Prevention Services Act (“Family First”) renewed this
commitment to family preservation with additional funding for removalprevention and reunification services.40 In between, the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”) pushed back in the safety/permanency
direction.41 It aimed to limit the rehabilitation time allowed to parents who
have committed maltreatment, so as to avoid unduly prolonged foster-care
stays for children, and to enable TPR proactively before a child is harmed
when parents have already manifested severe unfitness.42 Also aimed at
proactive intervention was the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of
2003 (as modified in 2009), which requires states to have birthing facilities
notify CPS of newborns exposed in utero to illegal drugs or alcohol, which
in some cases signals danger to children if sent home with their birth
mothers.43 These federal directives create an incentive for states to
experiment with policy innovations that might improve their compliance.
ASFA’s shortened timeline to TPR, in particular, has led states to search
for a magic pill that will transform parents quickly and/or alternatives to
foster care that allow them to evade the timelines.44

B. Advocacy Research Driving Policy Experiments
In addition to these directives from the federal government, wealthy
private advocacy organizations have conceived and promoted in state
legislatures, agencies, and courts new approaches to handling
maltreatment cases.45 The Annie E. Casey Foundation and Casey Family
Programs play an outsized role, together controlling billions of dollars in
endowment, and they uniformly display a single-minded devotion to the
39

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 471(15)(B)); see Dwyer, The Child
Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit
Parents, supra note 38, at 435–36.
40
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (codified in
U.S.C. tit. 42).
41
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
42
Id.; see GELLES, OUT OF HARM’S WAY, supra note 33, at 67–70.
43
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, §
114(b)(1)(B)(ii), 117 Stat. 800, 809 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)).
44
See infra notes 50–89 and 103–20 and accompanying text. See generally
Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: The Use and Misuse of
Research, supra note 34.
45
Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: The Use and
Misuse of Research, supra note 34, at 10.
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family-preservation aim and parental rights.46 With each new strategy or
program they promote, the Casey Foundation claims it will use
government funds more effectively to achieve removal-prevention and
reunification objectives,47 which do not necessarily equate to what is best
for a child. The core problem against which these innovations fight is
absence of programs with proven effectiveness at helping parents
overcome deep-seated mental health deficits, which typically stem from
their own adverse childhood experiences and usually lead to disabling
substance abuse.48 As discussed below, each new approach has
disappointed, and the consequences for many children have been severe –
either the children are returned to the custody of parents who remain
unprepared to adequately care for them (and so experience further
maltreatment), or they linger in foster care so long that chances for stable
permanency through adoption disappear.49 Yet once these programs have
been widely adopted, they continue by inertia even after independent
research proves them to be failures.
Perhaps the earliest example was the “Intensive Family Preservation
Services” (“IFPS”) model, which many states adopted in the 1980s at the
urging of the Edna McConnell Clark and Annie E. Casey foundations.50 It
rested on an unwarranted assumption that parental dysfunction
manifesting in child maltreatment is typically transitory and readily
46
See Marie Cohen, When Ideology Outweighs What’s Best for Kids, CHILD
WELFARE
MONITOR
(Mar.
10,
2021),
https://childwelfaremonitor.org/2021/03/10/when-ideology-outweighs-whats-bestfor-kids-the-case-of-san-pasqual-academy/ [https://perma.cc/2LYD-VER9] (noting
the “influence of two wealthy organizations started by the same family, Casey Family
Programs and the Annie E. Casey Foundation, that have used their financial resources
to produce reports…, lobby legislators, and provide free consultation with states.”);
Martin Morse Wooster, Foundation Adrift: The Casey Foundation Today, CAP. RSCH.
CTR.: FOUND. WATCH (Oct. 28, 2019), https://capitalresearch.org/article/foundationadrift-part-3/ [https://perma.cc/NB9W-MTUR].
47
See Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child
Welfare, supra note 35, at 574–90; RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: HOW
PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN’S LIVES 83–91 (1996).
48
See generally JAMES G. DWYER, LIBERAL CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND ITS
DESTRUCTION OF BLACK LIVES (2018); Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States'
Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, supra note 38, at 424–
27.
49
See infra notes 50–120 and accompanying text; see also STATE POL’Y ADVOC.
&
REFORM
CTR.,
NATIONAL
ADOPTION
FACTS
(2012),
http://childwelfaresparc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/National-ADOPTIONFACTS1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXU2-GM58].
50
See GELLES, BOOK OF DAVID, supra note 47, at 133–35 (noting that these
foundations “played crucial roles in selling, or overselling, of family preservation.
Both foundations marketed family preservation with a near-religious zeal and
substantial financial support.”).
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correctible.51 IFPS prescribes a heavy-dose of wrap-around services for
just four to six weeks for parents whose children were at imminent risk of
placement in foster care.52 Reports from initial research, funded by those
same foundations, announced success, but they ultimately came under fire
for flawed methodology and improper criteria of success – in particular,
asking only if children were still in parental custody rather than whether
the intervention secured children’s safety and served their long-term
wellbeing.53 After four decades of widespread use, IFPS still “does not
meet the standards for well-supported efficacious practice in child
welfare.”54 Yet whereas some states retreated from the program, a
significant minority have continued it, and Casey still touts it. 55

51

Id. at 133–35.
Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: The Use and
Misuse of Research, supra note 34, at 8–9.
53
See Don D. Schweitzer et al., Building the Evidence Base for Intensive Family
Preservation Services, 9 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 423, 424 (2015) (“to some in the
1980s IFPS seemed like a panacea. . . . [H]owever, IFPS is currently not recognized
as an evidence-based practice by most evidence-based clearinghouses.”); id. at 425–
26 (“Early studies of IFPS programs . . . were very promising. . . . In the mid-1990s,
[various authors] offered methodological critiques of this wave of research . . . [and]
multiple concerns regarding outcome measures, including use of out-of-home
placement as a sole measure of effectiveness in some early studies. While a central
policy goal of IFPS, avoiding placement does not ensure that children and families are
doing well. . . . Fraser, Nelson, and Rivard (1997) . . . noted that problems of targeting
and treatment integrity continued to plague family preservation research. . . . In 2012,
Al et al. conducted a meta-analytic study . . . which showed that intensive family
preservation programs . . . were generally not effective in preventing out-of-home
placement.”); see also Duncan Lindsey, Sacha Martin, & Jenny Doh, The Failure of
Intensive Casework Services to Reduce Foster Care Placements: An Examination of
Family Preservation Studies, 24 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 743, 751 (2002)
(“There is general consensus among child welfare researchers that the earliest studies
on family preservation that found such dramatic rates of program success were
seriously deficient.”); Amy M. Heneghan et al., Evaluating Intensive Family
Preservation Programs: A Methodological Review, 97 PEDIATRICS 535–42 (1996)
(“Methodological shortcomings included poorly defined assessment of risk,
inadequate descriptions of the interventions provided, and nonblinded determination
of the outcomes.”).
54
Schweitzer et al., supra note 53, at 439; see also Julia H. Littell & John R.
Schuerman, What Works Best for Whom? A Closer Look at Intensive Family
Preservation Services, 24 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 673, 673 (2002) (“Controlled
studies have shown that these programs have not met initial expectations . . . .”).
55
See NAT’L FAM. PRES. NETWORK, IFPS NATIONWIDE SURVEY 3–4 (2014),
http://www.intensivefamilypreservation.org/PDF/ifps_survey_report_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XN8-KANF] (finding 14 states still using IFPS, whereas a 2011
survey found 27); MINN. STAT. § 256F.01 et seq. (2003) (repealing IFPS legislation).
52
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Beginning in 1993, many states adopted “Differential Response”
(“DR”) at the urging of Casey and other foundations.56 DR entails
diverting reports CPS deems less serious away from the traditional
response of investigation and coercive intervention to a soft track of
merely assessing the family’s situation and offering assistance, both of
which are voluntary for parents.57 In cases placed on the assessment track,
case workers make no finding of maltreatment, so create no record of any
abuse or neglect that has occurred; do not insist parents accept services;
and leave children in the home regardless of parental response.58 The
underlying theory is that parents whose maltreatment appears less serious
just need a helping hand and will respond more positively to a noncoercive approach.59
Child welfare advocates were concerned from the outset that by
failing to investigate, requiring parents to change behavior, creating a
record, or removing a child from parental custody, agencies would leave
many children in situations of danger and make it more difficult to respond
properly to subsequent maltreatment reports.60 The concern intensified
following revelation that many jurisdictions were channeling most reports
onto the soft track—in some places, close to three-fourths of all reports.61
56
See CTR. FOR CHILD POL’Y, ISSUES IN DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: REVISITED 2
(Dec. 2019), https://www.centerforchildpolicy.org/post/policy-report-issues-indifferential-response-revisited [https://perma.cc/2F7E-GFHQ].
57
See id. at 13, n. xvii.
58
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.040(1)(b) (West 2019).
59
See Kathryn A. Piper, Differential Response in Child Protection: How Much
Is Too Much?, 82 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. Rev. 69, 70–71 (2017); CTR. FOR CHILD
POL’Y, supra note 56, at 2. An additional motivation states might have had for
adopting DR is to avoid having to report instances of repeat maltreatment to the federal
oversight agency, which ties funding to keeping repeat rates low; if there is no
substantiated finding of maltreatment in a given case, that case does not become part
of a pattern states must report. Id. at 14.
60
See Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child
Welfare, supra note 35, at 593–608.
61
See CTR. FOR CHILD POL’Y, supra note 56, at 3 (noting “growing concerns
about potentially detrimental consequences of DR programming on children’s safety,
particularly in jurisdictions that had abandoned fact-finding, risk assessment,
authoritative compliance when necessary, and ongoing safety planning with families
in alternative tracks in their efforts to remain `family friendly’”); id. at 13, n.xvii
(“Arizona stopped a program called Family Builders in the mid-2000s when a state
audit found that of the more than 9,000 families offered services, about two-thirds
(67%) declined to participate and, of those referred to Family Builders, only 28%
completed a service plan. In Washington state a 2008 study found that services were
offered to 70% of AR cases but `[o]f those referred, 32 percent participated in services
and 15 percent completed services’.”) (citations omitted); Piper, Differential Response
in Child Protection: How Much Is Too Much?, supra note 59, at 71 (noting 43% rate
in Massachusetts, 70% in Minnesota).
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The financial savings from doing so are substantial.62 Once again, early
research – funded by foundations that promoted the innovation – claimed
success, but without measuring child safety and wellbeing; instead it cited
reduced rates of removals (the obvious result of making no investigation
or finding) and greater parent satisfaction (the obvious result of offering
financial assistance but demanding nothing).63 That research was
ultimately proven methodologically flawed as well as focused on the
wrong outcomes.64 Later research that did study child safety and
wellbeing confirmed child advocates’ concerns, and that, along with
states’ own perception of very high rates of parents’ refusing services and
of increased fatalities,65 led many states to retreat from DR – either
eliminating the assessment – only track or authorizing caseworkers to

62
See Douglas B. Marlowe & Shannon M. Carey, Research Update on Family
Drug Courts, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG CT. PROS. (May 2012), https://www.nadcp.org/wpcontent/uploads/Reseach%20Update%20on%20Family%20Drug%20Courts%20%20NADCP.pdf [https://perma.cc/YBG3-WW2W].
63
See Hughes et al., supra note 36.
64
See id; Ronald C. Hughes & Frank Vandervort, Differential response: A
misrepresentation of investigation and case fact finding in child protective services,
28(2) APSAC ADVISOR 9–16. (2016); see also CTR. FOR CHILD POL’Y, supra note 56,
at 6 (noting as to research published between 2010 and 2018: “(1) basing conclusions
on surveys with extremely low response rates…, (2) recall bias, because surveys were
not completed until the time of case closure, which may have been months after
services were delivered, or (3) simply ignoring study findings that supported an
opposing conclusion in the reporting of findings. . .”); id. at 8 (“The family survey
sample was not random and the response rate for the family survey was low. None of
these issues was disclosed in the discussion of findings in the research reports. . . . The
response rate for family surveys ranged from 1.7% in Oregon to 16.l7% in Minnesota
to 24% in Colorado”); id. at 10 (stating “substantiated re-reporting as a measure of
child safety is inherently invalid, and conclusions drawn from this measure are
misleading” and explaining several reasons why) (citations omitted).
65
Piper, Differential Response in Child Protection: How Much Is Too Much?,
supra note 59, at 71 (noting 87% rate in Virginia of parent refusal of counseling and
substance abuse treatment, 80% refusal of services in Wyoming); CTR. FOR CHILD
POL’Y, supra note 56, at 23 (citing state audit finding two-thirds refused in Arizona).
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revert to an investigation if parents refuse necessary services.66 Still,
though, roughly thirty states deploy a DR system.67
In the mid-1990s, family drug courts (“FDC”) emerged in response
to recognition that addiction is more intransigent than IFPS supposed, and
today there are nearly four hundred in the U.S.68 On their own initiative
and without special legislative authorization, state court judges have
created FDCs and special rules to govern them.69 Their motivating theory
is that longer-term wrap-around services, more frequent court
appearances, and a more intimate relationship between judge and parent
will substantially improve rates of parental success in overcoming
addiction and avoiding loss of parental status.70 Rather than quickly
placing a child for adoption when maltreatment or endangerment results
from chronic, incapacitating substance abuse, the state puts children in
foster care while the judge, who also acts as a sort of coach, tries to nurture

CTR. FOR CHILD POL’Y, supra note 56, at 10 (“there are considerable data to
indicate that many children served in AR tracks have increased safety issues and may
be at significantly higher risk than was identified at the time of track assignment . . . .
”); id. at 12 (“In spite of the fact that AR track cases are, by design, lower risk than
TR cases, observational studies in Georgia and Wisconsin found that re-reporting on
the lower risk AR track actually exceeded that of cases on the TR track . . . . ”); id. at
2 (“By 2018, twelve states that had tried DR discontinued the program, suspended it,
or elected not to expand it statewide . . . .”); id. at 22–24 (“In Massachusetts: ‘From
2009 to 2013, 10 children on the lower-risk [AR] track died, including seven in 2013.’
In Florida: ‘The voluntary track [AR] of Florida’s DR program saw 80 child deaths
from 2008 to 2014. Of those 80 children, 34 died after Florida DCF had documented
at least 10 reports on the child’. . . . In Arizona: . . . after high-profile cases of child
death or abuse, the Family Builders program ended as an alternative response in 2004.
. . . In Illinois: Illinois discontinued its DR program in 2011 after a randomized
controlled trial study sponsored by the NQIC-DR found that families assigned to the
AR track were re-referred to CPS at higher rates than those assigned to the TR.”)
(citations omitted).
67
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE: A PRIMER FOR
CHILD
WELFARE
PROFESSIONALS
(Oct.
2020),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/differential_response.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YRL2-4H5J].
68
See CHILD. & FAM. FUTURES, THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FAMILY
DRUG COURTS 2 (2017).
69
See Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving
Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1500–01
(2004) (“In some states . . . . [t]here is no enabling legislation or mandate: the courts
simply
open
shop.”);
Dependency
Drug
Courts,
FLA.
CTS.,
https://www.flcourts.org/Resources-Services/Court-Improvement/Problem-SolvingCourts/Family-Dependency-Drug-Courts [https://perma.cc/ST6G-A884] (last visited
Oct. 24, 2021).
70
See DWYER, LIBERAL CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND ITS DESTRUCTION OF
BLACK LIVES, supra note 48, at 208–09.
66
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the parent to recovery and reunification.71 It does so even when the
children are highly-adoptable infants with urgent need to form a secure
attachment to a permanent caregiver,72 and even though the vast majority
of drug-dependent parents will relapse, be arrested for crimes, and/or be
reported again for child maltreatment after their initial FDC entry.73 It
does so without requiring approval by an independent representative for
the child.74 In some FDCs, the holding pattern for children persists much
longer on average than that for children whose cases proceed in a regular
juvenile court, as one might expect when the judge bonds with parents,
thereby postponing and potentially thwarting stable permanency, with
lifelong adverse consequences.75
Research on FDCs also has been plagued with design flaws.76
Researcher bias might play a role. For example, one study’s team included
71
See Sam Choi, Family Drug Courts in Child Welfare, 29 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 447, 451 (2012) (“Pursuant to the theory of therapeutic
jurisprudence, the court functions as an agent of therapeutic change and the role of the
members of the drug court may be more akin to the relationship between
psychotherapist and patient than the traditional role of judge and defendant.”).
72
See Mary Haack et al., Experience with Family Drug Courts in Three Cities,
25(4) SUBSTANCE ABUSE 17, 20 (2005) (study of FDCs in three large cities showing
63% of children entered the system at birth).
73
See Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al., Risk of Re-Reporting Among Infants Who
Remain at Home Following Alleged Maltreatment, 20(2) CHILD MALTREATMENT 92
(2014); see Marlowe & Carey, supra note 62.
74
See JAMES G. DWYER, LIBERAL CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND ITS
DESTRUCTION OF BLACK LIVES, supra note 48, at 210. Immediate TPR and adoption
following removal from parental custody is not even legally possible except in very
limited circumstances, so the alternative to FDC is simply the normal juvenile court
process, which also entails placing the child in foster care while parental rehabilitation
is attempted (only less rigorously). See CHILD.’S BUREAU, REASONABLE EFFORTS TO
PRESERVE OR REUNIFY FAMILIES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN 1–2
(2020), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/reunify.pdf. And in some states, the
child might not even have a legal representative in the process of deciding their fate
after removal. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.4022(4)(b) (2021) (making it optional to
include a child’s guardian ad litem, “if one is appointed,” in the multi-disciplinary
team that develops a placement recommendation following removal from parents’
home).
75
See Dwyer, LIBERAL CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND ITS DESTRUCTION OF
BLACK LIVES, supra note 48, at 212, 248, 252–53; see also Jami Vigil, Ethics Issues
Unique to Problem-Solving Courts, 46 COLO. LAW. 23, 26 (2017); Hon. Karen Adam
et al., FDC Models – Parallel vs. Integrated, NAT’L FAM. DRUG CT. 19, 25, 43 (Oct.
10, 2012), http://www.cffutures.org/files/webinar-handouts/FDC%20Models%20%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HG6-KTQP] (noting FDC advocates’ recognition of
ethical problems with the judge’s role, tension between goals for parent and goals for
child, and lack of child-welfare accountability).
76
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, LITERATURE
REVIEW: FAMILY DRUG COURTS 6 (2016) (noting “lack of rigorous study designs,
small sample sizes, absence of comparison groups or use of inappropriate comparison
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the family court judge who had herself initiated the program in her
jurisdiction.77 In other FDCs studied the judges operating the courts, who
volunteer for the assignment, control whether their court is subjected to
study, and if so by whom and according to what measures.78 That also
could skew research toward positive findings. In addition, these studies
also focus on whether parents regain possession of offspring, not childwelfare measures.79 And even as to that adult-centered aim, the results are
not uniformly positive.80
A smaller-scale development in the 1990s was resurrection of the
prison nursery – a special unit in women’s prisons where inmates who give
birth while incarcerated live with their babies until release.81 New York
State has had a nursery at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility since 1901,
but other states that created one in the early twentieth century later shut
them down, citing child-safety concerns.82 Starting with Nebraska in
1994, legislatures in nine states have approved new prison-nursery units.83
This revival occurred with no research support for any prediction of
positive child-welfare effects, simply at the urging of advocates for women
prisoners who claimed children would benefit by forming an attachment

groups, inclusion of only program graduates in the outcome data, and lack of
appropriate statistical controls when calculating results”); see also Jody Brook et al.,
Family Drug Court, Targeted Parent Training and Family Reunification: Did This
Enhanced Service Strategy Make a Difference?, 66 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 35, 37 (2015)
(“Much previous research on FDCs is limited in rigor.”); Holly Child & Dara
McIntyre, Examining the Relationships Between Family Drug Court Compliance and
Child Welfare Outcomes, 94 CHILD WELFARE 67, 72 (2015) (noting 140 of 673 parents
who participated were not included in the study because of incomplete data); Elizabeth
J. Gifford et al., How Does Family Drug Treatment Court Participation Affect Child
Welfare Outcomes?, 38 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1659, 1663 (2014) (“Thirty
children exited foster care for other reasons, including emancipation, runaway, or
death. These children were excluded from analyses.”).
77
See Judge Jeri B. Cohen et al., Increasing Family Reunification for SubstanceAbusing Mothers and Their Children: Comparing Two Drug Court Interventions in
Miami, 60 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 11, 11 (2009) (“In 1999, Judge Cohen founded the
Miami-Dade Dependency Drug Court . . . . ”).
78
See Gifford et al., supra note 76, at 1660 (noting “the selection bias inherent
in using only a small sample of courts that agree to release their data for a study”).
79
See DWYER, LIBERAL CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND ITS DESTRUCTION OF
BLACK LIVES, supra note 48, at 210–15, 235–55.
80
Id.
81
See Naomi Schaefer Riley, On Prison Nurseries, NAT’L AFFS. (Spring 2019),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/on-prison-nurseries
[https://perma.cc/KT5Q-PVC4].
82
See Leda M. Pojman, Cuffed Love: Do Prison Babies Ever Smile?, 10 BUFF.
WOMEN’S L. J. 46, 52, 64–65 (2001). A more punitive attitude toward female
criminals might also partly explain the closings. Id. at 65.
83
Id. at 57–59.
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to their mothers, and – more importantly for many legislators – the public
treasury would benefit, because the program would reduce criminal
recidivism among these women following their release from prison.84 To
substantiate the latter claim, advocates cited studies plagued by severe
selection bias, comparing women who qualified for the program (no
history of violent crime, short sentences) and completed it (remained
focused on parenting, committed no rule infractions) to the rest of the
prison population.85 To substantiate the attachment claim, advocates
began citing new research reports from a Columbia University nursingschool team, which studied the children who began life in the Bedford
Hills prison.86 That team had also been providing direct health services to
the mothers in the program,87 which likely generated sympathy for the
84

See, e.g., Sarah Yager, Prison Born, THE ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/07/prison-born/395297/
[https://perma.cc/K3E3-78KJ].
85
See Mary Woods Byrne et al., Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment
for Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 375, 377–78
(2010) (“Recidivism, one aspect of maternal rehabilitation, has been the most
commonly used measure of prison nursery program success. Relationship factors have
received no empirical attention until the present study.”); Erin Jordan, Prison
Nurseries Cut Female Inmates’ Risk of Reoffending, THE GAZETTE (Jan. 31, 2011,
6:52 AM), https://www.thegazette.com/2011/01/31%20/prison-nurseries-cut-femaleinmates-risk-of-reoffending/ [https://perma.cc/BH8N-QR8H] (“Prison nurseries are
gaining ground because of evidence they reduce recidivism, which saves the cost of
housing repeat offenders.”). For critique of recidivism studies, see James G. Dwyer,
Jailing Black Babies, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 465, 503–04 (2014).
86
See, e.g., Anna T. Smyke et al., Mental Health Implications for Children of
Incarcerated Parents, 63 LOY. L. REV. 405, 427–28 (2017); DIAMOND RSCH.
CONSULTING LLC, PRISON NURSERY PROGRAMS: LIT REVIEW & FACT SHEET FOR CT2012
4,
https://www.diamondresearchconsulting.com/_files/ugd/f2f533_fc7cfce398854a27a
5b2c65feb8a8efc.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y2G-6R8A]; Sarah Abramowicz, A Family
Law Perspective on Parental Incarceration, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 228, 234–35 (2012).
87
See Byrne et al., Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment for Infants
Raised in a Prison Nursery, supra note 85, at 379 (describing “weekly visits by a
Nurse Practitioner . . . incorporating anticipatory guidance regarding infant
development, responsive parenting, maternal life goals, and maternal coping with
reentry issues using . . . interactive communication responsive to mothers' expressed
concerns” as well as feedback to the mothers on their interactions with their children);
id. at 387 (“[O]ur NP interventionists provided individualized visits and follow-up
contacts with tailored content focusing on specific moments of maternal-infant
behavior, fostering each mother's sensitivity to infant development, and encouraging
reflective narration about the child as a unique person.”); id. at 388 (conceding that
Byrne’s research could not distinguish any positive effects of her team's therapeutic
intervention from effects of the prison nursery per se); Making Women’s Health a
Priority,
COLUM.
U.
SCH.
NURSING
(Aug.
5,
2014),
https://www.nursing.columbia.edu/news/making-womens-health-priority
[https://perma.cc/K2NU-9FR9].
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mothers and personal interest in showing the program successful, so that
the mothers could continue to keep their babies with them. The reports
grossly distorted outcomes. They claimed to find a normal rate of
attachment among the children, but only after they excluded without
explanation outcomes for seventy percent of the children involved in the
study.88 They also ignored the fact that many of the remaining thirty
percent did not remain in their mothers’ care after exiting the prison – that
is, suffered disruption of any attachment to their mothers, which is
traumatic and typically causes lasting psycho-emotional damage.89
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was increased attention to the
disproportionately large number of black children in foster care.90 Nongovernmental organizations seeking to reduce the foster-care population
generally,91 along with advocates for parents and for racial minorities, 92
charged that this was a product of pervasive racial bias among CPS
employees (even though most of them in high-minority-race communities
are themselves of minority race).93
A “Race Disproportionality
Movement” (“RDM”) began, and its proposed solutions, which many
local agencies adopted, included capping numbers or percentages for black
children in foster care and subjecting CPS caseworkers to race-sensitivity
training.94 Both measures would leave more black children in homes
where maltreatment had been reported.95 Authors of a report on the third
88

Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, supra note 85, at 507–17.
See id.
90
See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement
in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871
(2009).
91
See id. at 880 (“The Casey-CSSP Alliance for Racial Equity, which heads the
Movement, consists of five Casey foundations together with the Center for the Study
of Social Policy”).
92
See, e.g., Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal
Redress for African-American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 110 (2008); Christina White, Federally
Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 1
NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 303 (2006); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil
Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 172 (2003); Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children
or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An
Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 578–79 (1997).
93
See DWYER, LIBERAL CHILD WELFARE POLICY AND ITS DESTRUCTION OF
BLACK LIVES, supra note 48, at 203.
94
Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False
Facts and Dangerous Directions, supra note 90, at 883–84, 888. Some still endorse
such measures. See, e.g., Alan J. Dettlaff & Reiko Boyd, Racial Disproportionality
and Disparities in the Child Welfare System: Why Do They Exist, and What Can Be
Done to Address Them?, 692 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 253, 266 (2020).
95
Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False
Facts and Dangerous Directions, supra note 90, at 885–86; cf. NAOMI SCHAEFER
89
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iteration of a “National Incidence Study” of maltreatment (“NIS-3”) – a
federal effort to calculate the extent of actual, as opposed to reported, child
maltreatment – endeavored to support the racial-bias charge, by claiming
to find that the actual rate of maltreatment was the same for black and
white families.96
In reality, NIS-3 did not find the same rates; it found higher rates of
actual maltreatment in black families, but it had too small a sample and
too primitive a methodology to declare that finding definitive.97 Yet the
reporters chose to assert instead that “NIS-3 found no race differences in
maltreatment incidence.”98 Ultimately, a fourth National Incidence Study
(“NIS-4”), with a larger sample and more refined methodology,
definitively concluded that maltreatment rate does in fact vary
substantially by race, explicable in terms of the much higher poverty rate
among blacks, to a degree matching the disparity in rate of placement in
foster care.99 In addition, no research has found a substantial number of
unwarranted maltreatment reports or removals for any group of children,
and all iterations of the NIS have found rates of actual maltreatment for all
races substantially exceed rates of reported maltreatment.100 All of this –
that is, that black children disproportionately incur maltreatment in
numbers far greater than substantiated reports reflect, and that there is no
reason to believe many substantiated reports are actually false or frivolous
– suggests that policies discouraging action to protect black children in
RILEY, NO WAY TO TREAT A CHILD: HOW THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM, FAMILY
COURTS, AND RACIAL ACTIVISTS ARE WRECKING YOUNG LIVES 95–99 (2021)
(describing policy of New Orleans judge to require greater injury to black children in
order to authorize their removal from an abusive home).
96
Brett Drake & Melissa Jonson-Reid, NIS interpretations: Race and the
National Incidence Studies of Child Abuse and Neglect, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS.
REV. 16, 17 (2011) (quoting ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, THIRD
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FINAL REPORT 4–30, 8–
7 (1996)).
97
See id. at 18, 18 fig.1.
98
ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE
STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FINAL REPORT 8–7 (1996) (emphasis in
original); see also id. at 4–29 (“there were no significant race differences in any
category”); id. at 8–7 (“there are no overall race differences in the incidence of child
abuse and neglect”).
99
JESSE RUSSELL & TRACY COOPER, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BRIEF: THE NIS4: WHAT IT ALL MEANS (AND DOESN’T MEAN) 5 (2011), https://www.ncjfcj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/nis-4-technical-assistance-brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5M75-Y9PG] (“NIS-4 found ‘strong and pervasive’ race differences
in child maltreatment, with higher rates of maltreatment for Black children than for
White and Hispanic children.”) (quoting FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 29, at 9).
100
See Drake & Jonson-Reid, Defining and Estimating Child Maltreatment,
supra note 29.
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response to maltreatment reports have caused black children
disproportionately to incur repeated maltreatment. RDM was in remission
for nearly a decade after NIS-4, but in 2020 it returned with a vengeance,
inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement, urging abolition of the child
protection system altogether.101 A 2019 study funded by Casey Family
Programs of a new “race-blind removal decision making” pilot program
appeared to give new credence to claims of race bias, and it led New York
State to direct all local agencies to adopt the program, and Los Angeles to
pilot the program itself, before the fatal flaws in Casey-funded study were
revealed.102
Another, ongoing race-related movement is a concerted effort by the
National Association of Black Social Workers (“NABSW”), the Casey
foundations, and other advocates to ensure that any black children who
have been removed from parental custody because of maltreatment are
placed with relatives rather than in non-relative foster care at any point
when relatives are available.103 This intensified after passage of federal
legislation prohibiting race matching in foster care and adoption
placements through the Inter-Ethnic Placement Act (“IEPA”).104 Casey

101

See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Abolishing Policing Also Means Abolishing
Family Regulation, IMPRINT YOUTH & FAM. NEWS (June 16, 2020, 5:26 AM),
https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/abolishing-policing-also-means-abolishingfamily-regulation/44480 [https://perma.cc/6DG3-86ZX]; Dettlaff & Boyd, supra note
94, at 267.
102
See The power of wishful thinking: the case of “race-blind removals” in child
welfare,
CHILD
WELFARE
MONITOR
(July
27,
2021),
https://childwelfaremonitor.org/2021/07/27/the-power-of-wishful-thinking-the-caseof-race-blind-removals-in-child-welfare/ [https://perma.cc/YF24-LBB6] (explaining
fundamental flaws in the study).
103
See Dettlaff & Boyd, supra note 94, at 269–70; NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOC.
WORKERS,
KINSHIP
CARE
POSITION
STATEMENT
4
(2003),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nabsw.org/resource/resmgr/position_statements_paper
s/kinship_care_position_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AXM-AUG6] (“In order to
preserve and enhance the vitality of African American families . . . services must not
be ‘child-focused,’ but ‘family-centered.’”); id. at 6 (recommending “[e]xpand[ing]
the definition of kin/relative in public policies to include the full range of blood
relatives (including all cousins, regardless of degree).”); How can we improve
placement stability for children in foster care?, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS (Oct. 3,
2018),
https://www.casey.org/strategies-improve-placement-stability/
[https://perma.cc/E9AF-39PF]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of
State Support for Children, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2001).
104
See NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOC. WORKERS, POSITION STATEMENT:
PRESERVING
FAMILIES
OF
AFRICAN
ANCESTRY
4
(2003),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nabsw.org/resource/resmgr/position_statements_paper
s/preserving_families_of_afric.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2HR-QX7N]; cf. Bartholet,
The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and
Dangerous Directions, supra note 90, at 889 (noting RDM efforts to scale back IEPA
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and NABSW oppose that Act, the latter group having an official policy
statement that “a white home is not a suitable placement for Black
children.”105 Caseworkers can use kin preference heavily with black
children in order to circumvent IEPA’s prohibition of racial discrimination
among foster and adoptive parents.106 The advocacy, using flawed
research and mischaracterizing competent research, has been quite
effective.107 Most state and local government agencies have adopted an
explicit or implicit policy of preferring kinship care for any black children
removed from parental custody and treating any placement of black
children with white non-relatives as an unfortunate temporary measure
that should be disrupted as soon as a minimally-adequate relative becomes
available, regardless of any attachment a child has formed with foster
parents.108
Advocates make sweeping claims that research shows placement
with relatives is better all-around for children.109 In reality, the measured
were indifferent to the evidence that it reduced the number of black children in foster
care).
105
NAT’L ASS’N OF BLACK SOC. WORKERS, POSITION STATEMENT ON TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTIONS
4
(2003),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nabsw.org/resource/collection/E1582D77-E4CD-4104996A-D42D08F9CA7D/NABSW_Trans-Racial_Adoption_1972_Position_(b).pdf
[https://perma.cc/3AFM-QXE3].
106
Cf. Rob Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice, 14
FUTURE OF CHILD. 131, 135 (2004) (noting children in kinship care are “far more
likely to be black than children in non-kin foster care.”).
107
See Merav Jedwab et al., Kinship care first? Factors associated with
placement move in out-of-home care, 115 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 5 (2020)
(“African American children, compared to other races, had higher odds of being
placed in kinship care”); Geen, supra note 106, at 134 (“Almost all states report giving
preference to and actively seeking out kin when children cannot remain with their
biological parents.”).
108
See Jedwab et al., supra note 107, at 5 (“African American children,
compared to other races, had higher odds of being placed in kinship care”); Geen,
supra note 106, at 134 (“Almost all states report giving preference to and actively
seeking out kin when children cannot remain with their biological parents.”).
109
See, e.g., How can we improve placement stability for children in foster
care?, supra note 103 (“A systematic review of research studies on kinship care found
that the behavior, mental health, and well-being of children placed in kinship care is
better than that of children placed in traditional/non-relative foster care, and that
children placed with relatives are least likely to experience placement instability.”);
Leonard Edwards, Relative Placement: The Best Answer for Our Foster Care System,
69 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 55, 58 (2018) (“Research has demonstrated that children placed
with their kin fare better than those placed in foster care.”); Ellyn Jameson, Comment,
“Best” Interests and “Bad” Parents: Immigration and Child Welfare Through the
Lens of SIJS and Foster Care, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 513, 520 (2020) (“Children
removed from their homes fare far better in kinship care than in foster care with
strangers by every metric and it has been lauded as the best solution for the notoriously
problematic foster care system.”); JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N, IMPROVING
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outcomes are quite mixed,110 and the studies have serious design flaws—
in particular, falsely assuming the two populations (children in kinship
care and children in non-relative foster care) are comparable, even though
there is no random assignment.111 Children placed in non-relative care are
VIRGINIA’S
FOSTER
CARE
SYS.
28
(2018),
http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt513-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7TQ-DY9B]
[hereinafter JLARC Report] (“National research shows that, compared to children in
other placements, children placed with relatives tend to experience improved
outcomes . . . .”); Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children,
supra note 103, at 1625.
110
See, e.g., Sarah A. Font, Are children safer with kin? A comparison of
maltreatment risk in out-of-home care, 54 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 20, 22 (2015)
(“children in formal kin placements were found to have significantly higher exposure
to physical violence when compared with children in non-relative care (Litrownik et
al., 2003). Formal kin caregivers have also been found to use harsher disciplinary
techniques… [and] scored significantly higher on the Child Abuse Potential Index as
compared with non-relative foster parents.”); id. at 24 (finding from statewide sample
of nearly 50,000 children not in parental custody that “about 14.5% of IKC [informal
kinship care] placements experience a maltreatment investigation, a rate at least 60%
higher than NRFC [non-relative foster care] or FKC [formal kinship care]
placements… FKC and NRFC placements are approximately equally likely to
experience an investigation of an OHP [out-of-home placement] caregiver”); Sarah A.
Font, Kinship and Nonrelative Foster Care: The Effect of Placement Type on Child
Well-Being, 85 CHILD DEV. 2074, 2074 (2014) (finding, from national sample of 1,215
children, negative effect of kin placements on reading scores, no difference in child
health, and mixed results on math and cognitive skills test scores and behavioral
problems); Sarah A. Font, Is higher placement stability in kinship foster care by virtue
or design?, 42 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 99, 108 (2015) (noting “better performance
among NFRC (non-relative foster care) placements with high risk children.”); see also
id. (“All differences, even in the full sample, decrease substantially or disappear
entirely after the first 2 months.”).
111
See, e.g., Font, Is higher placement stability in kinship foster care by virtue
or design?, supra note 110, at 108; Marc Winokur et al., Kinship care for the safety,
permanency, and well‐being of children removed from the home for maltreatment,
2014 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS., no. 1, at 20, available at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7386884/pdf/CD006546.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XY2K-5KN3] (“the lack of a baseline measurement of initial
behavioural functioning makes ambiguous the conclusion that children in foster care
have lower levels of current behavioural functioning. Furthermore, caregiver reports
may be biased because foster parents have more incentive to report behavioural and
mental health issues, whereas relatives are more apt to view the behaviour as
acceptable and thus less likely to report it as problematic.”); id. (noting “the
pronounced methodological and design weaknesses of the included studies and
particularly the absence of conclusive evidence on the comparability of groups. It is
clear that researchers and practitioners must do better to mitigate the biases that cloud
the study of kinship care.”); id. (bemoaning “the weak standing of quantitative
research on kinship care (Cuddeback 2004). Specifically, the "differences between the
children who enter kinship care and those who enter nonkinship care" lead to a lack
of confidence regarding the comparability of groups and the subsequent lack of control
over contaminating events such as family preservation services (Barth 2008b, p. 218).
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typically from more deeply fractured biological families and much harder
for anyone to care for because of their pre-existing individual
characteristics (e.g., disability, health problems, behavioral disorders) and
pre-placement histories (e.g., sexual and other abuse by parents, prior
foster care episodes).112 Relatives step forward more often to take in
children who are less challenging.113 Some children, though not unusually
challenging, are in non-relative care because the agency was not able to
identify a suitable relative at the time of removal or qualify someone
identified quickly.114 But in those cases, the agency is likely to disrupt the

In general, the included studies also have unclear to high risks of performance,
detection, reporting, and attrition bias, which compromise the tenability of the findings
from the systematic review.”); Eun Koh & Mark F. Testa, Propensity Score Matching
of Children in Kinship and Nonkinship Foster Care: Do Permanency Outcomes Still
Differ?, 32 SOC. WORK RSCH. 105, 106 (2008).
112
See Koh & Testa, supra note 111, at 106 (“Differences in the characteristics
of kin and nonkin placements, which many studies have demonstrated, make such
arguments plausible. Children in kinship settings are different from children in
nonkinship settings in many characteristics such as age, race, and disability (Beeman
et al., 2000; Berrick, Barth, & Needell, 1994; Chipungu et al., 1998; Grogan-Kaylor,
2000).); id. at 109 (“Children in nonkinship placements are more likely to have been
removed because of abuse or neglect and to have entered out-of-home care at later
years compared with children in kinship foster care.”); Jedwab et al., supra note 107;
Carolien Konijn et al., Foster care placement instability: A meta-analytic review, 96
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 483 (2019); Font, Is higher placement stability in
kinship foster care by virtue or design?, supra note 110, at 100 (“today’s children
generally only enter NRFC if a kinship placement is not available.”); id. at 101; id. at
105; id. at 108 (“children who enter kinship care have better cognitive scores, fewer
behavior problems, lower rates of disability, and fewer biological family risk factors
than children entering non-relative foster care (e.g., Font, 2014).”); Font, Are children
safer with kin?, supra note 110, at 21–22 (“Children with more severe maltreatment
histories may have more difficulty attaching to a new caregiver, and may exhibit more
behavioral and mental health problems than children with no or fewer past experiences
of maltreatment. … [and] may be less willing to disclose when the abuser is a relative.
Additionally, case-workers may make fewer visits to kinship foster homes than nonrelative foster homes thus leaving less opportunity for maltreatment to be identified
or disclosed.”); Geen, supra note 106, at 135 (noting children in kinship care are more
likely to have been removed because of neglect rather than abuse, parent-child
conflict, or behavioral problems).
113
See, e.g., JLARC Report, supra note 109, at 29 (“Of 161 local department
caseworkers who responded to JLARC’s survey, about half said that, in the past 12
months, they had asked relatives to be foster parents, and relatives had ultimately
declined. The most commonly cited reasons for declining were (1) the high needs of
the child in foster care, such as challenging behavioral or medical needs, (2) an
inability or unwillingness to go through the foster parent approval process, (3) an
inability to meet the criteria for approval, and (4) an inability to assume the financial
responsibilities of caring for the child.”).
114
See Edwards, supra note 109, at 63 (“Criminal background checks seemed to
take months. Finding fathers was a struggle and some agencies simply did not try to
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placement when any minimally-capable relative does appear, and then the
children will be treated as evidence that non-relative placements are
inferior because less stable.115 The policy causes instability, then the
instability is cited to support the policy.
Currently, the Family First Act pushes states to leave children in
homes with parents reported for maltreatment, shifting funds from foster
care to maltreatment-prevention services.116 The message to social
workers is that they could safely leave at-risk children in parental custody
far more often, if only they provided parents more services. Certain
underlying premises are crucial, but dubious – namely, that services exist
that are effective in preventing maltreatment incipience or recurrence
(which most often stems from chronic and severe substance abuse and/or
mental illness) and that agencies have simply lacked information or money
to provide those services.117 The Act restricts use of additional prevention
money to services supported by substantial research—that is,
demonstration of their effectiveness, but without a clear and concrete
statement of what they must be effective in accomplishing.118 The Act
only broadly refers to mental health, substance abuse prevention,
parenting skills, and “important child and parent outcomes.”119 This
locate unmarried fathers. Searches for relatives often did not start until the father could
be located, and many relatives were reluctant to engage in the process during the
reunification process, hoping that the custodial parent would succeed in reuniting with
the child.”).
115
See Jedwab, supra note 107, at 8 (“In some cases, a child could enter care
because a kinship caregiver had not been screened yet, and when the family is
approved, the child will be moved into the kinship care placement.”); Font, Is higher
placement stability in kinship foster care by virtue or design?, supra note 110, at 105
(finding from statewide multi-year sample that “NRFC placements are… less likely
to be intended as long-term placements). Sometimes the agency will even remove a
child from a non-relative placement in order to shift the child to a different nonrelative placement, in order to prevent adoption by the (typically different-race) foster
parents with whom the child has lived since initial removal, because its steadfast
objective when a child cannot safely return to birth parents is placement with
biological relatives. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 1, A.R.L. v. Norfolk Dep’t
Hum. Servs., No. 4:20-CV-00110 (E.D. Va. July 13, 2020) [hereinafter A.R.L.
Complaint]. This, too, will register as placement instability’ with non-relatives.
116
See Fabiola Villalpando, Family First Prevention Services Act: An Overhaul
of National Child Welfare Policies, 39 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 283, 283 (2019).
117
See Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment
of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, supra note 38, at 424–26, 430–32.
118
See 42 U.S.C § 671(d)(4)(C).
119
See 42 U.S.C § 671(d)(4)(C)(v). Ultimately, funded prevention services must
be “well-supported” by “evidence,” meaning “superior to an appropriate comparison
practice using conventional standards of statistical significance… in validated
measures of important child and parent outcomes… as established by… at least two
studies that… were rated by an independent systematic review … well-designed and
well-executed [and] were rigorous random-controlled trials (or, if not available,
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invites debate about the design, validity, proper interpretation, and
significance of research touted in favor of particular programs. Already
there are signs that bad research will carry the day.120
In sum, the past several decades of child welfare policy have been
marked by a succession of new approaches to managing parents and
children in response to maltreatment reports, aimed at preserving parents’
legal status and effecting either return of children who have been removed
or transfer to parents of children taken into state custody at birth. These
strategies reflect hostility to adoption – especially adoption of black
children by white caregivers – regardless of a child’s age or existing
relationship to the parents. Proponents have made empirical claims resting
on bad research and subsequently undermined by good research.

III. VIEWING THE PROBLEM THROUGH A LENS OF
EXPERIMENTATION AND RESEARCH ETHICS
The foregoing description of various programmatic responses to
child maltreatment illustrates several problems relating to social-service
experimentation and the social-science research used to promote it. These
problems infect other social policy realms as well.

A. Inadequate Pre-Implementation Review
As shown in Part II, new ideas for interventions into intimate aspects
of individuals lives are implemented broadly without reliable evidentiary
basis for their promises. These policies have life-altering impact on
persons incapable of objecting, and valid ex-post research concludes the
innovation does not generate the desired outcome and instead inflicts
harm.121 Certainly, social service agencies should be attentive to new

studies using a “rigorous quasi-experimental research design”).” 42 U.S.C §
671(d)(4)(C). The Act directs DHHS to provide additional guidance, but it offered no
more specificity regarding types or objectives of services than the legislation. See U.S.
ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, ACYF-CB-PI-18-09 (2018),
https://www.cwla.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ACYF-CB-PI-18-09-StateFFPSA-Prevention-PI.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHZ7-4YJ6].
120
See, e.g., Marie Cohen, The misuse of data to support preferred programs:
the case of family resource centers, CHILD WELFARE MONITOR (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://childwelfaremonitor.org/2021/09/21/the-misuse-of-data-to-support-preferredprograms-the-case-of-family-resource-centers/ [https://perma.cc/J68Y-J55F]; Marie
Cohen, Homebuilders program, never proven effective for family preservation,
approved regardless by Title IV-E Clearinghouse, CHILD WELFARE MONITOR (Apr. 8,
2020),
https://childwelfaremonitor.org/2020/04/08/homebuilders-program-neverproven-effective-for-family-preservation-approved-regardless-by-title-iv-eclearinghouse/ [https://perma.cc/U7CR-3D7Y].
121
See supra Part II.
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approaches that might be better, but novel medical interventions with far
less impact would be subject to much greater ex-ante strictures, even if
undertaken by public agencies without profit motive. Social-service
innovations are simply not recognized as the human-subject experiments
they truly are. They transform overnight from some advocacy
organization’s theory to the new “best practice” and implemented widely,
often on the wings of early program evaluations commissioned by the
advocacy organizations themselves.122
Some innovations in social-service practice do require formal preapproval by government officials, at least in some states.123 For example,
before the invention and proliferation of DR (channeling supposedly less
serious cases to an assessment-only track), state laws required
investigation of all screened-in reports, so legislatures had to amend
statutes to permit local agencies to forego investigation in some cases.124
Prison nurseries have mostly required legislation, at least for additional
funding to retrofit prison space.125 Some innovations, such as IFPS, might
already have been within agency operational discretion but, in some
jurisdictions or in order to make it proliferate, required new funding or
redirection of existing funding, and therefore legislation at the federal
and/or state level.126 Any such legislation would go through the normal
vetting process, including referral to a committee that would hold public
hearings at which interested parties could present objections. 127 Other
innovations might require only change to a state’s administrative code, but
then “notice and comment” should precede decision making.128
Even when there is such a formal approval process by a deliberative
government body, the value of vetting could vary considerably, depending
122

See supra notes 50–120 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: Differential Response in Child
Protection, 21 J.L. & POL'Y 73, 74, 77 (2012).
124
Id.
125
See, e.g., H.B. 258, 150th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2020); JUDICIARY COMM.
JOINT FAVORABLE REPORT ON HB-5569, AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CHILD NURSERY
FACILITY AT THE CONNECTICUT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, NIANTIC (Conn. 2014).
126
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.14C.040 (West 1995).
127
See H.R. Doc. No. 110-49, at 9, 13–14 (2007).
128
See, e.g., 20 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-201-40 (2018) (administrative code
provision relating to foster care placements that is a mix of federal mandate (no race
matching), state mandates (e.g., search for relatives), and agency policy (e.g., “place
the child in as close proximity as possible to the birth parent's or prior custodian's
home”); see also Implement Foster Parent Bill of Rights and Reenforce the Role of
Foster and Adoptive Parents Action, VA. DEP’T SOC. SERVS.,
https://www.townhall.virginia.gov/l/ViewAction.cfm?actionid=5383
[https://perma.cc/J6WA-8DBC] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021) (indicating proposed
addition of Foster Parent Bill of Rights to administrative code is subject to Virginia
APA).
123
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on how prominent a proposal is on a particular legislature’s agenda, the
extent of public awareness, and who has the inclination and resources to
participate.129 Typical legislators are themselves policy generalists,
unlikely to have expertise in a particular area such as child welfare, and
few are trained or naturally sophisticated consumers of scientific
research.130 Federal legislators and congressional committees have
staffers with somewhat deeper substantive knowledge on many issues, but
expertise in social services for vulnerable populations might not be high
on a hiring-priority list, and one legislator who does have expertise can be
outvoted by two who lack expertise or do not value expertise.131 If one
imagines Congress rather than the FDA deciding whether drug
manufacturers may commence human-subject clinical trials with new
vaccinations or pharmaceuticals, one can readily perceive the unreliability
of legislative deliberation for rational decision making as to complex
human service matters, especially if any lobbying and public comment are
heavily lopsided in favor of approval. State legislators are less likely than
federal legislators to have expertise within their staff, given their smaller
office budgets, yet they are at least as susceptible to persuasion by wealthy
constituents and campaign contributors.132
In addition, no ethical code like that for medicine governs
experimentation in provision of public benefits and services.133 Omnibus
legislation might require a fiscal or environmental impact for many
129
See Drutman & Teles, supra note 15 (“Given limited time and nearly
unlimited demands, policymakers have to choose who and what to pay genuine
attention to. The loudest, most insistent voices have an advantage.”).
130
See Craig Volden and Alan E. Wiseman, “Members of Congress are
specializing less often. That makes them less effective.” The Washington Post (Sept.
17, 2020).
131
Cf. See Drutman & Teles, supra note 15 (describing a “pattern of diminished
in-house expertise… throughout government”); Ruth Mayne et al., Using evidence to
influence policy: Oxfam’s experience, 4 PALGRAVE COMMC’N 1, 2–3 (2018)
(describing cognitive shortcuts and indifference to evidence among legislators); David
Eads, Too Many Politicians Misuse and Abuse Crime Data: When sloppily cherrypicking isolated numbers, they disrespect our intelligence and our democracy, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
10,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/politics/giuliani-trump-chicago-datacrime.html [https://perma.cc/NBN8-2MXE] (describing some politicians’
indifference to empirical research in promoting crime policy).
132
See Daniel E. Bergan, Does Grassroots Lobbying Work?: A Field Experiment
Measuring the Effects of an e-Mail Lobbying Campaign on Legislative Behavior, 37
AM. POLS. RSCH. 327, 329 (2009); State Legislators: Who They Are and How to Work
with Them: A Guide to Oral Health Professionals, NCSL.ORG (Mar. 2018),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/HTML_LargeReports/OralHealth_3.htm
[https://perma.cc/MRL5-PRMF].
133
See, e.g., Code of Medical Ethics: Research & innovation, AMA,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-researchinnovation [https://perma.cc/J39P-N6B8] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
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laws,134 but none requires a scientifically-rigorous review of evidence
informing judgments about likely impact on vulnerable persons. With
respect to child welfare, the simplistic notion of “family preservation” is
appealing to many, and legislators have repeatedly accepted claims by
advocates for parents and for poor and minority-race communities that
research shows the latest innovation will reduce state spending on foster
care, child protection agencies, and other costs of parental struggles, while
also improving children’s lives.135
Public comment provides a potential mechanism for injecting greater
expertise and ethical constraint, but it might come too late if lobbyists have
already persuaded legislators or agency heads, and any impact is likely to
depend on who shows up to hearings and how capable state agency
administrators are.136 Non-autonomous persons, whether children or
mentally-incompetent adults, themselves almost never attend hearings or
prepare presentations to counteract lobbying by powerful organizations
like Casey Family Programs or by advocates for one or another group of
adults, such as incarcerated women or poor and minority-race parents. If
children do attempt to participate in policy making, they are likely to
receive patronizing smiles or outright dismissal.137 Thus, whether there is
any input on their behalf that commands attention depends on existence of
organizational or individual advocates for them that learn about proposed
legislation or rulemaking and have the resources to lobby or to attend
hearings and make an effective presentation.

134
See, e.g., Fiscal Impact Review, VA. DEP’T HOUS. CMTY. DEV.,
https://www.dhcd.virginia.gov/fiscal-impact-review [https://perma.cc/BX6P-KDY7]
(last visited Oct. 24, 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1188(A) (West 2021) (“All state
agencies, boards, authorities and commissions or any branch of the state government
shall prepare and submit an environmental impact report to the Department on each
major state project.”).
135
See Elizabeth Bartholet, Thoughts on the Liberal Dilemma in Child Welfare
Reform, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 725–26 (2016).
136
See Daniel M. Butler & David R. Miller, Does Lobbying Affect Bill
Advancement? Evidence from Three State Legislatures, POL. RSCH. Q. (forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
2),
available
at
https://journals-sagepubcom.proxy.mul.missouri.edu/doi/epub/10.1177/10659129211012481; NAT'L CONF.
STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATORS: WHO THEY ARE AND HOW TO WORK
WITH
THEM
1
(Apr.
2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/cyf/ChildSupportProfessionals_v02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FWB-CVCY] (“Because of the variety and complexity of the
policy issues before them, state legislators often rely on their staff, researchers, experts
in the field, lobbyists, practitioners and community members to gather information
and develop policies . . . .”).
137
See Peter Wade, Sen. Dianne Feinstein Condescends to Kid Activists Touting
Green New Deal, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 23, 2019, 11:36 AM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/feinstein-green-new-dealactivists-799240/ [https://perma.cc/3YPD-HC9E].
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Social service agency officials presumably have greater expertise in
their field than do legislators, but they too might not be sophisticated
consumers of social science, nor able to maintain a clear and consistent
focus on the needs of the most vulnerable – in particular, if doing so is
likely to be more expensive, require more staff, increase caseloads, and
trigger complaints from other groups. Compared to the medical sector, the
social-services sector generally has far less sophisticated and more
ideologically-driven leaders and employees.138 It also has a substantial
problem of non-accountability to non-autonomous persons, because
conflicts of interest often arise between those persons and their caretakers,
with whom agencies more directly deal, as with child protection
services.139
In addition, agency administration incentives differ between medical
and social service sectors.140 The FDA does not itself produce or
administer new drugs or treat patients; its performance is judged by the
accuracy and objectivity of its screening function.141 It seems more likely
to generate new funding for itself by identifying problems with new
products, thereby demonstrating the agency’s value, than it is by creating
a perception that innovation always promises progress. In contrast, social
service agency officials often have self-interested reasons to approve new
interventions. They will administer the intervention, and doing so creates
a promise of improved agency performance that could stave off a
legislative or public verdict of ineptitude—in particular, if the legislature
has signaled new expectations.142 It might open new streams of funding

138

See RILEY, NO WAY TO TREAT A CHILD, supra note 95, at 146–50 (describing
the very low status of social work departments within universities, very low average
academic ability of social work students, and ideological nature of social worker
training); STOESZ, supra note 33, at 102–20 (discussing dominance of adult-focused,
anti-science, social-justice ideology in social work schools).
139
See GELLES, OUT OF HARM’S WAY, supra note 33, at 75–93 (showing that
child protection workers generally view parents rather than children as their clients
and deal directly primarily with the parents, whom they are charged to rehabilitate).
140
Compare The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and
Effective,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Nov.
24,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-consumers-and-patients-drugs/fdas-drugreview-process-ensuring-drugs-are-safe-and-effective
[https://perma.cc/CL956UQK], with Yue Stella Yu, `It’s emotionally exhausting’: Tennessee’s Children’s
Services workers express frustration in workload, leadership, NASHVILLE
TENNESSEAN
(Aug.
5,
2021
4:48
PM),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2021/08/05/tennessee-department-ofchildrens-services-workers-express-frustration/5497014001/
[https://perma.cc/W9HR-XYCZ].
141
See id.
142
See, e.g., Yu, supra note 140 (reporting that caseworkers are under pressure
from the agency head to close child protection cases quickly, even if that means
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for the agency or give the director opportunity for career advancement.143
There is also a self-policing function in medicine that might not exist in
social services; drug companies lose customers and get sued if their
products have adverse consequences.144
Further, as discussed in Part II, many local social service agencies
have substantial discretion to adopt new practices independently, without
any public input or legislative approval.145 One might hope these
specialized agencies’ supposed expertise and commitment to vulnerable
persons would prevent dangerous experimentation, but both virtues are
demonstrably more theoretical than real. Local human service agencies
are generally staffed by graduates of weak, ideology-dominated training
programs.146 A common pattern in child welfare is for parent-custodyfocused forces like the Casey Foundation to target sympathetic local
agencies, sell them on a new approach, offer assistance of various kinds,
commission and direct research to support the new approach, and then
urge legislators to mandate state-wide or even nation-wide adoption of
it.147 The only checks on such innovations might be the very remote
possibilities of successful constitutional challenge by some adults
displeased with decisions adverse to them (e.g., applicants for foster care
or adoption who somehow find out they were discriminated against), or

returning children to unsafe homes, to satisfy a legislative mandate to reduce worker
caseloads).
143
For example, Congress recently authorized federal funding for state child
welfare agencies to create and operate a “prevention-focused infrastructure” to avoid
removal of children from parental custody. See Family First Legislation, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/family-firstupdates-and-new-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/UGW2-VDGG] (last visited Mar.
6, 2022).
144
Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(holding state agency not subject to constitutional tort liability for harm to children by
parents).
145
See discussion supra Part II (discussion of FDCs, IFPS, race-sensitivity
training, foster-care race quotas, and kin preference).
146
See RILEY, NO WAY TO TREAT A CHILD, supra note 95, at 146–50; STOESZ,
supra note 33, at 102–20; JILL RIVERA GREENE ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF NEW YORK
CITY ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES SAFETY PRACTICE AND INITIATIVES
2,
5
(2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/acs/pdf/testimony/2017/NYCACSAssessmentReportM
ay2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ4A-C7L] (acknowledging extensive involvement of
Casey staff in the study).
147
See Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child
Welfare, supra note 35, at 576–77; Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality
Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, supra note 90,
at 880–84; see The power of wishful thinking: the case of “race-blind removals” in
child welfare, supra note 102 (explaining fundamental flaws in a study Casey used to
promote this innovation).
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else personal consequences for agency officials or caseworkers if things
go badly – for example, firing or, in rare cases, criminal prosecution.148
The danger of governmental policy making without public comment
is especially great when it relates to non-autonomous persons. Those left
behind closed doors with guardians will not be heard from. Those who
come to agency attention after maltreatment and are taken into state
custody (e.g., foster care) are in a situation similar to prisoners upon whom
medical experimentation has been done.149 State agencies can handle
those persons’ cases in untested ways based on speculation about effects,
without awareness by an appropriate independent proxy for the dependent
persons or of the community, and/or without anyone having authority to
object.150 For children, this can include choice of placement (e.g., kin care
vs. non-kin foster care), nature of services provided and of interactions
with family members, and prolongation of foster care rather than changing
the permanency plan to adoption.151 With prison nursery programs, states

148

See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families For Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 817 (1977) (unsuccessful challenge to process for removing children from foster
homes); Howard Fischer, Appeals Court: Fired child welfare workers aren’t owed
jobs back, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Dec. 27, 2016), https://azdailysun.com/appeals-courtfired-child-welfare-workers-arent-owed-jobs-back/article_fe076259-143a-5aabb0df-a4f0e5fed147.html [https://perma.cc/S3VN-TXKF]; Alejandra Reyes-Velarde,
Charges dismissed against social workers linked to Gabriel Fernandez’s killing, LOS
ANGELES
TIMES
(July
16,
2020,
10:59
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-15/charges-against-the-socialworkers-linked-to-gabriel-fernandez-killing-will-be-dropped
[https://perma.cc/4UC5-BDRX].
149
Cf. Matt Lamkin & Carl Elliott, Involuntarily Committed Patients As
Prisoners, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 1041, 1042 (2017) (“Like prisoners, involuntarily
committed patients are confined against their will, rendering them isolated and
dependent on institutional authorities.”).
150
See, e.g., A.R.L. Complaint, supra note 115 (alleging public foster care
agency violated child’s due process rights by disrupting long-term placement and
attachment relationship with non-relative foster parents, with no justification but
internal policy to prefer kin placement, and without any administrative process or
possibility of judicial review).
151
See Rachel Sheffield, A Place to Call Home: Improving Foster Care and
Adoption Policy to Give More Children a Stable Family, JOINT ECON. COMM. (Sept.
9, 2020), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2020/9/a-placeto-call-home-improving-foster-care-and-adoption-policy-to-give-more-children-astable-family [https://perma.cc/G9YG-KTTR]; Amy Harfeld, Twenty Years of
Progress in Advocating for a Child’s Right to Counsel: There is much work to be done
before the promise of full legal rights for dependent children is realized, ABA (Mar.
22, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/articles/2019/spring2019-twenty-years-of-progress-in-advocating-for-a-childsright-to-counsel/ [https://perma.cc/MXH4-6QCA] (“Current law sets the federal floor
to require only a non-attorney guardian ad litem (GAL) or CASA to `represent’ the
child by conveying to the court what the GAL or CASA deems to be in the child’s
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literally make children prison inmates – living in a prison 24/7 potentially
for two or three years – unable to leave, yet there is no appointed advocate
for the child nor any rule requiring an assessment of whether residing in
prison is in the child’s best interests.152 Naturally, state agencies hope their
experiments will be only beneficial, but Part II showed that hope often has
no empirical foundation and ultimately proves false.
Moreover, state decision makers generally face neither political
accountability nor legal liability for unwise programmatic innovation. The
persons most likely to be harmed are generally disempowered, not likely
to discern and formally complain about defects inherent in a program or
process that harmed them. In any event, state actors are protected from
suit by state-action doctrine, qualified immunity and in many jurisdictions,
low standards of care.153 They incur liability, if ever, only when
caseworkers are deliberately indifferent to abuse by foster parents, not for
any failed family-preservation innovation.154
A final problem regarding implementation of novel ideas in social
services is lack of piloting – that is, an incremental approach that begins
with just a few, low-risk cases and expands only after reliable verification
of the safety and welfare of subjects and assessment of whether the
intervention is effective.155 Piloting of a sort has occurred with some
innovations, but with others there has been a blanket statutory command
or authorization at the federal or state level. Then many states or localities

best interest. ... Only representation by an attorney properly allows for critical court
functions such as filing motions, appeals, subpoenas, and objections, and examining
witnesses.”).
152
See Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment
of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, supra note 38, at 470–76. In the rare case when
a father has tried to secure custody of a child, he has been refused. See Apgar v.
Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (“even the father does not have
the power under this statute to countermand the decision of an inmate mother to keep
her child”).
153
See generally Jarod Bona, The State Action Doctrine for Federal
Constitutional
Claims,
RGLOBAL
(Aug.
26,
2020),
https://www.irglobal.com/article/the-state-action-doctrine-for-federal-constitutionalclaims/ [https://perma.cc/VN58-SQB7]; Madeleine Carisle, The Debate Over
Qualified Immunity Is at the Heart of Police Reform. Here’s What to Know, TIME
(June 3, 2021, 6:35 PM), https://time.com/6061624/what-is-qualified-immunity/
[https://perma.cc/43SQ-LGN8].
154
See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 175
(4th Cir. 2010); Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
189 (1989) (holding state agency not subject to constitutional tort liability for harm to
children by parents following CPS return of repeatedly-abused child to parent
custody).
155
See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 123, at 74–75.
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adopt the new approach wholesale for all cases or a large subset of cases.156
In the pharmaceutical realm, this simply would not be allowed.157
That the changes in child welfare policy described in Part II are
implicitly recognized as experimental is evidenced by the fact that
substantial research is typically done on them after the fact in an effort to
demonstrate or objectively assess their effectiveness.158 Subparts B
through E below articulate the several specific problems with that
research.

B. Entities with Self Interest in Outcomes Conduct the Research
Three types of incentives compromise the objectivity of researchers
studying social-service delivery. What influences a particular social
scientist might depend to some extent on institutional location; academic
researchers are theoretically more independent than researchers working
for entities that dictate the content and objectives of research – for
example, some foundations, government agencies, commercial operations,
or policy institutes.159 But all face certain temptations to result-driven
work.160 One is the desire to reach the “right” conclusions in order to
secure continued employment or future grants.161 A second is personal
bias, a desire to demonstrate positive results of a program one favors

156

See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 123, at 74–75 (2012) (noting that some states
first piloted differential response in a few counties whereas others adopted it wholesale
at the outset).
157
See infra notes 238–44 and accompanying text.
158
See supra Part II.
159
Cf. Gläser et al., supra note 8 (noting danger that “demands from employers”
or “allegiance-turned-prejudice” compromise objectivity of research); Maria
Zagorulya, The Tough Choice of a Life Scientist: Industry vs. Academia, J. YOUNG
INVESTIGATORS (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.jyi.org/2015-november/2017/3/22/thetough-choice-of-a-life-scientist-industry-vs-academia
[https://perma.cc/Q84YR7QQ] (“Academic researchers benefit from significant freedom when choosing their
research topics, approaches, and collaborators, while industrial scientists have
significantly less say in the direction of their work."); Think Tanks and Policy
Institutes,
CITIZEN
SOURCE,
https://www.citizensource.com/Opinion&Policy/ThinkTanks.htm
[https://perma.cc/E9SD-EEZB] (last visited Mar. 6, 2022) (identifying the political
agendas of many research institutes); Activist Facts, ECON. POL’Y INST.,
https://www.activistfacts.com/organizations/516-economic-policy-institute/
[https://perma.cc/AV78-F2ZF] (last visited Mar. 6, 2022) (“EcPI’s donors have on at
least one occasion been allowed to review its research prior to publication.”).
160
See Piper, Science Funding is a Mess. Could Grant Lottery Make It Better?,
supra note 23.
161
See id.

2022]

SOCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION

39

because of one’s ideology or values.162 A third is professional self-interest
in the success of a program one is studying/conducting.163

1. Financial Self-Interest
Casey Family Programs is the clearest example of money distorting
child welfare policy and research. A behemoth foundation that focuses on
CPS practice, Casey is ideologically committed to eliminating foster care
and enhancing parents’ legal rights.164 It aggressively promotes familypreservation preferences in federal and state governments, and it funds a
great deal of research on programs embodying those preferences.165 This
gives the foundation inordinate power over the field and enables its
anointed researchers to control perceptions of experimental programs, at
least initially.166 Those whom it funds know Casey wants its favored
programs to show positive results, and this likely explains much of the
suspect research design and questionable interpretation of results
discussed in Part II.
One particularly overt way research manifests bias is in choice of
program outcomes or performance measures – for example, focusing on
parental possession of children and satisfaction rather than impact on child
wellbeing.167 A benign explanation for this focus could be the difficulty of
studying non-autonomous persons directly, including IRB approval,
discussed in Part IV But researchers express no regret about lack of direct
attention to child welfare and either (1) blithely portray programs and
practice as successful based solely on other measures, or (2)

162
See Gläser et al., supra note 8 (noting that “research allegiance, which is
understood as the adherence of a reasearcher to a theory or approach, turns into
epistemic prejudice… a strong intereset in confirming the superiority of theories or
approaches regardless of available evidence.”); Underhill, supra note 7, at 166.
163
See infra notes 174–205 and accompanying text.
164
See Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child
Welfare, supra note 35, at 576–77. At one point, Casey announced an aim to halve the
foster care population—but not to reduce rates of maltreatment—by 2020. CASEY
FAM. PROGRAMS, 2020: A VISION FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN (2020),
https://www.gahsc.org/nm/2009/ppcasey2020vision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET8TR8QT].
165
Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child Welfare,
supra note 35, at 584 (“The Casey Alliance used its wealth both to promote policy
advocacy on [race disproportionality] and to fund related research. For example, it
approached states throughout the country saying: we will help study your racial
disproportionality problem, write the report stating the nature of your problem, and
then help solve your problem with appropriate new policies.”).
166
See supra notes 50–66, 103–20 and accompany text.
167
See supra note 63 and infra notes 176 and 187–90 and accompanying text.
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mischaracterize other measures as “child-welfare outcomes.”168 For
example, in connection with Differential Response, Casey and other
foundations lobbied for supportive legislation and then funded research
claiming success for DR programs based solely on rates at which parents
retain custody or express satisfaction.169 Subsequent study by independent
social scientists determined the Casey-funded research was improperly
designed and mistakenly analyzed and that DR actually put many children
at substantial risk of serious harm.170

2. Personal Ideology or Policy Preference
Many social scientists who focus on the child protection system
appear pre-disposed to reach positive conclusions as to familypreservation programs simply because they are personally sympathetic to
poor and minority-race communities.171
Those whose work is
concentrated in a different field but who attempt a study in the child
welfare realm might be ignorant of child-welfare indicators or of childprotection processes. But then, too, normative commitments, such as race
or sexual orientation equality, appear to drive the research.172 This work,
too, displays poor design and misinterpretation of results, consistently in
a direction serving researchers’ policy commitments. Ideology can also
infect editorial boards of child welfare journals, creating an inviting venue
for ideologically-driven researchers.173
168
Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child Welfare,
supra note 35, at 622–23.
169
See id. at 576–78, 591–93, 609–11, 613–15.
170
See id. at 620–35; Hughes et al., supra note 36, at 493.
171
See STOESZ, supra note 33, at 66ff; DWYER, LIBERAL CHILD WELFARE POLICY
AND ITS DESTRUCTION OF BLACK LIVES, supra note 48, at 201–34.
172
See, e.g., Netta Barak-Corren & Nelson Tebbe, Does Harm Result When
Religious Placement Agencies Close Their Doors? New Empirical Evidence from the
Case of Boston Catholic Charities, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/10/does-harm-result-when-religious.html
[https://perma.cc/RZM8-HH23] (report of “preliminary results,” based on supposed
indicators that are actually irrelevant, suggesting no negative impact when a large
private foster care agency is pushed out because it discriminates against same-sex
couples, authored by law professors who previously had submitted an advocacy brief
in a case then before the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the same type of
agency action).
173
For example, the prominent child welfare journal Children and Youth
Services Review has a Co-Editor-in-Chief who is among those in the social work field
who continue to claim racial bias pervades the child protection system and explains
race disproportionality, citing as sole support pre-NIS4 publications issued or
supported by Casey. See Our Faculty: Darcey Merritt, NYU SCH. SOC.WORK,
https://socialwork.nyu.edu/faculty-and-research/our-faculty/darcey-merritt.html
[https://perma.cc/B28U-D9VE] (last visited Mar. 6, 2022); Darcey H. Merritt, How
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3. Studying Oneself
Persons who study programs that they themselves create or operate
have several incentives to show positive results regardless of what the truth
is – namely, personal satisfaction and self-esteem, professional reputation,
and future government or foundation funding of the same program or of
new projects. For example, in a study of the Miami-Dade County
Dependency Drug Court, Judge Jeri Beth Cohen, who founded the Court
and promoted the model nationally, served as a co-investigator and coauthor of the published report.174 The study examined the docket of one
of Judge Cohen’s colleagues, rather than her own, but Judge Cohen would
naturally have been pre-disposed to reach positive conclusions and to want
any positive results portrayed in the best light (i.e., as consistent with
children’s welfare rather than just protecting parents).175 Her coinvestigators, who must have been invited or approved by her, would have
known this. The research report thus declares improved “positive child
welfare outcomes” for the “Engaging Mom’s Program” (EMP), yet it
defined “child welfare” solely in terms of whether mothers avoided
termination of their parental rights.176 A subsequent independent
assessment of the study data by the federal Department of Justice found

Do Families Interact with CPS?, 692 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 203, 211
(2020) (“the child welfare system is one of a number of oppressive systems rooted in
structural discrimination and, as such, racial bias plays a role in the ways in which
CPS makes and executes programmatic decisions”) (citing Susan J. Wells et al., Bias,
racism, and evidence-based practice: The case for more focused development of the
child welfare evidence base, 31 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1160, 1160–71 (citing
ROBERT B. HILL, SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ON DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD
WELFARE: AN UPDATE (2006), https://assets.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-CFSSynthesisOfResearchOnDisproportionalityInChildWelfareAnUpdate-2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ML9Y-VUCL])).
174
See
Jeri
B. Cohen,
J.D., U. MIAMI HEALTH SYS.,
http://researchers.uhealthsystem.com/researchers/profile/150732
[https://perma.cc/W72S-HBAT] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021) (boasting that “In 1999,
Judge Cohen established the first Dependency Drug Court in Miami and one of the
first in the nation.”); Gayle A. Dakof et al., A Randomized Pilot Study of the Engaging
Moms Program for Family Drug Court, 38 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 265,
265 (2010).
175
Cf. Honorable Jeri B. Cohen, JD, EVIDENT CHANGE,
https://www.evidentchange.org/about-us/staff/honorable-jeri-b-cohen-jd
[https://perma.cc/A8MK-JAKK] (last visited Oct. 23, 2021) (“Judge Cohen’s strong
belief in treatment courts and the unique role the judiciary and community partners
play in protecting children from abuse and neglect is what defines her.”).
176
See Dakof et al., supra note 174, at 270.
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that, even so, the report’s claim was false and EMP actually showed no
positive effects of any kind.177
Another example is a study funded by Casey Family Programs
assessing the merits of “interdisciplinary law office” (“ILO”)
representation of parents charged with child maltreatment, as compared to
representation by solo “panel attorneys” who contract with the state on a
case-by-case basis.178 One of the co-authors is a clinical instructor at New
York University law school, Martin Guggenheim, who founded a Family
Defense Clinic that pioneered the ILO model and ultimately began placing
NYU students as clinical interns in one of the three ILO offices studied.179
Guggenheim also serves on the board of directors of another ILO, 180 and
he has long lobbied government officials to eliminate the panel attorney
system and substitute ILOs.181 Another co-author works for Casey, which
has also advocated for enhanced legal representation for parents.182 So, at
least two investigators had a strong antecedent interest in seeing positive
results that could trigger more public and private funding for ILOs to serve
parents charged with maltreatment.
The ILO study displays data-analysis sophistication and yields
intuitively plausible results.183 The ILO model seems likely to make
children as well as parents better off in most cases, by injecting greater
efficiency and rationality into agency and judicial processes that typically
are both chaotic and counter-productively generic.184 The glaring
analytical flaw of the study is that by design it cannot actually show it is
the inter-disciplinary nature of ILOs that caused any differences in

177
See Program Profile: Engaging Moms Program for Mothers in Family Drug
Court
(Miami,
Fla.),
NAT’L
INST.
JUST.
(Dec.
11,
2020),
https://crimesolutions.ojp.gov/ratedprograms/56#otherinfo [https://perma.cc/C4NBV8TQ] (“In 2011, the Engaging Moms Program received a final program rating of
Promising based on a review of a study by Dakof and colleagues (2010). In 2020,
CrimeSolutions conducted a re-review of the same study, using the updated
CrimeSolutions Program Scoring Instrument. This re-review resulted in the program
receiving a new final rating of No Effects. Programs rated No Effects have strong
evidence indicating they had no effects when implemented with fidelity.”).
178
See generally Lucas A. Gerber et al., Effects of an Interdisciplinary Approach
to Parental Representation in Child Welfare, 102 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERV. REV. 42
(2019).
179
Martin Guggenheim, How Clinical Scholarship Impacted the Family Defense
Clinic, 26 CLINICAL L. REV. 219, 227–28 (2019).
180
Gerber et al., supra note 178, at 53.
181
Guggenheim, supra note 179, at 230.
182
See How does high-quality legal representation for parents support better
outcomes?, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.casey.org/qualityparent-representation/ [https://perma.cc/Y3EM-Z52F].
183
See Gerber et al., supra note 178, at 52.
184
See id.
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outcomes; no effort was made to separate out effects from that feature as
opposed to (1) the greater capability of the salaried attorneys the ILOs hire
(mostly NYU law grads) relative to the scraping-by lawyers who do panel
work, or (2) the fact of being a collaborative multi-lawyer team in a firm
with administrative and clerical support rather than a bunch of
disconnected solo practitioners.185
What the study showed was a substantial difference in one outcome
measure – length of time children spend in foster care.186 And what is
most objectionable about the report, and likely reflects the influence of
Guggenheim and Casey, is its characterization of entry into and exit from
foster care as “critical child welfare outcomes” and treatment of parent
reunification and kin guardianship as achieving “permanency” for a
child.187 In reality, there is no straightforward connection between a
maltreated child’s location and his or her welfare.188 Stronger lawyers for
parents would naturally get better results for parents (e.g., lessened
likelihood of TPR, regardless of whether that would be best for children)
and would owe no duty to children. The study did not endeavor to assess
impact on child wellbeing from placement with relatives or disruption of
any established relationship with foster parents.189 Further, neither
reunifying with marginally-functional parents nor transfer to relatives
dragooned into service is a promising path to stability; “permanency” was
misleadingly defined as “any exit to reunification, guardianship, or
adoption,” without regard to how enduring the post-exit situation was.190
A different sort of self-study problem is reflected in the prison
nursery research conducted by a Columbia University nursing-school
team.191 The team’s report is widely and blithely cited by advocates for

185

Cf. Guggenheim, supra note 179, at 222, 229 (disparaging the quality of panel
attorneys); id. at 235 (stating numerous NYU law school graduates have gone to work
for the ILOs); Gerber et al., supra note 178, at 45.
186
Gerber et al., supra note 178, at 49–50 (also reporting null results on avoiding
entry and subsequent re-reporting for maltreatment).
187
See id. at 43, 46, 48, 52.
188
Reduced time in care appears primarily to reflect ILOs’ successfully pushing
for children to go live with relatives on an informal (non-foster-care) basis, either
initially after removal or by disrupting foster-care placements, not successful return to
parents (i.e., permanent and without further maltreatment) or adoption. See
Guggenheim, supra note 179, at 232 (“Giving parents lawyers from family defense
offices allowed children to be permanently released to relatives more than twice as
often in the first year of a case and 67% more often in the second year.”).
189
Gerber et al., supra note 178, at 46 (stating outcome measures).
190
Id.
191
Making Women’s Health a Priority: Programs and Research Targeting
Women and Maternal Health at CUSON Showcase a Diversity of Expertise, COLUM.
SCH. NURSING (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.nursing.columbia.edu/making-womens-
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incarcerated women as proof of success in ensuring secure attachment
among prison-nursery infants.192 The researchers did not work for the
prison, but they provided clinical services to the mothers in the nursery
unit and so presumably were heavily invested professionally and
personally in the nursery program’s success.193 The leader of the service
and research team, Professor Mary Byrne, received millions of dollars
from NIH and other sources over many years for this research, renewed as
she issued positive reports.194 The most widely-cited of the reports,
regarding rates of secure attachment, was published in a well-regarded
journal, yet was rife with methodological problems.195 In particular, the
study began with 100 mother-child dyads, but it excluded seventy from
reported results, for reasons suggesting those children had not formed a
secure attachment – indeed, the children likely had separated entirely from
their mothers.196 Yet the report (and Byrne’s characterizations of it
repeatedly in later publications) treated the thirty children who were not
excluded as representative of “children who resided in a U.S. prison
nursery,”197 for whom the team claimed a rate of secure attachment similar
to that for the general population in the community,198 ignoring the
health-priority [https://perma.cc/D67L-ZDHL] (describing Byrne’s long-standing
involvement in service provision at nursery she studied).
192
See, e.g., Caroline Beit, Legal, Ethical, and Developmental Considerations
Concerning Children in Prison Nursery Programs, 58 FAM. CT. REV. 1040, 1045
(2020); Torrey McConnell, The War on Women: Collateral Consequences of Female
Incarceration, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 493, 521 (2017).
193
See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
194
Cf. Mary W. Byrne, Maternal and Child Outcomes of a Prison Nursery
Program,
GRANTOME,
http://grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01-NR007782-02
[https://perma.cc/Y3XD-KLTB] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021) (showing Byrne received
~$3M from NIH for prison nursery research).
195
Byrne et al., Intergenerational Attachment for Infants Raised in a Prison
Nursery, supra note 85, at 375–393; see Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, supra note 85,
at 465, 485–517 (2014) (for full description of the problems).
196
Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, supra note 85, at 509–511.
197
See Lorie S. Goshin et al., Preschool Outcomes of Children Who Lived as
Infants in a Prison Nursery, 94 PRISON J. 139, 142 (2014); Mary W. Byrne et al.,
Maternal Separations During the Reentry Years for 100 Infants Raised in a Prison
Nursery, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 77, 79 (2012) (“Results of the first longitudinal study of
children who resided in a U.S. prison nursery provide evidence of positive infant,
toddler, and post-release preschool outcomes. Children in this group had higher-thanexpected rates of secure attachment during infancy and toddlerhood.”).
198
Goshin et al., supra note 197, at 142; Byrne et al., Maternal Separations
During the Reentry Years for 100 Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, supra note 197
(“Results of the first longitudinal study of children who resided in a U.S. prison
nursery provide evidence of positive infant, toddler, and post-release preschool
outcomes. Children in this group had higher-than-expected rates of secure attachment
during infancy and toddlerhood.”).
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enormous sampling problem. Moreover, the team had actually assessed
attachment for some of the seventy children who were excluded but
withheld those results.199 The team’s follow-up research was also
problematic. The team never acknowledged that, because of the high rate
of post-release separation and mothers’ return to unhealthy behaviors and
relationships,200 long-term outcomes for the thirty children included in the
2010 attachment report (let alone for the 100) were likely no better than
for children born to prison inmates who have the more common and
generally dismal fate of living in the community with extended family
while their mothers serve prison sentences.201 The team’s spin on a
seventy-six percent rate of separation was that “maternal parenting is not
universally seamless” and “separations do occur.”202
Finally, a phenomenon bridging all three distorting incentives is
“publication bias,” the notion that researchers are discouraged from
reporting null results.203 Social scientists want their efforts to result in
199

According to Professor Byrne, the team was only interested in comparing
children’s attachment with their mother’s own attachment relationship to her parents,
and for those children they did not have information on the mothers. E-mail from Mary
Woods Byrne, Professor, Columbia Univ., to author (Feb. 27, 2012) (on file with
author). The author asked Professor Byrne what the results were for those children,
but she did not respond.
200
See Byrne et al., Maternal Separations During the Reentry Years for 100
Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, supra note 197, at 83 (stating 24 of children at
three years after prison exit had remained continuously with mothers).
201
The team’s study of preschool children’s emotional well-being purported to
compare the prison nursery babies with children representing “what would have
happened had children not been allowed to co-reside with their mothers,” but in fact
compared with children whose mothers entered prison well after their birth, whose
mothers’ crimes were of an unknown nature (i.e., might have disqualified them from
a prison nursery program), and for whom much other relevant data was not obtained.
Goshin et al., supra note 197, 144–45, 150. Yet after conceding small sample size,
numerous unmeasured variables, and that their study “cannot attribute causation of
better behavioral adaptation to the prison nursery program,” and after finding no
significant differences on nearly all child-welfare measures, the authors ended with
the declaration: “This study greatly extends the available knowledge regarding the
developmental trajectories of children who have experienced early maternal
incarceration and exposure to a prison nursery program.” Id. at 152–53. There is no
indication of IRB review in the report. See id. at 139–58.
202
See Byrne et al., Maternal Separations During the Reentry Years for 100
Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, supra note 197, at 85.
203
Franco et al., Publication Bias in the Social Sciences: Unlocking the File
Drawer, 345 SCIENCE 1502, 1504 (2014) (synthesis of meta-analyses in social
sciences finding: “Although around half of the total studies in our sample were
published, only 20% of those with null results appeared in print. In contrast, ~60% of
studies with strong results and 50% of those with mixed results were published. …
However, what is perhaps most striking… is not that so few null results are published,
but that so many of them are never even written up (65%). … [More than half] whose
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publication (for the sake of grants, tenure, reputation, and promoting
preferred policies), but journals favor studies with significant findings.204
Some propose “funding agencies could impose costs on investigators who
do not write up the results of funded studies.”205 But so often, especially
in the child-welfare field, funding agencies do not want null results
revealed.

C. Impacted Persons Not Treated as Subjects
Some social science research is not even deemed human-subject
research, so whatever safeguards against flawed design might attend such
research do not apply. This is troubling, given the impact published results
can have on people’s lives. For example, if CPS-related research involves
only examining aggregate data, then (1) no interaction with families is
required and (2) no examination of confidential personal information is
required. Under the regulations, therefore, neither adults nor children
would be “subjects” as to whom researchers must get IRB approval and
informed consent, and no IRB would have “jurisdiction” to review the
study design, as its authority is limited to human-subject research.206
Other studies of social service provision might entail interaction with
some individuals, such that they are “research subjects” whose informed
consent is required and IRB review is required, but the interactions might
not be with all those substantially impacted or even those most impacted,
and those not directly studied can under current rules be ignored in the
approval process.207 For example, many studies of state response to child
maltreatment discussed in Part II entail researcher interaction only with
autonomous persons – parents, service providers, agency officials, and/or
caseworkers.208 As to that research, no children are deemed subjects
warranting any protection.209 This is true even as to children whose
parents are interviewed and who might be immediately affected by
studies yielded null results and did not write a paper… reported that they abandoned
the project because they believed that null results have no publication potential even
if they found the results interesting personally[, and] many of them simply lose interest
in `unsuccessful’ projects.”).
204
Id. at 1502–05; Mohammad Hassan Murad et al., The Effect of Publication
Bias Magnitude and Direction on the Certainty in Evidence, 23 BMJ EVIDENCEDBASED MED. 84, 84 (2018).
205
Franco et al., supra note 203.
206
See Michelle N. Meyer, There Oughta Be a Law: When Does(n’t) the
Common Rule Apply?, 48 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 60, 66–67 (2020).
207
See Holly Fernandez Lynch, Minimal or reasonable? Considering the ethical
threshold for research risks to nonconsenting bystanders and implications for
nonconsenting participants, 34 BIOETHICS 923, 923 (2020).
208
See, e.g., supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
209
Id.
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researchers’ conclusions (i.e., if those conclusions influence a decision
whether to continue a particular local programmatic response to child
maltreatment).210 Because the researchers choose not to examine the
children’s condition directly, the children are not research subjects.211 For
example, surveys of parent satisfaction to determine whether DR is
“effective”212 might call for parents’ or caseworkers’ opinion as to
children’s wellbeing (e.g., “Do you think this program is better for your
family than a more coercive or aggressive intervention?” or “Are the
children safe?”).213 The children are, in a sense, themselves being
experimented on with novel maltreatment-response interventions, and
researchers might draw conclusions about the impact of the intervention
on them. Yet they are not “research subjects,” because the researchers
choose to interact only with parents and not to study directly the
experiment’s impact on the children.
Ideally, studies of social services would generally examine directly
those most impacted by the services and those for whose benefit the
services ostensibly exist. Studies of FDC effects, for example, ought to
look at (1) whether any delay in permanency prevents or disrupts
attachment or causes psycho-emotional distress; (2) whether separation
from foster parents that any reunification with parents entails is
disorienting or disturbing; and (3) what are rates of later dysfunction
among children whose families were channeled to FDC versus those who
were not, etc.214 The studies should determine these intervention effects
by directly examining the children or their records rather than by asking
case workers or parents their opinions about how the children have fared.
Yet most studies treat children as “bystanders,” even when researchers and
210

Id.
See infra notes 299–304 and accompanying text for discussion of
subject/bystander distinction.
212
See, e.g., L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Minnesota Alternative
Response Evaluation: Final Report, INST. APPLIED RSCH. ST. LOUIS, MO. (Nov. 2004),
http://www.iarstl.org/papers/ARFinalEvaluationReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HUFN76P].
213
See Lisa W. Coyne & Darin Cairns, A Relational Frame Theory Analysis of
Coercive Family Process, PLEA AGENCY (Oct. 14, 2015), https://plea-agency.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Chapter-7-Lisa-W.-Coyne.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG8E2HY7].
214
Cf. ICFW, ISSUE BRIEF: ASSESSING WELL-BEING IN CHILD WELFARE (2016),
https://uwm.edu/icfw/wpcontent/uploads/sites/384/2016/06/AssessingWellBeing.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8T9KXEG] (describing various child welfare assessment tools); Jasmin Singh & Pieter
Rossouw, Efficacy of Drawings as a Measure of Attachment Style and Emotional
Disturbance: An Australian Children Investigation, 3 INT. J. OF
NEUROPSYCHOTHERAPY
124,
126
(2015)
(same),
available
at
https://www.thescienceofpsychotherapy.com/efficacy-of-drawings-as-a-measure-ofattachment-style-and-emotional-disturbance/ [https://perma.cc/8AF5-244J].
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policy advocates use the studies to support assertions about child
welfare.215

D. Even if Impacted Persons Are Treated as Subjects, Protections are
Inadequate
When studies do directly target children, such as assessment of
attachment among babies in a prison nursery or behavior problems for
children in relative vs. non-relative foster care, they must treat children
themselves as research subjects.216 For several reasons, however, children
receive inadequate protection even in these instances.
First, the task of an IRB is generally understood to be limited to
protecting subjects from adverse impact from the study itself rather than
from the program under study, and specifically from disclosure of private
information and traumatic actions or statements by investigators.217 As
evidenced by the steady stream of poorly-designed research published in
the child welfare field even after IRB review, IRBs are generally not
rigorously assessing design and proposed methodology, because they have
no clear mandate to do so.218 They thus fail to weed out proposals that are
result-driven, posing the wrong questions, or otherwise methodologically
flawed, yet which might result in continuation of a program injurious to
the subjects.
Second, many recipients of social services lack the capacity to give
meaningful consent to research participation, and they might not receive
adequate proxy representation.219 Children are presumed incapable, and
even teens might find the process and its implications too complex to
comprehend what is at stake – for example, if surveyed for their attitudes
toward group homes or emancipation.220 Federal regulations thus

215

See, e.g., Gerber et al., supra note 178.
See Naomi Schaefer Riley, Life Inside a Prison Nursery, INST. FAM. STUD.
(Apr.
10,
2019),
https://ifstudies.org/blog/life-inside-a-prison-nursery
[https://perma.cc/Q9JN-CMZH].
217
See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 3; SCHRAG, supra note 1; Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 FR 7149, 7151 (“Many studies … involve
secondary analysis of data or biospecimens. Risks related to these types of research
studies are largely informational, not physical; that is, harms could result primarily
from the inappropriate disclosure of information”).
218
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
219
Participants with Diminished Capacity to Consent, UNIV. VA.,
https://research.virginia.edu/irb-sbs/participants-diminished-capacity-consent
[https://perma.cc/R65J-VS8G] (last visited Oct. 23, 2021).
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presumptively empowers parents to decide on behalf of children,221 so
researchers rely on parental consent.222 But, in situations where parents
have endangered a child’s wellbeing, parents are generally not suitable
proxies. Apart from possibly having their own cognitive deficits, there is
usually a conflict of interests; parents’ presumed primary motivation after
being reported for child maltreatment is to retain or quickly regain custody
of their children and avoid further state oversight and coercion.223 Yet that
is often inconsistent with children’s interest in healthy development within
a safe and nurturing environment. Much maltreatment is itself a reflection
of parents’ subordination of children’s interests to their own. 224 Thus,
parents might give proxy consent just because they think appearing
cooperative will help them, and they might refuse if they worry a child
might reveal something negative about them.
Outside the CPS system, too, parents’ and children’s interests can
conflict. Incarcerated women, for example, have intense self-interest in
moving to a more comfortable, low-conflict nursery unit and having a
baby with them; that is a far more pleasant way to do time.225 Further,
parents’ volition is substantially compromised in child protection and
criminal justice systems, which threaten profoundly negative
consequences for non-cooperation.226 Proxies for other groups of nonautonomous persons, such as mentally ill or disabled adults, might also be
of questionable reliability in some circumstances.
Conflict and coercion are very common with state response to
parental dysfunction, so one might expect to see independent advocates
frequently appointed for children in connection with research,227 to
substitute for parents, but there is no indication of this being done in any
221
Lynch, Minimal or reasonable? Considering the ethical threshold for
research risks to nonconsenting bystanders and implications for nonconsenting
participants, supra note 207, at 926.
222
See, e.g., Byrne et al., Maternal Separations During the Reentry Years for
100 Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, supra note 197.
223
See id.
224
Id.
225
Anne E. Jbara, The Price They Pay: Protecting the Mother-Child
Relationship Through the Use of Prison Nurseries and Residential Parenting
Programs, 87 IND. LAW REV. 1825, 1844 (2012).
226
See Merritt, How Do Families Interact with CPS?, supra note 173, at 203–
05, 209–10; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN
CHILD PROTECTION 26 (2006), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/courts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HS7A-QTP8].
227
Cf. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT 7 (Apr.
18,
1979),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report508c_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/364S-LDXC] [hereinafter The Belmont Report]
(stating that legally-authorized representatives (“LARs”) for non-autonomous persons
“should be those who are most likely to understand the incompetent subject's situation
and to act in that person's best interests.”).
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of the research discussed in this Article. A typical university IRB might
have no members who appreciate these problems with parental proxy
consent. Columbia University’s IRB, for example, seemingly saw no
problem with incarcerated women giving consent for their babies’
subjection to an attachment study; it enlisted a prisoner advocate to review
Byrne’s proposal, but no advocate for children.228 Thus, though it is a
positive thing when researchers look directly at the welfare of children,
there might be no real protection against potential harm from the way that
research is designed, conducted, or reported, because there is no reliable
IRB review nor appropriate informed consent.
Harms to children from studies (as opposed to the underlying
experimentation) are of two sorts. First, the research might involve
potentially disturbing interactions. For example, a line of questioning or
even just observing could be upsetting to a child or interfere with provision
of a therapy. The essence of attachment assessment with infants, for
example, is to generate anxiety in them and then observe whether they
look to a caregiver to resolve it.229 Questioning children in foster care
about their situation would certainly be fraught.
Second, the research could be used improperly to validate and
prolong children’s current situation, possibly to their detriment. Typically,
biased research validating a program will adversely affect only future
entrants to the child-protection system, because current participants will
have exited by the time of publication. However, in some instances the
timing of reporting results and reacting to them could be such that some
children examined are themselves impacted by researchers’
conclusions.230 For example, someone might examine the developmental
progress at age one for infants in the Washington State prison nursery
program, which allows children to stay until their third birthday.231 They
might quickly conclude and report to authorities that the children are doing
well – ignoring or downplaying contrary indications. The authorities
might then rely on that report to continue the program and those children’s
residence in the prison. Similarly, study of children whose stay in foster
care is prolonged by FDC or relative placement – which might report only
rates of physical abuse and ignore impact on attachment and psychological
wellbeing – could be sufficient basis for judges or legislators to persist
with their approach, causing the very children studied to remain in foster

228
Byrne et al., Maternal Separations During the Reentry Years for 100 Infants
Raised in a Prison Nursery, supra note 197, at 81.
229
Id.
230
See The Belmont Report, supra note 227.
231
Melissa Santos, ‘I really want him to have a different life.’ How Some Female
Inmates are Raising Babies Behind Bars, NEWS TRIBUNE (Apr. 6, 2017, 5:28 PM),
https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article140712783.html.
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care longer.232 Potential detriment to future entrants from bad research
also provides reason to prevent it, of course, but that might require a
mechanism other than informed consent, which focuses on research
subjects’ welfare. Part V considers some possibilities, including IRB
scrutiny of research design.

E. Some Autonomous Persons Are Incapable of Voluntary Informed
Consent
Many public benefit or service contexts entail a coercive environment
and diminished capacity among clients. CPS-involved parents threatened
with loss of custody, TPR, or criminal charges might fear making the
“wrong choice” about participation in a study. In its traditional form, the
CPS process is likely experienced by most parents as disempowering.233
Imagine an FDC judge informing a poor parent with an addiction and little
education that she has qualified for the program and that FDC has various
virtues for any parent truly committed to her children. Then, after the
parent has consented, the judge says “oh, by the way, will you agree to
being part of a study I and some colleagues are conducting?” Fearing TPR
or referral to criminal court, the parent can hardly give “voluntary”
consent. Likewise, in prison nurseries, mothers live in constant fear of
prison officials taking their babies away and sending them back to a
regular prison unit.234 If those officials approve a study of the program,
mothers risk adverse consequences if they decline consent to participation
on their own behalf or on their child’s behalf.235
Moreover, some social service clients might not receive full
information about the nature and implications of research and might be
less capable of requesting or digesting more information, or of formulating
an explanation for refusing to participate, because of diminished capacity
stemming from disability, mental illness, or substance abuse.236 Some
parents might be adversely affected by the study itself; it might be
intrusive, inconvenient, upsetting, confusing, etc. They might receive less
effective treatment than they otherwise would. Or, the results might lead
some decision maker to act contrary to their interests (e.g., discontinue the
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See Nina Williams-Mbengue, The Social and Emotional Well-Being of
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Care,
NAT’L
CONF.
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LEGIS.,
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/cyf/Social_Emotional_WellBeing_Newsl
etter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZTA-CZLJ] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
233
See Merritt, supra note 173, at 203–05, 209–10.
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See Dwyer, Jailing Black Babies, supra note 85, at 465, 489–90.
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Cf. Matt Lamkin & Carl Elliott, Involuntarily Committed Patients as
Prisoners, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 1041, 1064 (May 2017).
236
Cf. id. at 1055–56.
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program, prolong a program even though it is ineffective yet creates a false
impression that parents have been given a “fair chance”).
In sum, children of dysfunctional or incapacitated parents suffer from
bad policy making because unpromising innovations in state response to
their plight are not subject to effective protective pre-implementation
protocols, and because research used to launch and perpetuate the
experiments is badly designed and either fails to treat children as research
subjects or secures consent to children’s participation by illicit means.
Similar circumstances and problems might exist with institutional
handling of adults of diminished capacity, such as those in psychiatric
hospitals, drug rehabilitation centers, prisons, and congregate care for
those with mental disabilities.
Other policy contexts might present a subset of these concerns. For
instance, innovative practices and programs in ideologically fraught areas
such as policing, gender dysphoria, and abortion counseling also are not
likely to be treated as human-subject experiments requiring rigorous
expert pre-implementation approval. Research in any social science field
can be poorly designed because of incompetence, funder expectations, or
researcher ideology. In studying other non-medical aspects of life for
vulnerable populations – for example, sexual freedom for adults in
institutional care or impact on family life from dispensing welfare benefits
in a new way – researchers might fail to treat those persons as subjects,
even though their study will inform policy most directly impacting those
persons, instead focusing on their surrogates or on service providers. In
other fields of study, too, investigators might solicit consent from
representatives who have conflicting interests or feel pressured to consent
– for example, studies of impact on psychiatric patients of novel behaviormodification therapies or the child-welfare impact of housing-relocation
subsidies.237 And, in many areas of life, members of vulnerable groups
giving consent for their own participation in research might lack freedom
or capacity to give truly voluntary and informed consent. Part IV
examines what protections existing laws and guidelines provide against
these dangers.

Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 814–15 (2001) (“parents,
whether improperly enticed by trinkets, food stamps, money or other items, have no
more right to intentionally and unnecessarily place children in potentially hazardous
nontherapeutic research surroundings, than do researchers. In such cases, parental
consent, no matter how informed, is insufficient. … If the research methods, the
protocols, are inappropriate then… consent of the parents, or of any consent
surrogates, in our view, cannot make the research appropriate or the actions of the
researchers and the Institutional Review Board proper.”).
237
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IV. EXISTING RULES
The social service world has relied on political actors and journal
editors to protect society from ideologically-driven policy experiments
fueled by bad research. Part II illustrated the dysfunction in this regime.
This Part examines existing regulation of experimentation and research, to
discern the extent to which legal bases already exist for better disciplining
social services and social science, focusing on problems Part III identified.

A. Preventing Unpromising Experimentation
Federal regulations require manufacturers of a “drug” or medical
“device” to secure approval from the Food and Drug Administration based
on showing safety and efficacy relative to already-available treatments,
before applying the product to human bodies for “diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” or alteration of “the
structure or any function of the body.”238 The stringency of the process
depends on whether the product is entirely new or instead a generic
imitation of or modification to an already-approved product.239 In any
case, a multi-disciplinary team of experts reviews the evidence and must
find sufficient reason to believe the innovations would generate benefits
outweighing risks of harm.240 If so, the agency would initially permit only
piloting of the new intervention – that is, administration to a small number
of humans under close study.241 Only if that study further supported a
finding of safety, effectiveness, and acceptable risk of harm, would
promoters be permitted to administer it to a larger group of persons.242
Then, after further research confirmation, to a still larger group. Only after
study of a third “clinical trial” confirms safety and effectiveness (relative
to existing alternatives) outweighing risks may manufacturers market the
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21 U.S.C. § 355, 360e, 321(g), (h).
See Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The 505(b)(2) Drug Approval Pathway, 74
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403, 404 (2019).
240
Benefit-Risk Assessment in Drug Regulatory Decision-Making, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Mar.
30,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/Benefit-Risk-Assessment-inDrug-Regulatory-Decision-Making.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TSA-QWL7].
241
See Factors to Consider Regarding Benefit-Risk in Medical Device product
Availability, Compliance, and Enforcement Decisions: Guidance for Industry and
Food and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/files/medical%20devices/published/Factors-to-ConsiderRegarding-Benefit-Risk-in-Medical-Device-Product-Availability--Compliance--andEnforcement-Decisions---Guidance-for-Industry-and-Food-and-DrugAdministration-Staff.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7C7-K49C].
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See Darrow et. al, supra note 239.
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intervention widely.243 They must do so with appropriate “labeling” to
inform users of risks and how to minimize them. 244
Presently, no federal law requires comparable agency review, with
study of piloting at successive levels, of proposed new interventions in
human lives that are not drugs or medical devices. Some other
interventions are also physical – for example, medical procedures, taking
physical possession of people and putting them in a new environment, or
applying aversive physical stimuli to control behavior. Others are more
psychological than physical, as that distinction is conventionally
understood, involving communications or non-physical stimuli or
incentives intended to modify mood or behavior or to gather data.
Government agencies and private entities are now presumptively free to
experiment with new interventions of these sorts without ex ante
constraint.
In a few social-service settings, legal representation serves as a
potential safeguard for vulnerable persons– specifically, when they are in
state custody or under court supervision.245 In child protection court
proceedings, appointment of a lawyer or guardian ad litem for the child is
common.246 Such representatives could, in theory, endeavor to block
involvement of children in experimental programs – for example, by filing
a petition asking the juvenile court judge to exclude the child they
represent from a new, unproven process or policy, perhaps asserting the
child’s right to the best intervention already available. They might, for
example, request change of permanency plan from reunification to
adoption if CPS appears inclined, under a novel and untested program, to
drag out parent-rehabilitation efforts too long with too little hope.
That particular request, however, is not likely to receive much
hearing in an FDC or other court where the judge supports the novel
parent-supportive approach being undertaken; juvenile court decisions are
highly discretionary and judges believe themselves constrained by
constitutional rights of parents but generally not of children. Parents might
be given a choice whether to participate, but the child’s advocate will not.
And as to some agency actions, there might be no legal basis for anyone
to challenge. For example, if a foster-care agency is determined to disrupt
a long-term non-relative placement in favor of kin care consistent with a
243
See Marcia Boumil, FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of
State Laws for "Parallel" Tort Claims, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 4–6 (2015).
244
See Development & Approval Process: Drugs, supra note 28; Step 3: Clinical
Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-developmentprocess/step-3-clinical-research [https://perma.cc/D7JQ-VG2W].
245
See Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings,
CHILD.’S
BUREAU,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/represent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FL7L-7E9X] (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
246
See 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)–(b).
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new policy predicated on the false belief that research has shown children
always fare better in care of relatives, a GAL might have no legal basis for
challenging this action.247 In any event, the juvenile court judge might
share the agency’s mistaken view about kin placements or the mindset that
kin or racial groups own children.
Moreover, GALs generally do not challenge policies.248 They lack
the necessary motivation, legal creativity, and resources.249 And, there
might be no entity other than GALs able to act on behalf of a child or nonautonomous adult to halt harmful experimentation, as to that client or all
such persons entering the system, nor any legal basis for such action.
Some impact litigation has been brought to reform foster care systems that
operate very poorly, but not to prevent or end innovations in case handling
(and it typically focuses on the same evaluative criteria as the bad research,
such as speed of return to parental custody).250 In any event, injunctive
relief does little to deter agencies from experimenting in the first place.
So, even if there were ample funding for system litigation, it would have
a whack-a-mole futility to it. Outside the child protection system, there
might be even lesser prospects for any check on social-service
experimentation impacting vulnerable persons, if there is no court
oversight and no appointment of legal representatives for them, as is true,
for example, with placement of babies in prisons.
Ex-ante constraint on social services innovation per se is thus
virtually non-existent, at least so long as an agency is operating within its
scope of legal authority and discretion. There is the possibility, if novel
interventions in individuals’ lives happened to be undertaken as part of a
“research” project, with an aim from the outset to study its effects, that
prior IRB approval by an independent body would be required. That would
resemble FDA approval of drugs and devices insofar as it assesses the
safety of the intervention for “subjects.”251 And, as with any medical
intervention (whether experimental or not), the regulations also would
require informed consent by or on behalf of research subjects.252 However,
such screening and oversight apply only to the research activity per se and
to the actions of researchers, and social service innovation is typically not
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See generally A.R.L. Complaint, supra note 115.
See generally Mary K. Wimsett, The Guardian Ad Litem ProgramExpanding the Model and Meeting New Challenges 77 FL. BAR J. 26 (Dec. 2003).
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Id.
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See Washington D.C.: Lashawn A. v. Mayor Bowser, BETTER CHILDHOOD,
https://www.abetterchildhood.org/washington-dc
[https://perma.cc/ME3C-Y6GS]
(last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
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See Development & Approval Process: Drugs, supra note 28.
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See Draft Guidance: Informed Consent Information Sheet Guidance for IRBs,
Clinical Investigators, and Sponsors, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. FDA (July
2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/88915/download [https://perma.cc/G9WC-5TB3].
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structured like a clinical trial, embedded in a research project.253 In studies
of social services, the research is usually done by individuals other than
those providing the interventions, and the “research” would therefore not
encompass the services themselves.254 The IRB would be concerned only
with what researchers themselves do to people: interviewing, observing,
collecting information, not what the agency does to them.255
Notably, even in medicine, experimentation occurs informally in
clinical practice and, unless studied in a fashion that makes it “research,”
without pre-approval or oversight by any ethics body.256 This occurs
particularly in direct treatment of individual patients, when physicians are
not administering a new drug or device but rather trying a new technique,
process, or use of already-FDA-approved medications.257 Thus, at work
outside the narrow medical context of new drugs and devices is a
distinction between innovative “practice” and research.258 For the most
part, current law imposes ex ante constraints only on the latter.259 In
medicine, however, the possibility of ex-post penalty, in the form of a tort
suit, creates some deterrent to reckless experimentation with
procedures.260 Malpractice law looks to customary practice in the field as
a standard of conduct, so novel approaches are inherently suspect. 261 In
contrast, in social services, including child welfare programming, there
might be no such ex post recourse for harmful experimentation, no way
for those harmed to inflict a penalty on those responsible, and therefore no
disincentive to gambling on novel ideas. The United States Constitution
provides some check on harmful action by state agencies, but an important
U.S. Supreme Court decision rejecting a constitutional tort claim against
a child protection agency is viewed as establishing that state response to
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(Sept.
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See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Unregulated Health Research Using Mobile
Devices: Ethical Considerations and Policy Recommendations, 48 J. L., MED., &
ETHICS 196, 198 (Apr. 28, 2020).
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Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 913, 935–36 (Feb. 2015).
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private harms is outside constitutional bounds, with the limited exception
of potential state liability for abuse occurring within state-operated
facilities, including foster care.262 State protection of children from
maltreatment by parents or other private parties is gratuitous, the Court
said, not something to which children have any right, and so can be carried
out poorly with impunity.263 The Court later said the same regarding police
protection of adult domestic-abuse victims.264
In any event, in the realm of child protection, parents generally
cannot be expected to file suit for compensation when a new approach to
family preservation proves detrimental for a child, because the approach
likely would have been designed to serve the parents’ interests and they
would have agreed to participate, and it might be that no one else is
motivated or would be permitted to file such a suit.265 Further, qualified
sovereign immunity insulates state actors from liability unless a practice
violated a clearly-established legal rule,266 which is unlikely to be the case
with any experimental programmatic social-service responses to child
maltreatment or other human welfare predicaments.

B. Counter-Acting Researcher Bias
The federal regulations governing research, generally referred to
collectively as The Common Rule (“TCR”), could address some problems
in research identified in Part III, and that could in turn lessen the likelihood
of ill-advised policy experiments being initiated or prolonged. TCR
applies to research financially supported by particular federal agencies,
including the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), and
most states have adopted regulations patterned after TCR that apply to all
human-subject research within their jurisdiction regardless of funding
source.267 Most universities and other institutions receiving federal money

262
See Mary Kate Kearney, Deshaney's Legacy in Foster Care and Public
School Settings, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 284 (2002).
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Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1990) (Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 17 allows a “next friend” to bring suit on behalf of a child, but few
people pursue that possibility, and the court must approve the representative status of
that person.).
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See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 169
(4th Cir. 2010).
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See, e.g., Ethical Guidelines, Federal Regulations and State Statutes, UCI
OFF.
RSCH.,
https://research.uci.edu/compliance/human-researchprotections/researchers/ethical-guidelines-fed-regs-and-state-statutes.html#state
[https://perma.cc/7SSE-ZM8V].

58

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

for any research extend TCR rules to all human-subject research regardless
of funding sources.268
TCR’s primary policing mechanism is the IRB review of research
proposals.269 An institution’s IRB should approve a study only if the
proposal shows adherence to certain guidelines. IRB approval is required,
however, only for studies involving “human subjects,” so there need be no
prior review of studies that do not involve interaction with or action upon
individuals for the purpose of studying effects on them nor revelation of
personal information about individuals.270 Thus, studies limited to
analyzing aggregate data or individualized information without identifiers
are not subject to any advance screening no matter how poorly designed
or how much policy impact publication of results might have.271
In addition, a 2018 amendment to the TCR removes a substantial
portion of research on government social services from its ambit. 272 The
amendment reflects a belief that social-science research generally poses
no threat of harm and in that respect is categorically different from
biomedical research.273 As shown in Parts II and III, though this might be
true of research subjects per se, social science research can cause great
harm to persons who are subjected to social service innovations supported
by bad research. As a result of the Amendment, human-subject protections
now do not apply to study of “public benefit or service programs” if the
study is “conducted or supported by a Federal department or agency.”274
Until 2018, this exemption covered only research conducted by a federal
agency itself.275 The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research expanded it to include
research supported by a federal agency in capitulation to complaints from
social scientists that IRB review is unnecessary for their work.276 The
268
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original exemption rested in part on a perception that “this additional layer
of review for such projects is duplicative and needlessly burdensome in
light of the substantial review process to which they are already subjected
by state and federal officials.”277 But this is less true of research conducted
by persons outside the agencies.
When research is subject to IRB review, the process addresses bias
stemming from financial conflict of interests but not from professional
reward, political allegiance, advocacy commitments, or ideology.278 TCR
requires “investigators” to disclose only personal financial interests they
have that the research could affect.279 If an IRB determines from that
disclosure or otherwise that investigators have such conflict, it must report
this to the responsible federal funding agency and undertake “development
and implementation of a management plan and, if necessary, a
retrospective review and a mitigation report.”280 This might amount to
simply requiring disclosure of the conflict – to the subjects in advance and
to the public in publications stemming from the research. However, it can
also entail appointment of an “independent monitor capable of taking
measures to protect the design, conduct, and reporting of the research
against bias,” altering the research plan itself, and requiring investigators
to eliminate the conflict. At the extreme, if the conflict is serious and
ineliminable, it can even require disqualifying persons from the
research.281 A “retrospective review” would determine after study
completion whether it “was biased in the design, conduct, or reporting.”282
If so, the IRB must institute a “mitigation plan” (likely consisting mostly
of public notification), and a given institution might also have internal
sanctions for improper conduct.283
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In addition to addressing only financial sources of bias, TCR adopts
a rather narrow conception of financial conflicts of interest. The paradigm
case is biomedical laboratory scientists who work for or own stock in the
company whose new drug is being studied.284 They might expect a bonus
or higher stock value if they reach the “correct” conclusion, and
conversely to suffer discharge if they repeatedly reach “wrong”
conclusions.285 Corporate ownership is unlikely to be an issue in research
on social services; they are generally provided by government agencies,
and to the extent they are farmed out to private entities, those entities are
likely to be non-profits.286 Employment by the agency providing the
service could be an issue (if an employee is doing the research) but that
appears rare in practice, at least in child welfare. The only examples
identified above were the FDC judge who was one of the researchers
studying her own court and the NYU clinical professor listed as an author
of a study of inter-disciplinary law offices that he founded, sends students
to, and serves on the board of.287 The prison nursery researchers were not
employees of the prison, but they did receive funding through their
university employer to provide services to inmates in the nursery program,
and showing positive outcomes for the children could conceivably have
resulted in increased institutional support for the program or greater
personal supplemental compensation (e.g., endowed chair, fellowship
grants).288 Those rewards might not fit the regulations’ definition of
financial conflict,289 yet any normal person could be influenced by the
prospect of such rewards in designing a study or interpreting results.
The concept of financial conflict of interest is even less likely to
encompass more indirect ways, however substantial, by which researchers
benefit personally from reaching certain results. A causal connection
between results reported and receiving additional grants from government
agencies or foundations is unlikely to be clear or overt. Additional funding
to study the same program could be explained simply as sustained interest
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in the program rather than reward for those who support it. Yet a
researcher specializing in particular types of programs who reaches
negative conclusions or even null results might see foundations lose
interest in that type of program or specifically in them, and shift research
support elsewhere. In the child protection field, researchers must know
that major funding entities like Casey will want positive verdicts on
programs for which they have lobbied.

C. Protecting Subjects
As to human “subjects” in research, TCR directs both government
agencies sponsoring or overseeing studies and IRBs to take protective
steps. The agencies should evaluate any proposal taking into account “the
risks to the subjects, the adequacy of protection against these risks,” “the
potential benefits of the research to the subjects and others, and the
importance of the knowledge gained or to be gained.”290
In addition, an IRB reviewing any research plan should ensure that:

290

•

“risks to subjects are minimized and “reasonable in relation
to anticipated benefits . . . and the importance of the
knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.”;291

•

“the research plan makes adequate provision for monitoring
the data collected to ensure the safety of subjects,”292 and,
when subjects are vulnerable persons such as children and
prisoners, “additional safeguards have been included in the
study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.”;293

•

“informed consent” is secured from “each prospective subject
or the subject’s legally authorized representative,”294 with
information provided to include “disclosure of appropriate
alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if any, that
might be advantageous to the subject;”295 and

•

“choice among possible subjects is “equitable” and cognizant
of “the special problems of research that involves a category
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of subjects who are vulnerable to coercion or undue
influence, such as children.”296

Both sets of directions call for assessment of a proposed study’s
knowledge payoff, and this might seem to require scrutiny of both quality
of research design and rational relation to an identified policy objective.
Thus, sponsoring agencies and IRBs might expect researchers to identify
some social good whose provision will be informed by a proposed study,
and then those reviewers would assess whether the study is well-designed
to generate knowledge about how to provide that good. However, another
provision in the administrative code precludes consideration of how
results might be used in public policy.297 Thus, one kind of serious design
flaw that plagues child welfare research – namely, asking the wrong
questions (e.g., about children’s custodial situation rather than their
wellbeing) – would appear outside the ambit of IRB concern. Moreover,
the value of knowledge to be gained is to be compared somehow to the
risks to subjects from being studied, so if social scientists are right that
their research itself generally poses no risk to subjects, then any
knowledge about anything would seem sufficient to satisfy this aspect of
review. The remainder of the requirements listed above are exclusively
focused on a study’s impact on subjects, with no language inviting
assessment of scientific validity.
In light of what has been discussed thus far, we might distinguish: (1)
experimental programs initiated by researchers, like drug trials; (2) study
of programs operated by government agencies rather than the researchers,
where vulnerable persons are research “subjects”; and (3) studies in which
vulnerable persons are deemed “bystanders.” For (1), IRBs are directed to
ensure that there is little or no risk of harm to subjects from the intervention
or observations; personal information will be kept confidential;
investigators do not use “subjects who are vulnerable to coercion or undue
influence, such as children,” unless the study could not be done on less
vulnerable persons; and legally-authorized representatives (“LARs”) for
non-autonomous subjects give informed consent, after being informed of
“appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if any, that
might be advantageous to the subject.”298 This seems like robust
protection, but this category would likely be generally understood to
include only new therapies, not agency or court processes. For (2), IRBs
would likely concern themselves only with careful handling of
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confidential information. For (3), none of the above would apply to
protect the vulnerable persons, because all protections are limited to
subjects.
So, what is a subject? TRC defines “subject” as a person from whom
a researcher either “[o]btains information… through intervention or
interaction… and uses, studies, or analyzes the information” or “[o]btains,
uses, studies, analyzes, or generates identifiable private information.”299
An intervention includes “manipulations of the subject or the subject’s
environment for research purposes”300 and “communication or
interpersonal contact between investigator and subject.”301 Thus, persons
are subjects when directly studied or interviewed, when they are acted
upon “for research purposes,” or when their identifying information is
collected from a parent or agency.302
“Bystanders,” in contrast, are persons predictably impacted by an
experiment/study but not subjects as so defined.303 One might expect
protections to depend on persons’ objective situation relative to researcher
conduct, but in ethical and legal literature the distinction rests on
researchers’ subjective interest. If they care to study impact on you, and
perhaps if they manipulate you or your environment in order to study how
that impacts someone other than you, then you are a subject with the
protections the regulations afford. However, if they are not sufficiently
interested in an experiment/study’s impact on you, however great that
might be, to interview or observe you, you are a bystander with no ex ante
regulatory protections.304
Both the research/practice and the
subject/bystander distinctions thus turn on this seemingly morally
arbitrary fact of the mental state of the persons acting upon you.
A strained reading of the definition of “subject” might lead to treating
all new forms of government intervention in family life as research, and
children always as subjects of that research when impacted, simply
because agencies typically create records regarding each intervention.
CPS caseworkers interacting with children in foster care obtain certain
information – for example, about their health, academic performance,
299
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(1); Frequently Asked Questions: Human Subjects
(IRB),
COLUM.
UNIV.
RSCH.
COMPLIANCE
&
ADMIN.
SYS.,
https://www.rascal.columbia.edu/help/irbfaq.html#qd2
[https://perma.cc/6XL2EVKD] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
300
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(2).
301
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(3). The regulations do not define “investigator.” See
id.
302
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(1).
303
Nir Eyal, Study bystanders and ethical treatment of study participants – A
proof of concept, 34 BIOETHICS 941, 941, 942 (2020).
304
See Lynch, Minimal or reasonable? Considering the ethical threshold for
research risks to nonconsenting bystanders and implications for nonconsenting
participants, supra note 207, at 923.
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behavior, and visitation with parents or other relatives – that they will use
in some way.305 At a minimum, the agency is required to report to a
juvenile court at foster care review hearings how the child is doing, and
typically local agencies report certain aggregate data to a state level human
services office, which in turn reports it to the federal Children’s Bureau
for inclusion in national reports.306 Initial placement, subsequent
placement changes, and services provided to children could fit the
regulatory description of interventions.307 If one looks at just one
individual child, agency intervention and interaction seem quintessentially
“practice,” but CPS handling of each child’s case typically implements a
policy the agency has adopted for many cases – for example, kin
placement vs. non-kin placement, or concurrent planning vs. sequential
planning – and contributes to the agency’s records of overall
performance.308 Likewise with agencies providing other social services,
to adults or children; they apply a general policy to individual cases and
compile some statistics to assess compliance and effects.
By such stretched or unfamiliar interpretation of key concepts in
federal regulations, then, children reported as abused or neglected might
receive TCR protections against a new approach to CPS response (e.g..,
IFPS, DR, categorical preference for kin placement), including assessment
of risk of harm to them from that intervention and informed proxy consent.
DHHS would have to interpret the new policy as “research” and case
workers or local agencies as “investigators” in connection with that
research. It then would have to deem caseworker checkups on children
remaining in parental custody or placed in foster care as “interactions” that
generate information the agency will “use” in the relevant sense. No one
has ever before suggested applying TCR to human-service agency
program innovation, though, most likely because the first hurdle is never
passed; no one views such experimentation as “research.” Even if so
viewed, if no one involved bothers to study the impact on children, the
research community would still deem them bystanders rather than

305

45 C.F.R. § 1355.44(b).
AFCARS Data & Research, OFF. ADMIN. FOR CHIL. & FAM.,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/data-research/adoption-fostercare
[https://perma.cc/RPV7-J68Y] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021) (“The Adoption and Foster
Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) collects case-level information from
state and tribal title IV-E agencies on all children in foster care . . . [These] include
demographic information on the foster child as well as the foster and adoptive parents,
the number of removal episodes a child has experienced, the number of placements in
the current removal episode, and the current placement setting.”).
307
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(2) (“physical procedures by which information… [is]
gathered … and manipulations of the subject or the subject's environment”).
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Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System, 85 Fed. Reg.
28410–11 (May 12, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1355).
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2022]

SOCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION

65

subjects. And in addition, there is now the gaping exception noted above
for public service programs supported by the federal government.

D. Making Proxy Consent Meaningful
Receipt of social services and participation in research are generally
voluntary, so a potential participant’s own ability to refuse or complain
theoretically constitutes some check on risky experimentation and poorly
designed research. Parents in a limited sense are always voluntary
participants in civil child maltreatment cases; they could choose to walk
away, though at the high cost of losing custody and legal-parent status.309
With respect to research, TCR requires “legally effective informed
consent” from any autonomous person prior to making such person a
research subject.310 This entails disclosing “the information that a
reasonable person would want to have in order to make an informed
decision about whether to participate, and an opportunity to discuss that
information.”311 Such information includes “an explanation of the
purposes of the research”312 and “any benefits to the subject or to others
that may reasonably be expected from the research.”313 Arguably, this
should include explanation of how the research might impact policy – in
particular, how the research might lead to prolonging or stopping an
intervention. But it is unlikely researchers or IRBs deem that necessary.
As to any non-autonomous subjects, TCR contemplates devoted
proxies (LARs) have power to give or refuse consent on their behalf and
so provide the same protection autonomous persons would have against
an experimental program or research project that poses risks to them and
little prospect of benefit.314 TCR has provisions specific to use of children
as research subjects, requiring “permission” by a representative
(presumptively, parents), regardless of the study’s risk level, and that
likely amounts to proxy informed consent.315 TCR also requires “assent”

309
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.1 (West) (requiring the state’s Division
of Family Development to petition for termination of parental rights when a parent
reported for maltreatment “is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the
child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child” after
being offered services, or if the parent has abandoned the child).
310
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1).
311
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4).
312
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1).
313
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(3).
314
Id.
315
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.404 (“HHS will conduct or fund research in which the
IRB finds that no greater than minimal risk to children is presented, only if the IRB
finds that adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of the children and
the permission of their parents or guardians, as set forth in § 46.408.”); see also 45
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by any such children capable of expressing “affirmative agreement” to
participation.316 It sensibly dispenses with the assent requirement when
“the capability of some or all of the children is so limited that they cannot
reasonably be consulted,”317 which is certainly true of infants and arguably
all pre-adolescent children in the child-maltreatment context.
In most instances, therefore, the only real check on involvement of
maltreated children in research that could support prolongation of an
experimental intervention is a requirement of proxy approval. Yet that is
obviously problematic in the maltreatment context, given parents’ conflict
of interests, as well as their likely lesser capacity and volition. TCR does
recognize the problem with relying on parental consent in the child
maltreatment context, but its way of dealing with it is unsatisfactory.318 45
C.F.R 46.408 provides in relevant part:
[I]f the IRB determines that a research protocol is designed for
conditions or for a subject population for which parental or guardian
permission is not a reasonable requirement to protect the subjects (for
example, neglected or abused children), it may waive the [parental]
consent requirements…, provided an appropriate mechanism for
protecting the children who will participate as subjects in the research
is substituted… The choice of an appropriate mechanism would
depend upon the nature and purpose of the activities described in the
protocol, the risk and anticipated benefit to the research subjects, and
their age, maturity, status, and condition.319

This provision does not preclude IRBs from making parental consent
alone sufficient, even if it is entirely self-serving. Its purpose appears
instead to authorize reliance on an alternative mechanism when parents
C.F.R. § 46.405 (regarding research posing greater than minimal risk but prospect of
direct benefit to child), § 46.406 (regarding research posing greater than minimal risk
and no prospect of direct benefit to child); § 46.407 (giving effect to parental consent
to children’s participation even when the sole justification for the research is that it
might produce general knowledge as to a serious problem affecting
children).“Permission” is unhelpfully defined as “agreement, ” 45 C.F.R. § 46.402 (c),
and the regulations specify no procedure for obtaining such agreement, information
that must be given parents, or substantive limit on parents’ power to agree on
children’s behalf. Cf. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric
Research, 57 DUKE L. J. 517 (2007) (suggesting child maltreatment law might serve
as the check on parental proxy consent to children’s involvement in medical research).
However, that Subpart is entitled “Additional Protections for Children,” and states that
IRBs must satisfy it “[i]n addition to other responsibilities assigned to IRBs under this
part,” which include ensuring “legally effective informed consent of the subject or the
subject's legally authorized representative.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1).
316
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.402(b).
317
45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a).
318
45 C.F.R. §46.408(c).
319
45 C.F.R. § 46.408.
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refuse, making their consent unnecessary, so researchers can go forward.
And it trusts IRBs’ judgment regarding the appropriateness of an
alternative, guided only by quite vague standards, yet their members are
unlikely to have child-welfare expertise.320 This is especially problematic
given that TCR does contemplate including children in experiments and
research that pose greater than minimal risk to the children and that might
offer no prospect of benefit to the children studied or experimented on
themselves.321
One final potential safeguard is a categorical rule TCR contains for
children in state custody. Though seemingly targeting juvenile detention,
as an analogue to the special regulatory protections for adult prisoners, its
language could encompass any children removed from parental custody
and placed in a state facility, including foster care.322 45 C.F.R. § 46.409(a)
states:
Children who are wards of the state or any other agency, institution, or
entity can be included in research approved under § 46.406 or §
46.407 [involving greater than minimal risk and no likelihood of
benefit to the children] only if such research is: (1) Related to their
status as wards; or (2) Conducted in schools, camps, hospitals,
institutions, or similar settings in which the majority of children
involved as subjects are not wards.

That provision goes on to require appointment of “an advocate” for
each child in this special circumstance, when a child is a ward of the state.
The advocate should serve throughout the research process, act in the
child’s best interests, and have the necessary preparation to do that, and
they should be independent of the state agency and of the researchers.323
Such appointment is a good thing, but the provision does not make the
advocate’s consent prerequisite to a child’s participation, and it does not
expressly accord the advocate any other authority. Further, it applies only
to research an IRB views as presenting “no prospect of direct benefit” to
the children enrolled in the study.324 In the world of family-preservation
policy, there is much wishful thinking about possible benefits to children,

320

Id.; see also Robert J. Katerberg, Institutional Review Boards, Research on
Children, and Informed Consent of Parents: Walking the Tightrope Between
Encouraging Vital Experimentation and Protecting Subjects’ Rights, 24 J.C. & U.L.
545, 574–75 (1998).
321
Minimal risk is “the probability and magnitude of physical or psychological
harm normally encountered in the daily lives, or in the routine medical, dental, or
psychological examination of healthy persons.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(d).
322
45 C.F.R. § 46.409.
323
Id.
324
Id.
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and IRB members are likely to be as susceptible to this as anyone else.325
The rule above for protecting children in situations where parental consent
is not a “reasonable requirement” likewise calls for IRB speculation about
possible benefit to children, in its explanation of what constitutes an
“appropriate mechanism” of protection, so the wishful-thinking trap lies
there as well.326
The tendency to undue optimism and lack of expertise among IRB
members also make it worrisome to rely on IRB judgment as to the level
of risk an experiment or study poses, with no opportunity for advocates
for children to object. In some child welfare situations, level of risk is the
obverse of or dependent on the potential for benefit.327 For example, if
wishful thinking leads an IRB to exaggerate the prospects of a child’s
safely returning to parental custody, it will at the same time lead the IRB
to underestimate the danger of prolonged foster care and delayed–perhaps
even prevented–real permanence.328 If an IRB exaggerated the likelihood
of an incarcerated woman permanently changing her pattern of behavior
after bonding with a baby in prison, as advocates for prison nurseries
encourage legislators to do when they cite flawed recidivism studies,329 it
would thereby also underestimate the danger to the child of attachment
disruption as a result of the mother returning to drugs, abusive boyfriend,
gang, prison, etc. after exit from prison.330

E. Preventing Coercion
Parents themselves might be disserved by state experimentation with
different responses to maltreatment or by studies of those responses. An
innovative program or process might be traumatizing or less effective at
parental rehabilitation relative to the existing approach, and research could
add to the practical and psychological demands on parents brought into the
child protection system or might support policy decisions adverse to the
parents in some way. Indeed, one might doubt that parents are always
benefited by having children returned to their custody, if they are not able
to regulate their conduct toward the children. Even some who retain legalparent status might actually be made worse off thereby, if they will never
be able to fulfill the parental role adequately yet will be subject to
prolonged state coercion and shaming because of that status. Conceivably,
some might regret participating in research used to support a policy they
come to see as harmful to their children.
325

Coleman, supra note 315, at 599.
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Parents’ consent to their own participation in a novel program or in
research is therefore also normatively significant.331 Yet their capacity and
volition might be substantially compromised. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2)
requires that researchers “minimize the possibility of coercion or undue
influence,” but the situation is rife with inherent coercion if reunification
with children – and possibly avoidance of criminal charges – depend on
appearing fully cooperative with courts, CPS, and anyone to whom those
state actors refer parents.

V. BUILDING A MORE ROBUST ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
This Part considers additional strategies to accomplish what
deliberation by politicians, judgment of politically-appointed agency
heads, peer review, and IRB review have not: a cautious, evidence-based
approach to innovating in social services and robust checks against
publication of bad research. The proposals are, for the most part, novel
and intended to initiate conversation. The primary consideration in
developing ideas here is likely effectiveness; questions of political
feasibility are left to others.
Trying to fit social services innovation into an experiment/research
framework would be especially jarring, but the core problem is, as in some
areas of medicine, that entities charged with providing a certain
fundamental good to humans who have pressing needs are inclined, in the
face of ongoing failure, to try any new approach they think might be the
magic pill they have been lacking. Absent adequate institutional check on
that inclination – specifically, ensuring a sound research foundation and
protections for impacted persons – those entities are apt to make things
substantially worse for the very persons they are supposed to serve. Bad
research is not a problem in and of itself, any more than is bad legal or
historical scholarship if everyone ignores it. Bad research is a problem
because it is fueling the first problem, proliferation of misguided
innovation. This Part first considers checks on innovation that might
render bad research innocuous, then considers ways to prevent bad
research in case this is necessary as an indirect way of addressing the core
problem, if direct ways are incomplete or less feasible.

A. Treating Innovation as Experimentation subject to Pre-Approval
and Study
Two direct ways to guard against ill-advised social-services
experimentation would be (1) create a new mechanism for prior approval
and (2) bring systemic social-services innovation under the TCR rubric –
requiring IRB review and approval – by expanding the concept of research
331

Id. at 611.
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or mandating that innovation occur – as with new pharmaceuticals – within
a study setting. This subpart focuses on interventions substantially
impacting non-autonomous persons, because current safeguards in
legislative and rulemaking processes are particularly inadequate for them,
as discussed above.332
Something of the first sort, such as a national clearinghouse or statelevel ombuds offices with substantial powers, should be feasible; there are
existing models of these discussed below. There is, however, a recursive
agency problem inherent in appointing people to protect non-autonomous
persons; those choosing the protector might not themselves reliably act in
the interests of the non-autonomous persons in making the selection. The
second approach confronts a line-drawing challenge, but this might be
surmountable. Innovation in social service is usually a matter of overt
system-wide policy change, when some major player claims to have found
the cure for a social disease necessitating government intrusion in private
life, rather than informal experimenting at the retail social-work level. The
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides a model for limiting
protections to more significant changes.333

1. A New Screening Mechanism
At least when it greatly impacts non-autonomous persons, socialservice innovation should undergo screening beyond that which
legislatures and agency leaders currently provide. Additional screening
processes and substantive standards could be effective.
i. Impact Studies

Within existing decision processes, better and more public
information might improve outcomes. Federal and state governments
could adopt omnibus laws requiring that some or all types of proposed
legislation or regulation undergo a scientifically rigorous vulnerablepersons impact study, akin to studies of fiscal or environmental impact
commonly done today, with the results made publicly available.334 If
taxpayers and endangered species warrant such protection, certainly nonautonomous and other unempowered humans do as well.335

332

See supra Part IV.
See infra notes 394–97 and accompanying text.
334
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As the FDA does before approving testing of new drugs on
humans,336 those conducting this study would assess what evidentiary
basis proponents of new legislation or regulation have for it. Of course,
animal studies are not possible with social services, but often new
interventions have features of several other experiences that have been
studied. For example, they might entail prescribing addiction programs
for parents, so proponents should present and address research on success
of addicted adults in different programs. Or they might entail separating
children long-term from parents, disrupting foster-care placement that
have been nurturing and stabilizing for a child, or diversion of children
into informal kin care, and then proponents should be required to address
explicitly what that research might say about the likely impact of the new
innovation on children. Requiring public agencies to disclose their
empirical basis for predictions of impact could counteract the self-interest
some have in approving or promoting new programs. Ideally, the study
would be done by an entity independent of any agency that would be
implementing the new rules or spending new funds. An example of this
type of NGO review in child welfare is the Prevention Services
Clearinghouse, developed pursuant to the Family First Act, which is
staffed by professional social scientists and tasked with rating
maltreatment-prevention programs and services as “well-supported,
supported, promising, or does not currently meet criteria.”337
ii. Ombudsperson

A specialized government entity independent from the legislature and
the governing executive agency, if assigned a fiduciary mission and the
power to challenge or even block proposed innovations in programming
and procedures, could be of great value for non-autonomous persons.
Today, fifteen or so U.S. states have an ombuds office for children, and in
some other states there is an ombuds office within the state agency
administering foster care that fields complaints from any parties.338 All
states have a public ombuds office for elderly persons residing in long-

336
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FDA’S
REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW i (Mar.
2003).
337
Welcome, TITLE IV-E PREVENTION SERVICES CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://preventionservices.abtsites.com/ [https://perma.cc/86SS-Z3CQ] (last visited
Oct. 25, 2021).
338
See Alison Graham, Virginia’s First Children’s Ombudsman to Fill Gap in
Social
Services
Accountability,
ROANOKE TIMES
(July 1, 2021),
https://roanoke.com/news/local/virginias-first-childrens-ombudsman-to-fill-gap-insocial-services-accountability/article_d8fb0d58-d918-11eb-afcc-3f3059d02e06.html
[https://perma.cc/LZ4F-KZDC].
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term care facilities.339 The powers such ombudspersons possess vary.340
At a minimum, they receive complaints from protected persons or from
other private parties aware of harms to protected persons, and they can
convey concerns to agency personnel and legislative or executive decision
makers, serving in a formal or informal mediator role to help resolve the
complaints. In some states, the ombuds office for children can, in theory:
a) directly investigate and issue opinions in conflicts between children and
state agencies, b) review agency policies and practices, c) recommend new
regulations or legislation, and/or d) bring legal action to enforce the rights
of a child.341 Many such offices, though, receive such meager funding that
the state’s commitment to the beneficiary populations appears nominal.342
Assuming occupants of such offices are truly devoted to the
population they serve, knowledgeable, sophisticated in consuming
research, and in possession of sufficient resources, then ideally the
ombudsperson’s approval would influence decisions whether to
implement new ideas and could even be a necessary condition for adopting
any innovation. For example, should the Casey foundation lobby state
legislatures to authorize yet another approach to family preservation (or to
strengthen or weaken certain presumptions or priorities or timelines in
foster care rules) the legislatures would refer the proposal to the children’s
ombudsperson, and the bill should never be put to a legislative vote
without approval from that office. If that gives too much power to the
ombudsperson, their declining to approve might simply trigger additional
processes – such as more robust committee hearings – before the proposal
could come to a vote. With programs already in place or agency exercise
of existing discretion, the ombudsperson should have authority to examine
and assess the program or action, with full access to agency records, and
to introduce reform legislation or regulation or bring court action to enjoin
continuation of what is being done.
An ombudsperson office so designed would be a marked
improvement over the currently prevailing regime, in which vulnerable
persons are often unrepresented in the processes for creating policies that
will impact them. Creating such an office should not entail great expense
339

See Nursing Home Ombudsman, NURSING HOME ABUSE CTR.
https://www.nursinghomeabusecenter.com/elder-abuse/ombudsman/
[https://perma.cc/SF9N-EN5S] (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
340
Graham, supra note 338.
341
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-13l, 13m, 13o (duties include evaluating
agency procedures for service delivery to children and recommending changes;
powers include inspecting agency records, issuing subpoenas to public or private
actors, and filing legal action in court or agency to enforce child’s rights, investigate
complaints children submit, and advocate for children, recommend changes to state
policy, and propose legislative reform); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06A.030.
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See MOIRA KATHLEEN O’NEILL, PULLING BACK THE CURTAIN: STATE
CHILDREN’S OMBUDSMEN AT WORK 126–27, 131–32, 136–38, 175–76 (2011).
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– indeed, it would likely pay for itself by preventing public spending on
ill-advised experimentation.
iii. Addressing the Agency Problem

The conundrum with an ombuds office for non-autonomous persons,
and with a clearinghouse reviewing programs for such persons, is that
those persons typically have no say in who fills the office and are unable
to hold the office occupant accountable.343 The legislature or agency that
cannot be trusted to safeguard the interests of those persons, against forces
pushing other agendas, also cannot be trusted to select the office holders.
Further, anyone installed might be vulnerable to removal following any
controversial decision, or to capture by the likes of Casey. Even family
members might not be reliable watchdogs, overseeing an ombudsperson
for children or for incompetent adults, as they might have conflicts of
interest with the non-autonomous individuals. This is one instance of a
general problem with appointing agents for principals unable themselves
to select and monitor the agent.
Solutions to the agency problem developed in the corporate context
suggest strategies for dealing with it in the ombuds or clearinghouse
context. One is transparency: a possible procedural fix is to require that
both selection of ombudspersons or clearinghouse staff and decisions by
those officials be transparent and subject to public input.344 Legislatures
should publish names of nominees for the positions and invite public
comment, enabling organizations and scholars who focus on the interests
of the protected group to weigh in, as occurs with federal judicial
appointments. There could be public “interviewing,” with Q&A sessions.
Such vetting is an incomplete fix, given that legislators might be no more
capable of discerning objectively which of competing views about a
candidate’s merits is accurate than they are of discerning which of
competing views about new social-service policies is more accurate. A
further step would be to mandate that an ombudsperson, once in office and
carrying out its functions, publish written explanations for decisions to
support or oppose particular legislation or agency rule making, with
reference to any empirical research relied upon, so that the public can
critique the reasoning. Concern for reputation and public respect does not
guarantee objective, rational, and independent decision making, but it
should have some constraining effect. Another general fix for the agency
Laureen D’Ambra, Appendix E: Survey of Ombudsman Offices for Children
in the United States, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (June 5, 1996),
https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/pubs/walls/appen-e.html
[https://perma.cc/N3LZ-NHL6].
344
See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure As A Solution to
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
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problem is performance incentives, though performance metrics might be
difficult to develop in the social-service context.
iv. Specifying Standards for Approving Experimental Programs/Policies

Both an impact study and ombuds review, as well as legislative and
administrative decision making, might be enhanced by guidance on what
substantive standard to apply. TCR’s special rule for prisoners – who are
dependent, vulnerable, and limited in their ability to appeal to outside
support – suggests one possibility for children in foster care, whose
temporary caregivers are also under the thumb of state actors.345 It might
also be appropriate for incompetent adults under a guardianship or in state
custody. Under it, an experimental practice must hold out reasonable
probability of benefiting the subjects, to an extent outweighing any costs,
and costs must be measured in light of available alternatives.346 Further,
risks for subjects must be ones people not in the same constrained
environment would be willing to take. This heuristic might guide judgment
about, for example, how promising a new approach to parental
rehabilitation must be in order to justify holding children in foster care
waiting to see the outcome (i.e., considering how long we adults would
wait for such persons if interested in forming a family with them). Other
potentially pertinent protections are procedural, such as proscribing large
rewards for consent to participation that could compromise volition, which
supports the distrust of parental agreement noted above.347 A further
requirement is less clearly translatable – namely, that the procedure for
selecting participants must be “immune from arbitrary intervention” by
persons who have power over the potential subjects.348 But in the child
welfare realm this might mean, for example, strengthening prohibitions on
treating children differently on the basis of their race in ways that delay or
deny adoption.
345
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2. Treat Social Services Experimentation as Research
Another omnibus law might require that some types of new programs
or processes be instituted only within a formal research framework, subject
to expert vetting, piloting, and informed-consent requirements.349
Certainly, some parent-protective measures Part II described were
analogous to introduction of new drugs or medical devices. The state
effectively experiments on children when, for example, it decides as to
newborns of incarcerated women: “Well, we’ve been sending these
children out to the community to live with relatives, and we know that
generally goes very poorly for them. We know most would be far better
off if instead immediately placed for adoption. But rather than take steps
toward more adoptions, let’s try putting the babies into the prison with
their mothers and see what happens.”350 Likewise, when the state responds
to maltreatment stemming from severe and chronic parental drug abuse by
reasoning: “Well, we know the traditional approach typically leads
ultimately to termination of parental rights in these cases, and so that
children who are infants when removed would probably generally be
better off if we did up-front triage and placed many more immediately for
adoption. But let’s instead try holding all children in foster care for even
longer and applying the drug-court model to parents, and we’ll see how
that goes.”351 That is akin to experimenting with new protocols for
administering existing drugs (increased duration or dosage), which require
pre-implementation review entailing presentation of reliable evidence to
support predictions about positive effects.352 These novel interventions
with children were less promising and more dangerous than many new
drugs, dietary supplements, and protocols requiring FDA approval. Yet
they have proliferated without research support, and once various state and
local governments have sunk public funds into creating them they are very
difficult to undo.
Alternatively, TCR’s definition of research might be amended
explicitly to encompass some novel social-service interventions
349

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(b).
Cf. Justin Jouvenal, Raising Babies Behind Bars, WASH. POST (May 11,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/05/11/feature/prisonsare-allowing-mothers-to-raise-their-babies-behind-bars-but-is-the-radicalexperiment-in-parenting-and-punishment-a-good-idea/
[https://perma.cc/Y2GB3FUJ].
351
Cf. Suzanna Fay & Elizabeth Eggins. PROTOCOL: Family treatment drug
courts for improving parental legal and psychosocial outcomes, CAMPBELL
SYSTEMATIC
REVS.
(Aug.
14,
2019),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/cl2.1024 (describing lack of
“methodologically rigorous review” of family drug courts despite their proliferation
across the country).
352
See 21 C.F.R. § 312.30.
350
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undertaken on a system-wide basis by an agency that maintains case
records and compiles data, to impose greater protections and scientific
caution and rigor. The legal distinction between “practice” or “treatment”
and “research” is now murky.353 It seems to turn on whether interventions
are adopted for categories of persons rather than individualized and
whether those applying them aim to learn something that could be relevant
to treatment of other persons in the future.354 TCR provisions addressing
conflicts of interest state:
Research means a systematic investigation, study or experiment
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge relating
broadly to public health, including behavioral and social-sciences
research. The term encompasses basic and applied research (e.g., a
published article, book or book chapter) and product development
(e.g., a diagnostic test or drug).355

Federal regulations specific to human-subject research take a similar
approach, defining research as a “systematic investigation, including
research development, testing, and evaluation, designed to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge.”356 While not itself authoritative,
a document that greatly influenced development of the federal regulations
and has guided scholarly analysis of research ethics – the Belmont
Report357 – offers further explanation by distinguishing “research” from
“practice”:

353
See Yuan, supra note 258, at 47 (contending that the distinction is obsolete
in medicine, which today uses a “precision medicine and learning healthcare model,
whereby data and refinements of treatment methods made in the course of clinical care
are continuously fed back to improve care of individual patients and contribute to the
sum of medical knowledge”); Nancy M.P. King, The Line Between Clinical
Innovation and Experimentation, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 573 (2002).
354
See Yuan, supra note 258, at 67.
355
42 C.F.R. § 50.603.
356
45 C.F.R. § 46.102; see also Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 784–85
(1996) (“Medical research includes a class of activities designed to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge and generalizable knowledge consists of
theories, principles, or relationships (or the accumulation of data on which they may
be based) that can be corroborated by accepted scientific observation and inference.”).
357
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), HHS
OFF. FOR HUM. RSCH. PROTS. https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-andpolicy/regulations/common-rule/index.html [https://perma.cc/YR7A-25YT] (last
visited Oct. 25, 2021) (“The current U.S. system of protection for human research
subjects is heavily influenced by the Belmont Report, written in 1979 by the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research.”).
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For the most part, the term "practice" refers to interventions that are
designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or
client and that have a reasonable expectation of success. The purpose
of medical or behavioral practice is to provide diagnosis, preventive
treatment or therapy to particular individuals. By contrast, the term
"research' designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit
conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories,
principles, and statements of relationships). Research is usually
described in a formal protocol that sets forth an objective and a set of
procedures designed to reach that objective. When a clinician departs
in a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the innovation
does not, in and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a procedure
is "experimental," in the sense of new, untested or different, does not
automatically place it in the category of research.358

Thus, in federal regulations, the distinction appears to have two
components: (1) individual vs. group focus and (2) concern just for the
current patient versus an aim of creating new knowledge applicable
beyond the current patient.359 The first is clearly present when the child
welfare system jumps on a new bandwagon. As to the latter, the concepts
“systematic,” “designed to,” and “generalizable” are key, and consistent
with the Belmont Report’s reference to “formal protocol,” “test an
hypothesis,” and “generalizable knowledge.”360 Neither source defines
“systematic,” but dictionary definitions suggest it means following a
consciously-chosen methodology in applying an intervention and in
recording results.361
In experimenting with different behavioral interventions in reaction
to family dysfunction, state and private agencies do typically develop a
methodology for application, such as a set of procedures memorialized in
a statute, administrative regulation, or an agency policy manual.362 The
agencies intend from the outset to take a new approach with a large number
of people in a broad range of circumstances, expecting overall positive
results.363 Service providers are required to record outcomes in all cases,
compile aggregate data for the entire caseload of the local court or CPS
agency, and report the data to state-level agencies, which in turn compile

358

The Belmont Report, supra note 227, at Part A.
Id.
360
Id. at Part A n.2, Part A, Part C.
361
Systematic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. online). See generally The
Belmont Report, supra note 227; 45 C.F.R. § 46.102.
362
Bruce A.Thyer et al., Locating Research-Supported Interventions for Child
Welfare Practice. 34 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 85, 87 (2017).
363
Cf. id.
359
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state-wide figures and report them to a federal agency.364 National figures
are made available to the scientific community, for further analysis. 365
Policy makers routinely review, or solicit input from professionals who
routinely review, these compilations to learn what “works” and what does
not, in theory deciding whether to continue and grow a new approach
based on that information.366 Thus, if being non-systematic means acting
randomly and with myopic focus on single cases, or being oblivious to
outcomes, that is not the problem with these family preservation programs.
It is rather that the whole process is done very badly from a scientific
standpoint, and unethically.
In any event, it is somewhat ironic that federal regulations create
greater safeguards when innovation is undertaken in a more scientific
manner rather than haphazardly and with indifference to results.
Restrictions on research do in part protect patients from dangers intrinsic
to the kind of formal research that yields published results, such as breach
of confidentiality.367 But they also aim to protect persons from physical,
psychological, emotional, and dignitary harms that can equally well result
from trying untested therapies on individual patients in “practice.”368 The
research/practice distinction also partly reflects concern that danger of
such harms is greater when researchers have a motivation (e.g., knowledge
acquisition) other than just the wellbeing of patients. 369 Yet the Belmont
Report, after stating that the experimental nature of a treatment does not
render its application “research,” tellingly goes on to admonish:
Radically new procedures of this description should, however, be
made the object of formal research at an early stage in order to
determine whether they are safe and effective. Thus, it is the
responsibility of medical practice committees, for example, to insist
that a major innovation be incorporated into a formal research
project.370

Moreover, the Belmont Report takes the position that “if there is any
element of research in an activity,” including whenever research is

364

45 C.F.R. § 1355.
See Adoption & Foster Care Statistics, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/research-data-technology/statistics-research/afcars
[https://perma.cc/HNZ8-YXXK] (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
366
Id.
367
Katerberg, supra note 320, at 557.
368
Coleman, supra note 315, at 592.
369
See Yuan, supra note 258, at 50.
370
The Belmont Report, supra note 227, at Part A.
365
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designed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a therapy, then that activity
should undergo review for the protection of the human subjects.371
All this said, there must be a way to limit the scope of changes to
social service operations that are subject to pre-approval and other
safeguards attached to “research,” which add to their cost. The upshot of
the foregoing is that the law cannot rationally draw the line based on an
illusory conceptual distinction between research and innovative practice.
The vague concepts of systematic, design, and generalizable knowledge
fail as distinguishing characteristics. Also unhelpful is the Belmont
Report’s reference to “reasonable expectation of success,” as if
experimentation in a research context is commonly undertaken even when
that is absent.372
A more sensible alternative might be a measure of downside risk for
those on whom a new approach is tried, including both severity and
likelihood of any potential harm relative to available alternatives.373 If a
proposed approach is a substantial departure from prevailing practice or
from other treatments known to have acceptable results, and “risky” to a
degree that would make the ordinary competent patient wish for an
independent expert’s “second opinion” of its advisability, the service
provider arguably should have their plan subjected to pre-implementation
expert review. It is beyond this Article’s scope to flesh out a standard in
detail. I will simply suggest that “treatments” like placing babies to live
in prison for years or holding infants in provisional placements for years
with the intent eventually to disrupt whatever relationship they form,
should pass any plausible threshold of risk to wellbeing warranting the
protections now given to human-subject “research.” They entail “danger”
to psychological and emotional health and development within the
meaning of the federal statute governing DHHS funding of new programs.
As such, they should be subject to pre-implementation efficacy and ethics
review by an independent group of child-welfare experts, a process of
piloting and gradual extension dependent on documenting positive results,
and a meaningful proxy informed-consent requirement. Below is more
detail regarding each step.

371

Id.
Id.
373
Cf. Phoebe Friesen, et al., Rethinking the Belmont Report?, 17(7) AM. J.
BIOETHICS 15, 17, 19 (2017) (“[S]ome have argued that unique guidelines for
innovative practice are needed, especially since disadvantaged groups are particularly
at risk of being enrolled. . . . The boundaries around what requires oversight should be
defined pragmatically, so that … harms to participants are minimized. Oversight
should be required for any research or intervention involving novel, significant risks.
. . . Regulation ought to be proportionate to novelty and level of risk, rather than
derived from intent.”).
372
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i. Pre-Approval

If an unproven program for state response to parental dysfunction
(addiction, mental illness, mental disability, incarceration, etc.) is treated
as research and entails “more than minimal risk” of detriment to children,
it would need pre-approval by an entity with appropriate scientific
expertise independent of the program operator.374 That vetting authority
should also include in the process a representative for children.375
Approval would require convincing the approving entity that the new
program or practice promises an “anticipated benefit” for children and that
the “relation of the anticipated benefit to the risk is at least as favorable to
the subjects as that presented by available alternative approaches.”376
Reference to alternatives is crucial in connection with parental
dysfunction. The state’s aim when it assumes control of a child’s intimate
life, which it does in a parens patriae rather than police-power capacity,
should be to find the best for the child among all possible non-ideal
resolutions of a bad situation. 377 Yet the only alternative that participants
in child welfare policy typically contemplate is the existing or traditional
approach – that is, reacting after maltreatment has occurred by holding the
child in the limbo of foster care while trying to transform parents. As
Richard Gelles and others have documented, CPS social workers operate
with a parent-focused, never-give-up mentality. 378 Even in comparison
with this norm, though, it might be that some proposed innovations could
not pass the test – for example, if the only potential benefit that can be
substantiated is for parents and the innovations would only increase risk
of detriment to children, such as by further prolonging foster care (as some
FDCs have done) or by leaving children more often in the custody of highrisk parents (as with DR).
But treating novel family-preservation interventions as research
would have the additional effect, under these rules, of forcing state actors
to consider the full range of alternatives – in particular, the alternative of
placing immediately for adoption children whose parents have little
prospect of becoming adequate (reliable, safe, nurturing) caregivers within
374

Id.
This could be instead of or in addition to vetting by a child ombudsperson,
who might not have empirical training.
376
See also 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (“in seeking informed consent the following
information shall be provided to each subject or the legally authorized representative:
… disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if any, that
might be advantageous to the subject…”); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(4) (requiring
disclosure to research subjects of any alternative procedures or courses of treatment
that might be advantageous to the subject).
377
See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 195–200
(2006).
378
See GELLES, OUT OF HARM’S WAY, supra note 33, at 75–92.
375
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a time consistent with children’s developmental needs (which is shorter
with infants than with older children).379 Adoption is as a practical matter
– though not always as a legal matter – an available alternative for any
newborn or infant in the U.S., and also for a substantial portion of
somewhat older children in the maltreatment system.380 It is also available
as a legal matter in some cases even at the time of initial state response to
parental incapacity or a maltreatment report – that is, whenever CPS is not
required to undertake rehabilitative efforts.381 In other cases, it becomes
legally possible later (e.g., after the child has been in foster care
continuously for fifteen months) yet CPS does not even consider it because
it is implementing some new family-preservation program or policy, such
as FDC or kincare-prioritization.382 Treating that program or policy
change as research could force CPS to explain, with evidentiary basis, why
adoption is not a better option for many children, all things considered.
An alternative basis for approving “research involving greater than
minimal risk” to children is an IRB finding that the research is likely to
yield “generalizable knowledge” of sufficient value to outweigh the risk
to the children.383 Some new family-preservation programs could
conceivably satisfy that requirement, but most likely could not. Most
entail instability for many children during the crucial attachment stage of
development, making a tradeoff for new knowledge unacceptable.
Such balancing becomes irrelevant if a proper advocate is appointed
for children, and if the advocate (unlike a parent) is subject to the normal
obligations of an attorney or other fiduciary, which generally prohibit
“vicarious altruism” – that is, approving sacrifice of a ward’s interests to
benefit other persons or social causes.384 The advocates would have a duty
of loyalty that requires acting solely for the ward’s best interests, which
would mean refusing permission to inflict the innovation on children they
represent.385 Thus, treating new family-preservation programs as
experimentation or research subject to pre-approval would mean they
simply could not be undertaken with any children for whom the anticipated
benefit, taking into account probability, does not outweigh the downside
risk, relative to all available alternative ways of responding to their
predicament, including placing them for adoption.

379
Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment of
Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, supra note 38, at 415–35 (2008).
380
Id. at 408–09 (2008).
381
Id. at 437–48.
382
Id. at 437.
383
45 C.F.R. § 46.406.
384
See Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment
of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, supra note 38, at 411–12.
385
See Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary
Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993, 995 (2017).
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ii. Piloting

A proposed innovation that passes the test described above for
approving research should be piloted before widespread adoption. DHHS
should authorize only one or a few agencies in the country initially to try
an innovative approach to responding to parental incapacity or
maltreatment reports. The pilot programs should be subject to immediate
and rigorous study to determine at the earliest possible time whether
predicted benefits or feared costs have materialized, and the innovation
should not be expanded to other jurisdictions unless properly conducted
study of the pilot programs shows positive results for the children
involved. Expanding only in stages, as with pharmaceutical clinical trials,
would guard against the possibility that the first trial was unrepresentative
– for example, because a program received extraordinary state attention
and funding unlikely to continue or to be replicated elsewhere. At any
point when it becomes apparent that measured outcomes for children are
or will be negative, their advocates should refuse continuation of their
clients’ (i.e., the children’s) participation.
Given that some innovations have already been introduced and
proliferated despite lack of valid study confirming their net benefit, some
retrospective work is also required.386 Practices that should still be
considered experimental and untested, such as prison nurseries, should
spread no further until properly examined. Those that persist despite
robust research disproving their promise, such as DR, should be halted; if
no other means is feasible, this could occur by LARs for children refusing
consent to their participation, as discussed below.
iii. Legitimizing Participation

Any implementation of novel CPS policy subject to TCR should treat
children as subjects. If the agency is viewed as the investigator, this
requires no alteration of the existing definition; CPS is required to collect
information about each child reported for maltreatment or in its custody. 387
Even if a new policy involves avoiding or relinquishing custody, by
leaving children with parents or non-foster-care relatives, at the point of
choosing to do that social workers act upon the child and make a record of
having done so.
CPS should not be able to avoid this implication – that children are
“subjects” to whom protections apply – including a proxy consent
requirement, by themselves opting to be indifferent to a new policy’s or
program’s effects on children. TCR should be amended to broaden
“subject” to encompass any persons substantially impacted by research
386
387

See supra Section IV-A.
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 67.
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interventions. Leading medical-research ethicists have noted the absurd
implications of the existing conception, dependent on researcher
interest.388 Holly Fernandez Lynch, for example, hypothesizes a study of
a new cure for HIV, asking persons with HIV to stop taking current
medication that keeps it under control. 389 That makes patients’ viral levels
skyrocket, which endangers any intimate partner they have. Yet if the
researchers are interested only in the patients and ignore the partners, the
latter are bystanders under current regulations and need not be informed
or give consent. Any harm they incur would be a proximate result of the
patients’ autonomous choice, so they would also have no ex post recourse
against the researchers.
Illustrations are possible in many areas of life. Imagine researchers
interested in whether – and in what percentage of – cases exposing
COVID-vaccinated children who attend public school to live COVID
virus has any adverse impact on them. The researchers undertake this
experiment knowing vaccinated children, even if not themselves adversely
affected by exposure, could be carriers, and they know there are some
children in every school not vaccinated. Yet the researchers have no
interest in any “secondary” effect of the virus exposure – that is,
transmission of disease to unvaccinated children. Then the unvaccinated
children are not subjects, and consent on their behalf is not required for
this test. Neither they, nor their parents, need be informed, at least not by
virtue of rules governing research. A non-medical example: imagine a
government authorizing location of a pollution-spewing factory in the
midst of a residential community, wanting to test the spatial limits of
human impact.390 The researchers hired by government ignore residents
within a half mile, knowing they are doomed, and start at the half mile
mark, moving outward till they find people showing no adverse effects.
Those examined, including those for whom there is no effect, are subjects,

See, e.g., Eyal, supra note 303, at 941 (“it is preposterous that neither the IRB
nor any other entity is currently tasked legally to protect [bystanders] against, e.g.,
study-borne infections”); Lynch, Minimal or reasonable? Considering the ethical
threshold for research risks to nonconsenting bystanders and implications for
nonconsenting participants, supra note 207, at 923–32.
389
Id. at 923; see also id. at 928 (“when the risks look similar, it seems
inadequate to justify differential treatment based simply on the fact that researchers
directly intervene upon or interact with participants, or use their identifiable
information, whereas they do not with bystanders”); Ivan Glenn Cohen, Organ Donor
Intervention Trials and Risk to Bystanders: An Ethical Analysis, 16 CLINICAL TRIALS
463, 464 (2019).
390
See, e.g., Jim Salter, The Army Sprayed St. Louis With Toxic Aerosol During
A
Just
Revealed
1950s
Test,
INSIDER
(Oct.
4,
2012),
https://www.businessinsider.com/army-sprayed-st-louis-with-toxic-dust-2012-10
[https://perma.cc/6777-HA4G].
388
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but the definitely-doomed are bystanders who receive no ex ante
protection from research rules.
There must be some threshold of significance, of course, beyond
which impact triggers the protections owed a research subject. In the
context of child welfare policy, any experimentation in state response to
maltreatment reports that affects decision making regarding children’s
residence (e.g., parents’ home vs. foster care) or legal relationships (e.g.,
fast-track TPR vs. normal timeline vs. extended timeline) should treat
children as subjects and directly examine the effect on them. Even when
handling of children is driven by parent-focused objectives (e.g., extension
of foster-care timelines so long as parents remain engaged in FDC
services), the impact on the children can be great, indeed commonly more
dramatic than impact on parents.391 These decisions can determine
whether a child has an opportunity for a flourishing future life or instead
suffers attachment failure or even severe permanent neurological damage
or early death. And whereas in medicine there is generally testing on nonhuman animals first before application of a new intervention to humans
(eliminating much uncertainty about what the effects will be on humans),
with family-preservation innovations children are the involuntary guinea
pigs.392 One implication of treating them as research subjects would be
that, both for purposes of undertaking the experiment and of studying the
results, program administrators or researchers should not include any
family unless a reliable (explained below) proxy for the children gives
consent.
iv. Concerns

If this view were generalized to all new human-services programs, it
would seem far too broad a rule, potentially subjecting every modification
of practices by any of thousands of public or private agencies to additional
oversight procedures and substantive conditions. This could be crippling,
or at least stifling and too costly.393
Public agencies generally are, however, already subject to procedures
for pre-adoption review of proposed substantial changes in policy and
practice, under the federal Administrative Procedure Act or one of its state
analogues, so the proposals here are mostly about making those procedures

391
Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment of
Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, supra note 38, at 415–34.
392
Aysha Akhtar, The Flaws and Human Harms of Animal Experimentation, 24
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 407, 409 (2015).
393
Cf. Emily A. Largent et al., Patient-Centered Outcomes Research:
Stakeholder Perspectives and Ethical and Regulatory Oversight Issues, 40 IRB:
ETHICS & HUMAN RSCH. 1, 7 (2018) (showing that IRB oversight can be a deterrent to
research participants as well as to researchers).
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more effective.394 Indeed, most programs discussed in Part II should have
gone through public comment in state legislatures, when authorizing
legislation was considered, and/or in the state’s social services agency.
The marginal cost of impact studies and ombudsperson and/or
clearinghouse review should be modest. The review would naturally take
into account the degree of effects that the impact study reveals; the
approval process would be less demanding with low-impact changes to
agency practice. The APA, by analogy, presumptively requires noticeand-comment regarding any proposed change in regulation but contains a
good-cause exception applicable to “situations in which the administrative
rule is a routine determination, insignificant in nature and impact, and
inconsequential to the industry to and to the public.”395 An agency must
explain an invocation of the good-cause exception, and courts can override
the agency’s judgment if someone challenges it.396 A substantial number
of court rulings have addressed the bounds of that exception.397 A standard
for waiving the research-protocol requirement could piggyback on that
doctrine.
Ethicists have expressed additional worries, even within medicine,
about transforming innovative treatments into research projects.398 It
could mean injecting into decision-making about individual care the
utilitarian aims of research. Laakmann writes:
Transforming an individual from a patient into a research subject
fundamentally alters her role in the medical decision-making process
and the goals of the intervention. By enrolling in a randomized clinical
trial, an individual forfeits decisional autonomy over her ultimate
treatment course. And while the goal of a medical intervention in the
treatment setting is to further the patient’s interests, the goal in the
research setting is to expand generalizable knowledge, with the
individual subject’s interests acting as a side constraint. It is not
desirable to compel every individual to accept these conditions in
exchange for the opportunity to explore innovative therapies.399

394

See 5 U.S.C. § 551; Summary of the Administrative Procedure Act, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-administrative-procedure-act
[https://perma.cc/RBS8-QFGF] (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
395
See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d
95, 114 (2d Cir. 2018).
396
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).
397
See, e.g., N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755,
768 (4th Cir. 2012); Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 746 (2d Cir. 1995); Riverbend
Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).
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See, e.g., Laakmann, supra note 257, at 944.
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Laakmann, supra note 257, at 916–17; see also ALEX JOHN LONDON, FOR
THE COMMON GOOD: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH ETHICS ch. V
(2021).
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In the social services realm, we might worry that those studying a
new program will push for completion of a piloted intervention even when
it appears to be going poorly for some vulnerable persons, in order to have
fuller information about program effects and a publishable paper.
However, consent to participation, whether direct or by proxy, need
not entail commitment to remain in the trial even if at some point it appears
contrary to a person’s wellbeing.400 Participants should at all times retain
the right to exit. Explicitly treating the program as experimental might
signal to advocates for vulnerable persons that they should be vigilant and
that exit is possible. In addition, in child protection, agency case workers
currently are not focusing exclusively on children’s interests in the way
we assume physicians are focused exclusively on their patients’
interests.401 Case workers generally manifest great sympathy for and
dedication to parents and are hardly accountable to children.402 Thus, the
oversight that research provides is likely to increase rather than diminish
attention to children’s needs, at least if researchers are required directly to
measure child welfare outcomes and not, for example, simply surveying
parents about their satisfaction. That said, something less elaborate than
the clinical trial model might suffice in many situations, so long as it
includes informed consent by an independent advocate for nonautonomous participants and/or a judgment by a body of experts in the
field, such as a clearinghouse, that the claims made in support of a
proposed new program have an adequate evidentiary basis.403
The additional requirement of piloting any new program before
widespread adoption would be new for many agency practices, but starting
out small should not increase public costs greatly, or at all if this more
rational – rather than scattershot – approach attracts more private
foundation support or prevents expenditures on efforts that must later be
abandoned (as with IFPS or DR training in jurisdictions that retreated from
it).

400
Cf. Holly Fernandez Lynch, The Right to Withdraw from Controlled Human
Infection Studies: Justification and Avoidance, 34 BIOETHICS 833 (2020).
401
See, e.g., Harry Ferguson, How Children Become Invisible in Child
Protection Work: Findings from Research into Day-to-Day Social Work Practice, 47
BRITISH J. SOC. WORK 1007 (2017).
402
See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, In a Year, Child-Protective Services Checked
Up on 3.2 Million Children, THE ATLANTIC (July 22, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/07/in-a-year-child-protectiveservices-conducted-32-million-investigations/374809/
[https://perma.cc/SQ53HKJA].
403
Cf. Laakmann, supra note 257, at 917 (“Special private boards of medical
experts could be set up to evaluate the potential risks and benefits of innovative
treatments, much like institutional review boards (IRBs) currently evaluate proposed
research protocols.”).
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B. Minimizing the Prevalence and Influence of Bad Research
If additional institutional constraints of the sort proposed above are
inherently insufficient or politically improbable, indirect protection for
social-service recipients could come from injecting greater discipline and
objectivity into the research that inspires or is invoked to support
experimentation. Social scientists with personal political or ideological
biases and illicit motivations will continue to exist and conduct research
no matter what regulations anyone imposes, but there might be ways to
lessen their opportunities or influence or to induce improved work.

1. Treat all Substantially-Impacted Persons as Subjects
TCR should be amended to require that any study of social service
innovations having a foreseeable, substantial impact on non-autonomous
persons treat those persons as research subjects. Such impacts would
include perpetuation and proliferation of the innovations by appearing to
provide proof of positive results. Treating the non-autonomous persons as
subjects because of the impact would trigger all TCR protections for
human research participants, regardless of whether researchers actually
collect information about them.404 Even if the innovation itself is not
treated as experimentation that must occur within a research setting, as
recommended above, so that informed consent to the intervention itself on
behalf of those persons would not be required, treating persons
substantially impacted by the innovation as subjects of any study of the
innovation would provide some safeguard against the danger that bad
research will support innovations detrimental to those persons and/or
others in their category.405 Making IRB approval and informed consent by
a proxy for those persons prerequisite to conducting the study (as opposed
to the intervention) would provide some check on bad design, conflicts of
interest, and the influence of major foundations with ideological
commitments to purposes other than the welfare of those non-autonomous
persons. In child welfare, this would counteract the tendency of
researchers to ignore the impact of new programs on child welfare even
though the programs exist in the world known as “child welfare.”
IRB review is no panacea, to be sure, especially regarding protection
of vulnerable persons. Current IRB practice incurs criticism of many
kinds,406 but I suggest reasons below for greater faith in the process after
404

45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–.124.
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004
SUP. CT. REV. 271, 293 (2004).
406
See, e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, The New Common Rule Corrects an Old
Misunderstanding: Journalistic Investigation, Biographical Interviewing, Legal
Research, and Creative and Historical Writing Focusing on Specific People Are Not
“Research” “Involving Human Subjects” Requiring IRB Approval, 44 SETON HALL
405
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amending its mission. In addition, as explained below, if those providing
proxy consent have special training, they might act to enhance the process.
There would essentially be two stages of substantive study review. First,
researchers must convince an IRB that the research design is sound and
that they are objective and disinterested scientists. Second, they must
convince representatives for children that they should consent to
participation, and that proxy consent should also take into account the
soundness of study design and the objectivity of the researchers.

2. Mandate Consideration of Impact on Non-autonomous Persons
TCR could mandate that all studies of social service programs
substantially impacting non-autonomous persons examine effects on those
persons, unless and until good research has conclusively established the
effects are positive.
Considering again the analogies above to
experimentation with new HIV treatments, COVID exposure with
vaccinated children, and polluting factories, there are clear reasons to
insist on research attention to the impact on those whose wellbeing is at
greatest risk.407 This is particularly so when those persons are incapable
of objecting and when researchers have manifested a tendency to treat
those persons as bystanders for informed consent purposes but then claim
to derive findings about impact on them based on facts that do not actually
support such findings, as has been the case with much research in realm of
parent dysfunction, as detailed in Part II.
At some point, it might become superfluous to study certain effects
yet again, but the history described in Part II of quick proliferation and
later abandonment of family-preservation strategies suggests that in the
early years of a new program, the danger is too great that scientificallyLEGIS. J. 253, 254–56 (2020) (contending that IRBs are over-reaching and unduly
restrictive); Sabriya Rice, Policing the Ethics Police: Research Review Boards Face
Scrutiny as Feds Propose New Rules, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Dec. 1015) (“Critics
say studies with serious design flaws that could lead to unethical practices or
participant harm continue to win approval because IRBs are too lax, have unqualified
members, are riddled with institutional and personal conflicts of interest, and are
overwhelmed by the volume of studies they must review.”); Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 817 (2001) (“IRBs, are, primarily, in-house organs.
In our view, they are not designed, generally, to be sufficiently objective in the sense
that they are as sufficiently concerned with the ethicality of the experiments they
review as they are with the success of the experiments. … Here, the IRB, whose
primary function was to insure safety and compliance with applicable regulations,
encouraged the researchers to misrepresent the purpose of the research in order to
bring the study under the label of “therapeutic” and thus under a lower safety standard
of regulation. The IRB’s purpose was ethically wrong, and its understanding of the
experiment’s benefit incorrect. The conflicts are inherent. This would be especially so
when science and private industry collaborate in search of material gains.”).
407
See discussion supra note 390 and accompanying text.
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unsophisticated actors in the legal system and in advocacy organizations
will seize on a positive report about any feature of the program (e.g., parent
satisfaction, fewer days spent in foster care) as a basis for making blanket
assertions or conclusions about the beneficial nature of the programs. They
should be less likely to mischaracterize something as a child-welfare
outcome, or to focus on something other than child welfare as a basis for
assessing whether an intervention is beneficial, if a study report directly
addresses effects that truly are about children’s wellbeing.
This prescription would mean increased scrutiny of vulnerable
populations, which can itself pose hazards for them. The intrusion in their
lives will naturally be greater the more directly and thoroughly researchers
examine their situation and condition. Simply inspecting agency records
– for example, CPS records of subsequent maltreatment reports following
reunification – is non-intrusive in a physical sense, but that is likely to be
too partial or indirect a means of assessing wellbeing.408 For example,
because much maltreatment goes unreported and a child’s wellbeing might
suffer considerably even if parental conduct does not rise to the level of
maltreatment under state law,409 CPS records of substantiated reports are
an incomplete measure of child wellbeing. Ideally, researchers would
assess children’s attachment status, mental health, physical condition,
behavioral self-regulation, school performance, etc. Some of that they
might determine by looking at assessments others have done, such as the
children’s psychologists or caseworkers, but sometimes no one will be
paying attention to the children’s condition, or those who are might be
unwilling or legally unable to share information. Given that children are
being impacted by the programs, though, the cost of any increased scrutiny
seems justified in light of the potential harms that could befall them as a
result of the programs themselves. If this mandate poses such an obstacle
that some studies are never done, that might not be a bad thing; a bad or
misused study is often worse than no study at all.

3. Rigorous Review of Study Design Before Approval
IRBs should be explicitly tasked with review of research design, no
longer limiting their vision to protection of subjects’ privacy and comfort

408

Howard Dubowitz, Neglect in Children, 42 PEDIATRIC ANN. 73, 73 (2013).
Emotional neglect by itself, for example, is unlikely to be reported to CPS or,
if reported to CPS, to be treated by the intake officer as warranting any agency
response. See Samantha Jacobson, The Impact of Parental Narcissistic Personality
Disorder on Children and Why Legal Intervention Is Warranted, 24 CARDOZO J.
EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 315, 336–37 (2018) (describing focus of child protection
law and process on physical harms).
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in the research setting.410 Research designs vary considerably by
discipline and sub-discipline, but IRBs typically have members from
multiple disciplines, and anecdotal evidence of thick-headedness in some
IRBs is insufficient to negate the intuition that scientists generally will be
a) respectful of work in disciplines other than their own, and b) capable of
assessing design of studies similar to those done in their field when done
in different substantive areas.411 The methodological flaws Part II
identified should, for the most part, be readily identifiable by scientists in
many fields other than sociology or social work. Indeed, one need not be
a trained researcher at all to spot some defects, such as selection bias or
mischaracterization of outcomes.
To motivate IRBs to approach this new task with rigor, some shaming
strategies could be adopted – for example, requiring all reports of studies
governed by TCR or a state analogue to indicate whether an IRB approved
the study and, if so, at which institution. Readers could then report any
unwarranted failure to seek approval and call attention to any particular
IRB’s poor judgment. This might have some reputational effect on the
university or other research institution, sufficient to cause the
administration to clamp down, and it might also incentivize individual IRB
members concerned about their personal reputation. If a further step were
needed, names of the members, or at least the chair, of the IRB that gave
approval might be mandatorily included in research reports. This publicity
would be financially costless. It would, of course, make people more
averse to serving on IRBs, but institutions can be incentivized to make this
a job expectation along with other unpleasant forms of service that could
be subject to public scrutiny. One might also worry that these changes
would make IRBs too risk averse, too inclined to reject proposals (to the
detriment of scientific knowledge) but that too could be counter-acted by
adjustments to the incentive structure – for example, offering financial
rewards for helping a research team develop a proposal truly worthy of
approval, or requiring IRBs to publish their reasons for rejecting a project.
Persons with experience serving on and seeking approval from IRBs can
assist in refining such ideas; the intent here is to start a conversation.
Ideally, every IRB evaluating a proposal to study social services for
a vulnerable population, such as children, should contain an advocate for
410
The federal government considered including this mandate from the outset,
during deliberations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and decided not to do so simply
because of protests by researchers, as a sort of compromise. See SCHRAG, supra note
1, at 70–71. In recent years, the government’s challenge is to resist social scientists’
call to eliminate IRB review altogether. See NAT’L RSCH COUNCIL, PROPOSED
REVISIONS TO THE COMMON RULE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN THE
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 4 (2014).
411
Frequently Asked Questions About Institutional Review Boards, AM. PSYCH.
ASS’N,
https://www.apa.org/advocacy/research/defending-research/review-boards
[https://perma.cc/ND3D-EJMC] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
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that population – just as federal law requires a prison advocate on IRBs
reviewing prison research.412 That person should be familiar with all
protections for that population in TCR at the time. There might not be
enough such advocates capable of detecting problematic research design,
so it is worth exploring the alternative of requiring all IRBs to send out
proposals for such research to the larger scientific community, soliciting
expert input and perhaps offering compensation. They might use either a
list of professional researchers around the country who have expressed
interest or a clearinghouse. Though Part II cast doubt on the competence
or objectivity of many social scientists, it also cited the excellent work of
many people who have devoted time to debunking the bad research. Those
better people in the field might be expected to pay attention to notices of
new study proposals and to prefer identifying problems with proposals
before they receive approval.
Substantively, IRBs might push social scientists to be more attentive
to the possibility of randomization. A common design flaw that Part II
identified, in addition to ignoring impact on non-autonomous persons who
are most at risk, is selection bias.413 With pharmaceuticals, randomization
and double-blinding are usually required. In contrast, very few studies
done in the child welfare field to date have involved random assignment,
and propensity score matching is either not attempted or not done
sufficiently well to generate confidence in conclusions.414 Selection bias
consistently distorts results in a direction supportive of adult rights.415 It
is commonly supposed that randomization is infeasible with research on
behavioral interventions or other social services,416 but it might be feasible
in more situations than supposed, and when random assignment is feasible

45 C.F.R. § 46.304(b) (“At least one member of the Board shall be a prisoner,
or a prisoner representative with appropriate background and experience to serve in
that capacity . . . .”).
413
See discussion supra Part II.
414
JAMES BELL ASSOCS., EVALUATION BRIEF: CONDUCTING RANDOMIZED
CONTROLLED TRIAL IN CHILD WELFARE PRACTICE SETTINGS: CHALLENGE AND
SOLUTIONS
2
(Nov.
2013),
https://www.jbassoc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Conducting-RCTs-Child-Welfare.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WHK8-WJG5]; see Mark Chaffin, A Statewide Trial of the SafeCare
Home-based Services Model With Parents in Child Protective Series, 129 PEDIATRICS
3, 509 (Mar. 2012).
415
Julia H. Littell, Client Participation and Outcomes of Intensive Family
Preservation Services, National Association of Social Workers, 103, 105 (2001).
416
See Underhill, supra note 7, at 182 (“Despite the advantages of
randomization, there is often resistance to using this methodological tool. This
reluctance often reflects strong normative commitments in favor of (or against) a
policy choice--namely, the belief that it would be inequitable to withhold a presumed
benefit from one group (or to inflict a presumed harm on one group) on the basis of
chance.”).
412
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and ethical it should be encouraged.417 For example, to study a prison
nursery’s impact on criminal recidivism, a program could randomly admit
only a subset of all women who apply and qualify. The study could then
compare long-term recidivism for women who were admitted (including
any who drop out or are expelled) and those who were not. This should
give lawmakers a more accurate basis for determining whether prison
nurseries serve that state interest, as proponents claim.

4. Expand the Concept of Conflict of Interests
TCR also should direct IRBs to look for threats to objectivity beyond
just obvious financial conflicts. Studying a program one operates or
materially supports should be considered a conflict and at a minimum fully
disclosed. On the program side, states instituting innovations should
commission independent research – that is, study by people with no
existing involvement.
In addition, IRBs should be attentive to funding sources for proposed
research.418 Subjective assessment of particular foundations as biased
could be problematic, but IRBs might be directed to inquire into
communications the research team has had with the funders, to see if any
outcome expectations were conveyed. TCR might require researchers to
report any pressure from funding sources to suppress or distort results after
a study is completed. Substantial internal sanctions for non-disclosure
might be needed. If institutions keep records of concerns surrounding
particular funding sources or particular researchers, IRBs can take them
into account in assessing new proposals, creating a disincentive for
researchers to flirt with foundations known to generate corrupt research.

5. Reduce the Influence of Large Funding Sources
Elizabeth Bartholet observes: “It is extremely dangerous to have one
set of wealthy, private players dominating both policy advocacy and
research to the degree that they [the Casey Alliance] have. …
[F]undamental change in the dynamics of child welfare research is needed

417
Cf. Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Overcoming Obstacles to Experiments in
Legal Practice, 367 SCIENCE 6482, 1078 (Mar. 6, 2020) (urging use of randomized
controlled trials to assess the merits of innovative approaches to legal-service
provision); Douglas Mackay, Government Policy Experiments and the Ethics of
Randomnization, 48 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 319, 321 (2020) (concluding that “random
assignment is permissible when the social science community occupies a state of
uncertainty regarding the interventions under study”).
418
Cf. Underhill, supra note 7, at 184 (“Ensuring that studies are done by a party
without a stake in the results is an important priority”).
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if history is not endlessly to repeat itself.”419 A possible structural fix to
this problem would be to create a wall between advocacy and research.
Rules might be adopted prohibiting grant providers from funding research
on programs they have themselves promoted in the lobbying branch of
their organization, or perhaps going even farther to prohibit organizations
that do any advocacy work from funding research in the field. Of course,
the rules would need to counteract any efforts to subvert them by corporate
redirection or restructuring. These would bear some resemblance to rules
precluding entities that engage in lobbying from claiming charitable tax
status; those same entities would also be precluded from funding scientific
research on the programs for which they lobby. This could alternatively
be addressed via IRB review, making conflict of interest on the part of a
funding institution a basis for rejecting a study proposal.
Independently of the problem of mixing advocacy and research, it is
dangerous for any single source of funding to dominate a field, to such a
degree that it is able to dictate to a large extent what gets researched and
by whom. Yet it is unclear that monopolizing any research field runs afoul
of any existing law, regulation, or ethical guideline. It might be difficult
to craft a rule that fairly but effectively addresses the concern, but the
federal government could encourage states to adopt practices that lessen
the problem. Congress could condition some pertinent funding stream on
states’ themselves funding study by an independent evaluator of any pilot
program they initiate. Or on states’ giving access for testing of program
outcomes to two or more research teams with different funding sources.420
Or federal law could require DHHS approval before programs move
beyond the pilot stage, just as the FDA must approve the progress of new
drugs from one stage of trials to the next.421 And it could direct DHHS to
subject any research that has been done on a pilot program to rigorous
scrutiny, inviting other experts in the field to assess its design quality and
the soundness of the analysis, before DHHS decides whether to rely on it.

6. Rationalizing Consent to Participation in Research
The best fix for the coercive environment in which parents and other
vulnerable adults consent to research in the social services field might be
education of IRBs, so they appreciate that “subjects who are vulnerable to
coercion or undue influence” include: (1) anyone vulnerable to serious
legal or financial consequences, at the discretion of authorities supporting
the study, should they appear uncooperative, and (2) most CPS-involved
419

Bartholet, Differential Response: A Dangerous Experiment in Child Welfare,
supra note 35, at 638–39.
420
Cf. Underhill, supra note 7, at 185 (discussing example of this in federal
oversight of state Medicaid programs).
421
Development & Approval Process, supra note 28.
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adults, because they have “impaired decision-making capacity” and/or are
“economically or educationally disadvantaged persons,” which might also
be true of many persons immersed in other social service programs, such
as welfare benefits.422 IRBs should scrutinize more closely anything to
which these adults consent.
Lastly, TRC must be amended to direct that in any situation when
parents do not have physical custody of a child, including a) whenever a
child is in foster care or in the custody of relatives following a
maltreatment report or b) whenever parental custody is in issue because of
a maltreatment report, experimental programs and research cannot involve
the children at issue absent proxy consent by an independent LAR. And
that LAR must be someone who is neither a parent nor any other relative
of the child, and who has some expertise in the child welfare system at
issue. It makes a mockery of the informed-consent requirement, in the
case of non-autonomous persons, to rely on agreement by family members
with strong interests potentially adverse to those of those persons. IRBs
should also ensure LARs are fully informed about the nature of the
intervention, the full range of alternative treatments or legal options
available, and the design of the study.

VI. CONCLUSION
Child welfare is just one area of social services where ideology or
other illicit motives can drive innovation and research to the detriment of
vulnerable persons. Similar problems might be found in housing of
mentally disabled adults, rehabilitation of prisoners and delinquent
juveniles, policing, welfare benefits, treatment of illegal immigrants, and
innumerable other fields. The harm to society lies not just in falling short
of the truth, but also in the damage done to human lives by government
actors who adopt policies and practices as a result of bad research. This
harm is ample reason to hold a national conversation about minimizing
bad social science and ill-advised programmatic innovation. This Article
has aimed to start that conversation.
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45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3).

